OPERATION JUBILEE - THE DIEPPE RAID - 19 August 1942
(as seen from a German perspective)

 


The Dieppe Raid, also known as the Battle of Dieppe, Operation Rutter and, later, Operation Jubilee, was an Allied attack on the German-occupied port of Dieppe during the Second World War. The raid took place on the northern coast of France on 19 August 1942. The assault began at 5:00 a.m. and by 10:50 a.m. the Allied commanders were forced to call a retreat. Over 6,000 infantrymen, predominantly Canadian, were supported by a Canadian Armoured regiment and a strong force of Royal Navy and smaller Royal Air Force landing contingents. It involved 5,000 Canadians, 1,000 British troops, and 50 United States Army Rangers.
Objectives included seizing and holding a major port for a short period, both to prove that it was possible and to gather intelligence. Upon retreat, the Allies also wanted to destroy coastal defences, port structures and all strategic buildings. The raid had the added objectives of boosting morale and demonstrating the firm commitment of the United Kingdom to open a western front in Europe.
Virtually none of these objectives were met. Allied fire support was grossly inadequate and the raiding force was largely trapped on the beach by obstacles and German fire. After less than 10 hours since the first landings, the last Allied troops had all been either killed, evacuated, or left behind to be captured by the Germans. Instead of a demonstration of resolve, the bloody fiasco showed the world that the Allies could not hope to invade France for a long time. Some intelligence successes were achieved, including electronic intelligence.
A total of 3,623 of the 6,086 men (almost 60%) who made it ashore were either killed, wounded, or captured. The Royal Air Force failed to lure the Luftwaffe into open battle, and lost 96 aircraft (at least 32 to flak or accidents), compared to 48 lost by the Luftwaffe. The Royal Navy lost 33 landing craft and one destroyer. The events at Dieppe influenced preparations for the North African (Operation Torch) and Normandy landings (Operation Overlord).

Contens of this page:


1. After-action report by the LXXXI Armeekorps (25 August 1942)
1a.Ic intelligence report by the LXXXI Armeekorps (22 August 1942) (= Anlage to 1 above)(enemy plans on the basis of captured orders)
2. After-action report by the 302 Infanteriedivision  (25 August 1942)
3. Chronological overview of the battle and its aftermath from a German point of view
4. Grundlegende Bemerkungen OBWest Nr. 10 (die Abschlusserfahrungen über das Zerschlagen des feindl. Landungsversuches bei Dieppe)
(13 September 1942)
5. Documents from the Kriegsmarine (report by the Kommandierenden Admiral Frankreich to the Marinegruppenkommando West (20 August 1942), list of Kriegsmarine casualties, short comment by the Marinebefehslaber after his visit to Dieppe on 20 August 1942, strength of navy personnel in Dieppe), Report by the Hafenkommandant Dieppe on combat actions on 19 August)


1. After-action report by the LXXXI Armeekorps (25 August 1942)


I. Own organisation and deployment

The deployment of the 302 Infanteriedivision was determined by the 70-km wide divisional sector and the nature of the coastline, with high cliffs and numerous samm beach exits cutting through the cliffs. This resulted in the absence of a continuous line of defence, but rather a concentrated defence in the ports. It had been a deliberate decision not to use the weak available forces to defend every gorge or ravine. This way it could not be prevented that special commando units landed and achieved local successes in Berneval and Varangeville. Defensive strength was concentrated in an around the ports in order to be able to repulse an attack from the sea of the land in these locations. Strong and mobile reserve had also been planned to come to the rescue of specific strongpoints and strongpoint areas, but also to launch a large-scale counterattack against a large-scale invasion., be it by seaborne or airborne forces or both.
In the Stützpunktbereich Dieppe itself the following forces were deployed on 19 August 1942:
  • 1 Infanterieregimentsstab (IR 571) mit 2 Infanteriebataillonen, Stab Pionierbataillon und 2 Pionierkompanien
  • 8 Landeabwehrgeschütze und 3 4,7cm Pak, von Infanterie bedient
  • III/AR 302 mit 2 Batterien leichte Feldhaubitze und 2 Gerätebatterien
  • Stellungsbatterie (Küste) 265 (schwere Feldhaubitze)
  • 1 schwere Flakbatterie (7.5cm), 1 Flakzug (5cm), 1 Flakzug (3.7cm) und 2 Flakzüge (2cm)
  • +/- 200 Mann verschiedener Marineformationen
  • 60 Mann Polizei
  • 1 Versuchskompanie von 60 Mann

The corps reserve consisted of:

  • Regimentstab IR 676 (Doudeville)
  • I/IR 676 um Héricourt
  • II/IR 676 um Yvetot
  • III/IR 676 um Bacqueville
  • Panzerkompanie 81 in Yvetot

This deployment showed itself to be effective on 19 August. The artillery batallion of the corps reserve (I/AR 332) was engaged in coastal defence near Fécamp and deployed from there.

II. The allied attack plan (from a German perspective)

The objective of the operation (as shown by the detailed captured plans) was to launch 2 commando units (250 and 300 men) at Berneval and Varangeville in order to put the two Heeresküstenbatterien there out of action, so that these would not be able to fire at the time of the landing and that of the retreat. The main objective was to be reached by 7 batallions, supported by special troops and an armoured batallion (58 tanks) in the Stützpunktbereich Dieppe itself.

2 batallions (in two waves) were to land at Puys. One part of this unit was to attack the AA-defences at Camp de Romain, so take an easterly direction after landing. Another part was to enter Puys and attack all the AA-positions along the coastal road leading from Puys to Dieppe. The remainder of this unit was to move from Puys in a southerly direction and attack the position of Batterie A (Gerätebatterie) at the Neuville crossroads and take the Dieppe power station, which was to be blown up by a special engineer unit.

1 batallion was to land near Dieppe directly west of the port, with the right wing at the Rue Duquesne. This unit was tasked with taking the rear port and the Becken von Kanada and to push as far as the horse-racing track and prepare this location as a makeshift airfield. At the same time the destroyer Locust and another ship (Chasseurs) were to enter the port.

2 batallions, supported by tanks, were to land on the Dieppe beach, west of the Rue Duquesne. One part of this unit was to attack the western heights west of the casino in the direction of the coastal road leading to Pourville and to mop up the headquarters there. Another part of this unit was to take the city itself and take the AA-position and the position of the Gerätebatterie B at the main road leading to Le Havre. The remainder of both batallions was to push beyond the main road to Rouen to the headquarters of the Pionierbataillon at the southern edge of the city and establish contact with the left batallion near the AA-positions east of the Pioniergefechtsstand.

A sixth batallion was to land at Pourville and, with one company, roll up the AA and air force positions along the coastal road to Dieppe. The second company was to attack the farm 4 Ventes on the eastern bank of the Scie river. The third company was to push through to the southern edge of Pourville on the western bank of the Scie. The fourth company was to move east along the coastal heights to take the MG-positions there.

The seventh batallion was also to land at Pourville (second wave) and was to push forward to the southwest on the western bank of the Scie towards the St-Aubin airfield, from there on turn northeast to take the position of Batterie 265 north of Arques-la-Bataille and to push forward right until Arques, where the divisional headquarters were suspected.

 

It is unclear whether further follow-on forces were to land. It is possible that a convoy of 26 large ships leaving Portsmouth towards noon, which turned back later, constituted the second wave. Indeed, numerous prisoners talked about backup from 5pm onwards and relief.

The allies had excellent map material as well as photographic images. However, it could not be concluded that local espionage networks had worked will, since the regimental headquarters were not known. The divisional headquarters were also mistakenly suspected at Arques-la-Bataille. Finally, the division was assmed to be the 110th division.

 

III. Chronology

 

A. At sea

 

Towards 5am the approaching allies ran into a German convoy some 20km off Dieppe. A short firefight ensued, thus alerting the entire coastal defence. While it was still being resolved whose side the naval units off Dieppe were on, heavy air attacks began on positions near and on either side of Dieppe. While these air attacks were still ongoing, large numbers of landing boats emerged from a part natural, part artificial mist. This mist made it impossible for the own artillery to fire at these landing boats while still at sea, which could only target the landig craft on the beach. But even here the mist greatly reduced visibility.

 

B. East of Dieppe

 

East of Dieppe the opponent had landed in the Schlucht near Berneval, presumably with a strength of 250 man, with the mission of taking and destroying the position of the Heeresküstenbatterie 2/770. The enemy soldiers succeeded in climbing the rock faces and thus to avoid the minefields present only in the gorges/ravines. The battery sent an officer and an MG-recce troop to the Berneval Schlucht, who taal part in the defence. The battery repulsed uncoordinated attacks, sometimes by direct close-range artillery fire, with MG and rifle fire, supported by a Heeresflakzug; The adjacent Sondergerät  of the Luftwaffe - with an strength of more than  100 men, was also attacked, albeit weakly, and also repulsed all attacks, sometimes at close ranges.

As soon as the attack had been identified, the 302 Infanteriedivision had ordered the commander of the Panzerjägerabteilung 302, Major von Blücher, with the Radfahrschwadron in St-Nicolas and the subordinated 3. Pionierkompanie in Arques-la-Bataille, to counterattack towards Berneval. Later, the 3/IR 572, which had been directed towards St-Martin was also subordinated to von Blücher. The Battereie Berneval successfully resisted the enemy attack and Major von Blücher succeeded in destroying the enemy at Berneval, capturing 2 officers and 80 troops.

 

C. West of Dieppe

 

A similar operation was executed by a commande unit of some 300 men west of Dieppe against the Heeresküstenbatterie 813 near Varangeville. Protected by early-morning mist, these commandos landed on both sides of Varengeville, while another unit attempted to land near the Stp Quiberville, where a platoon of the 3/IR 571 was deployed. The latter landing attempt was repelled by the joint defensive fire of the 3/IR 571. On the other hand, the enemy landing in the difficult defensive terrain at Varengeville succeeded through a number of small Schluchten, in places only possible for well-trained troops. These forces - some 300 men - attacked the Batterie 813 from alls sides, supported by low-flying aircraft, as a result of which the ammunition, the canons and the battery position itself caught fire. After a brave defence, causing 28 dead and 29 injured, the position was captured by the enemy. By 9pm the commandos had probably returned to their boats, taking 4 prisoners and numerous own dead ad wounded with them.

 

The attacks on either side of Dieppe were aimed at putting the batteries out of action, so that they would not be able to fire at the troops landing in Dieppe itself. The batteries were located outside of the Stützpunktbereich Dieppe and could not be protected by infantry due to a lack of forces. The dangerous location of the Batterie 813 was known. Its intregration within the Stützpunktbereich Dieppe would soon take effect.

 

D. The main attack on Dieppe

 

D1. Puys

 

The attack of the batallion landing at Puys failed completely under the joint fire of the heavy weapons with heavy casualties for the attacker. No single enemy was able to break through the defences. Through flanking fire the enemy was stopped in front of the obsstacles, on the high beach wall and on the beach itself. In addition to mumerous prisoners more than 150 dead were counted.

 

D2. Pourville

 

Protected by darkness and mist this unit successfully landed in Pourville-West and managed to overrun the weak defenders (1 platoon of infantry and some OT-personnel). Thereafter, the batallion tried to achieve its objectives. Two companies crossed the coastal road and headed for the positions in the Scie-valley, where they reached the AT-bunker. Here the enemy succeeded in putting the gun out of action by direct hits and hand grenades? Most of the crew were killed. Parts of the unit pushed on through the dam of the Scie and tried to attack the 4 Ventes Ferme from the north. These attackers were eliminated. The two companies did not succeed in breaking through the main defensive line, which only began near the AT-bunker. Pourville itself was only a weakly-defended outer post.

The two other companies; operating west of the Scie, apparently reached their first objective, in that they occupied the southern boundary of Pourville and the MG-position on the hill west of Pourville, where they established a bridgehead.

The follow-on batallion had the mission of using the western bank of the Scie to advance south to the St-Aubin airfield. This unit managed to get near to Hautot. However, it was attacked by flaking fire from the 4 Ventes Ferme and ran into the Radfahrzug of the Regimentstab IR571 and some recce troops of the I/IR 571. It is unclear why this batallion, which until then had not encountered any resistance worth mentioning due to the fact that there were no German defences, only advances as far as Hautot. It is equally unclear why the unit did not advance to St-Aubin, in accordance with its orders. Probably, the advance of the unit was halted in view of the failure of the attack on Dieppe itself. According to the captured order the units were to advance until 12.30, at which time they were to commence their withdrawal, which had to be completed by 15.30.

 

D3. Dieppe beach

 

Three batallions were to land here, supported by tanks. The batallion which landed west of the port of Dieppe until the Rue Duquesne was detroyed on the beach promenade together with the supporting tanks. Around 7am the destroyer Locust neared the port entrance, where it it received several direct hits from LAG, artillery and Flak guns. It turned away and presumably sank.

The two batallions which landed on either side of the casino suffered the same fate. The units were defeated on the beach and the beach promenade, together with the supporting tanks. With the exception of some recce troops, the enemy did not manage to enter the city.

Until noon numerous further ships landed at the Dieppe beach. It is not clear whether theese were supposed to beach further troops or evacuated already landed troops.

 

E. Measures taken by the division and the corps

 

When, soon after 6am, the width of the attack was identified and it was also clear that no further attack had taken place in the Somme estuary, at Le Tréport and in the sector of the 332ID, the 302ID ordered (see also above) the Radfahrschwadron and the reinforced 3. Pionierkompanie from Arques under the command of Major von Blücher to Berneval

At 6.40am the corps ordered Alarmstufe II for all of its divisions as well as the corps reserve.

At 7.10am the IR 571 in Dieppe ordered the I/IR 571 in Ouville to prepare itself in the Hautot area for an attack towards Pourville.

At 7.30am the corps subordinated the III/IR 570 in Bacqueville (14km from Dieppe) to the 302 Infanteriedivision and ordered it to Offranville, while the remainder of the corps reserve (Regimentstab IR676, I und III/IR 676, I/AR 332 and the Panzerkompanie 81) was ordered to move to Bacqueville.

At 9.50am the 10 Panzerdivision was subordinated to the LXXXI Armeekorps and received the order to move its Vorausabteilung immediately to the area Torcy-le-Petit (14km south of Dieppe). The remainder of the division was to follow to the area Neufchatel-Londinières. In case the local counterattacks were not successful, the corps commander planned to deploy the division agains the incursion at Pourville and then, if necessary, veer east towards Dieppe.

At 10am the I/IR 570 had prepared itself in the Hautot area for the attack towards Pourville. With the tactical most unclear, the batallion initially sent out patrols to Pourville and Varengeville.

When the I/IR 570 attacked towards Pourville at 11.30am, the batallion succeeded in clearing the western heights of Pourville, making some 200 prisoners in the process.

In order to clean up the situation in Dieppe itself, the commander of the IR 571 towards noon ordered the 5/IR 571, parts of 11/IR 571 and 2/3 of the 2. Pionierkompanie 302 to counterattack. This counterattack mananaged to persuade the attacking enemy to surrender and hundreds of prisoners were taken.

Meanwhile the entire corps reserve had been put at the disposal of the 302ID and marched off to Offranville with the plan to attack towaards Pourville with the Panzerkompanie 81. The attack of the corps reserve, however, was made redundant, since the I/IR 571 had already cleared the terrain west of Pourville.

At 12am the corps commander gave the following orders to the 10 Panzerdivision and the 302 Infanteriedivision:

  • The 10 Panzerdivision first attacks with its Vorausabteilung and already deployed parts of the 302ID and the corps reserve towards the heights west of Pourville, destroys the enemy and then, if necessary, takes part in the Dieppe battle from the west.

  • Boundary between the 10 Panzerdivision and the 302 Infanteriedivision: western edge Pourville - Janval - Scie valley.

  • Deployed parts of the 302ID and the corps reserve west of this line were subordinated

  • 1 reinforced Panzergrandierregiment was remain at the disposal of the corps in the Londinières area and to the south of that.

  • The take-over time by the 10PzD was to be agreed by the divisions.

In the afternoon, the corps reserve (IR 676) was deployed to the sector Pourville - St-Aubin with 2 batallions at the coast and one in reserve in view of many reports that ships might be landing new troops to renew the attack.

At 1.45pm the 10 Panzerdivision, beefore entering in to action, received the order to remain at the disposal of the corps in the area Torcy-le-Petit - Neufchatel - Londinières. During the night the division stayed in the combat area.

 

F. Why did the allied attack fail?

 

Even though the captured maps show that the attacker was fully aware of all the defences, he completely underestimated the strength of German defences by having the mass of troops attack the Dieppe beach in a frontal assault. It is also incomprehensible why the arttackers at Pourville were not given tank support. An attack with tanks from Pourville against the western heights of Dieppe and the 4 Ventes Ferme could have had much success. Against all expectation the enemy used no paratroopers or glider forces. A simultaneous seaborne and airborne attack at Puys could have created a very precarious situation. The attacker must have expected that his strong use of air support was sufficient to break down the defences. However, the strong mist and smoke at Dieppe probably substantially reduced the effectiveness of the air support. Even though the enemy landed light and heavy mortars, few other heavy weapons were used. It was only planned to land a light artillery battery and a light AA-troop at Puys. However, due to the failure of this attack, this artillery was neveral operational. The use of some light Sturmgeschütze had probably supported the attack more than tanks. Since also ship artillery fire was ineffective due to the mist and smoke, the attack lacked any direct artillery support. Unbelievable is the underestimation of our defences, as well as the unrealistic time span in which the attacked hoped to carry out all missions. The 100-page operational order contained precise instructions for all units, thus containing the seeds for the failure of the operations in case of unexpected difficulties. The Dieppe attack was totally repulsed due to the brave defence of all Wehrmacht parts. 95 officers and 2122 troops were captured. Until 24/8 475 dead had been buried, and bodies continued to appear with each high tide. A large proportion of enemy losses were infllicted on the water. Total losses are presumed to be 60-70% of the total landing force. The 302 Infanteriedivision suffered 87 dead (5/14/68), 10 missing (0/1/9) and 156 wounded (5/27/124). Captured were: 28 tanks; 7 recce vehicles, 1 jeep, 1300 riflles, 170 MGs, 60 MPs, 42 AT-weapons, 70 light and 60 heavy mortars, as well as large numbers of ammunition, hand grenades, explosives and equipment.

 

G. Lessons learnt

 

G1. Organization

 

It has to be taken into account that the enemy will probably not again frontally attack a strongmy defended Stützpunktbereich, but rather will attempt to land in between Stützpunktbereichen in areas of weak defences and take ports by encircling them. It is therefore necessary to have mobile reserve with mant motorized AT-weapons (still missing at the moment) for the counterattack.

 

G2. Sector reserves

 

The regimental and sector reserves must be positioned close to the coast and, if possible, equipped with heavy weapons and artillery. At the latest with Alarmstufe II the reserve batallions, in as far as they are located apart, are to be assembled. These reserve must automatically and rapidly counterattack. In unclear situations, they should not wait long for orders. An energetic attack will cleur up the situation fastest and prevent the enemy from establishing a bridgehead. It will also enable higher headquarters to move reserves to where lower-level reserves have not succeeded in clearin up the situation. The case of I/IR 571 may serve as an example here. As early as 7.10am the unit was informed that the attack near Quiberville had been defeated, but that the enemy had landed at Pourville. The batallion was ordered by the regiment to prepare for attack near Hautot. The situation remained unclear for the batallion for a long time. A rapid and energetic attack towards Pourville would have not only clarified the situation faster, but could also have lead to a higher number of enemy being captured/destroyed.

 

G3. Corps reserves

 

Even though the alarming of the corps reserve had worked, it had taken too long for it to arrive. The transport columns were concentrated in one location. It is necessary to better couple them to the batallions and the artillery. It is also necessary to allocate artillery to the corps reserve on a permanent basis and ready for movement, so that the artillery, so that the artillery can advance together with the infantry. The artillery batallion of the corps reserved arrived too late at the coast, as it had to be transported first. It is desirable to bring the corps reserve closer to the coast or to again subordinated parts of to the division. This, however, is only possible when the corps can count on a motorized or armoured division in case of attack.

 

G4. Landing of tanks

 

It was shown that the attacker can very rapidly bring tanks ashore with special landing ships. The defence must take this into account in increased measure with stronger AT-defences, also at the small ravines, e.g. at Criel-Quiberville-St-Aubin-Veulettes and others. The pebbles on the Dieppe beach made the landing of the tanks more difficult but not impossible. Eye witnesses also report that more tanks than originally thought (probably 16) reach the beach promenade, but returned  to the beach for shelter.

 

G5. AT-defences

 

The passive AT-defences by means of AT-walls worked perfectly. AT-walls shoudl be constructed such that they can be covered by flaking MG-fire so that demolition troops cannot get near. It is also to be recommended. It is also to be recommended to established passive AT-defences in depth, in case the front AT-wall is broken through.

On the other hand, the active AT-weapons are not sufficient. In general the tanks were almost not damaged by the 37mm Paks.

 

G6. Artillery

 

The Landeabwehrgeschütze worked very well. Increased allocation is desirable (two to three-fold numbers). Deployment should be such that flanking fire at close distances is possible, while the guns are protected from fire from the water. The corps has ordered that the Heeresküstenartillerie was to be fully drawn into the Stützpunktbereiche or infantry strongpoints. The decision to open fire was taken by the Heeresküstenartillerie itself, while the order from the Seekommandant arrived only 2 hours after the start of combat.

 

G7. Air attack

 

The allied air attack have not have a negative effect on defences. The reason for this was that the air force was hindered by the artifical smoke.

 

G8. Cooperation

 

Cooperation with the other Wehrmacht services and the OT was excellent. Every man fulfilled his duty. The corps cooperated with the Jagdfliegerführer 3, Jagdfliegerführer 2, IX Fliegerkorps  and the liaison officer of the Luftflotte 3 with the Heeresgruppe. Neverthless, it might be more effective to designate one central organisation with which the corps can communicate. Infantry training for air force and navy personnal remains a necessity.

 

G9. Minefields

 

The minefields in the small ravines/gullies did not meet expectations everywhere. The reason for this is still being investigated. The attacker managed to bypass the minefields. Minefields must be wider than the actual ravibe/gully and no wire should be visible towards the enemy's side. On the other hand, the first attackers at Puys got caught u^p in a mine obstacle and were killed. As a result 50-60 men were engaged with MG fire in front of the obstacle and were killed in rows.

 

G10. Communications

 

On the whole, communications went very well., so that the division and the corps were continuously aware of what was going on. However, it is to be take into account that the attacker did not attempt to destroy headquarters or communication centres. However, it would be effective to establish deeper inland (some 10km) but parallel to the coast, Meldeköpfe connected with one another and with the divisions and the corps, so that reserves, coming from the rear into the combat area, could always be contacted by telephone. This would facilitate operating and moving the reserves.

 

G11. Civilian traffic

 

In case of Alarmstufe II all civilian motorized traffic in the combat area is to be discontinued. During combat French vehicles drove in and out of Dieppe. Discontinuation of civilian telephone communication is also necessary in the rear army area.

 

H. Logistics (not processed)

 

The report contains some Anlagen in the form of maps, showing:

Anlage 1: Gliederung der 302ID und Korpsreserve

Anlage 2: Stützpunktgruppe Dieppe

Anlage 3: Englisches Landungsunternehmen bei Dieppe

These maps can be found here (password-protected)

The fourth Anlage is an Ic report by the LXXXI AK. It has been processed below:

 

1a.Ic intelligence report by the LXXXI Armeekorps (22 August 1942) (= Anlage to 1 above)(enemy plans on the basis of captured orders)


1. Mission

6.10am: landing in Dieppe and on both sides of the city under cover or air and naval forces
Occupation of the city and the Festungsbereich Dieppe. Push inland with armour and infantry until Arques-la-Bataille, where the divisional headquarters were believed to be.

2. Aim

The aim was to render  the Verteidigungsbereich Dieppe inoperable for a longer period. To this aim all military infrastructure, coastal batteries, radio stations, airfields, ships, as well as all infrastructure and utility installations (gas, electricity, port, cranes, railways) were to be destroyed/damaged. In addition, possibly many prisoners were to be captured , as well as military documents, weapons and equipment items. After the completion of the mission the troops were to reembark at 3.30pm.

3. Leadership

High command: presumably Lord Mountbatten
Commander of army troops: Generalmajor Roberts (unit unknown)
Commander 4th Brigade: Brigadier Lett
Commander 6th Brigade: Brigadier Southam

4. Troops

2 Can Inf Div:
  • 4. Brig (25 Mann)
    • 1. Royal Regt of Canada (500 Mann)
    • 2. Rotal Hamilton Light Infantry (540 Mann)
    • 3. Essex-Scottish Regt (520 Mann)
  • 6. Brig (25 Mann)
    • 1. Fuseliers Mont-Royal of Canada (560 Mann)
    • 2. Camerons of Canada (500 Mann)
    • 3. South Saskatchewan Regt (500 Mann)

Subordinated troops (1380 Mann)

  • Black Watch of Canada (5. Brig), subordinated to 6. Brig
  • Canadian Heerespanzerabteilung XIV (Calgary Rgt)(58 tanks)
  • British naval forces (number unknown)
  • Canadian engineer units (RCE) (330 Mann)
  • 3 Commando (+/- 360 Mann)
  • 4 Commando (+/- 225 Mann)

It is not known whether all troops came ashore in full strength. With part of the above subordinated troops, especially the tank troops, this was certainly not the case.

5. Planned course of events

  • 3 Commando was tasked to land with 4 troops near Berneval and with 2 troops in the Schlucht west of Berneval and attack the Batterie 2/270 from 2 sides, after the completion of which they would re-embark.
  • The Royal Regt of Canada, with 1 light artillery battery and 1 light AA troop in the first wave, with the Black Watch as the second wave, were tasked to land at Puys, take the military objects along the coast to the east, advance towards Neuville with another part and secue the heights east of Dieppe with a third part.
  • The Essex Scottish, Hamiltons, Heerespanzerabteilung XIV and the Canadian engineer units in the first wave, followed by the Fuseliers Mont-Ryal in the second wave were tasked with landing at Dieppe itself. The Essex Scottish supported by 1 tank platoon were tasked with taking the eastern part of Dieppe and the port area. The other 2 batallions and the remaining tanks were tasked with taking the western part of Dieppe and the western heights, and to push inland until the heights at St-Aubin-Arques-la-Bataille, where the HQ of the 110ID were suspected. The engineers were supposed to help the tanks across the beach and past the anti-tank obstacles.
  • The South Saskatchewan in the first wave, the Camerons of Canada in the second wave were to land at Pourville, push inland through the Scie valley, turn east and destroy the airfield at St-Aubin and the suspected divisional headquarters at Arques.
  • 4 Commando was to land at Varengeville and at the Somme estuary (!), capture the battery 813 and then re-embark
  • For each landing site one destroyer would give covering fire. Two destroyers would sail into the port of Dieppe and land troops.
  • After completion of all the missions the troops were to re-embark, under the cover of bombers, completing the re-embarcation process at 3.30pm.

6. Preparation

The landing was prepared in great detail. The operational order contained 121 A4 pages and, as a result, was very chaotic. The presence of many code names made carrying out the operation even more difficult. The heavily pre-planned nature of the operation did not allow for initiative taken by lower officers to take decisions independently in case of unforeseen circumstances. The nemy possesed very good maps with the situation of coastal defences on 1 August. Fortifications were well indicated, presumably as a result of aerial recce. However, enemy agents would appear not to have played a major role (strength of AT-obstacles in Dieppe not recognized, belief that 110ID was deployed, that HQ was at Arques-la-Bataille, no knowledge of regimental and most batallion headquarters.

7. Assessment of the combat quality

The 2 Canadian Infantry Division had been based in South-England for some time. On the afternoon of 18 August they were transported to the coast in trucks, loaded onto transport ships and sailed to the French coast without any information. In general, the Canadians fought badly and later surrendered in large numbers. In contrast, the commandos were well trained and fought very well.

8. Results of the raid

  • 3 Commando at Berneval was repulsed by members of the Marinesignalstation and the 2/HKAA 770. 80 men of the division were captured.
  • The Royal Regiment of Canada and the Black Watch at Puys did not succeed in taking the strongpoint. Their attack booged down on the beach with 150 dead and 300 surrendering.
  • The Essex Scottish, Hamiltons, Heerespanzerabteilung XIV and the Canadian engineer units in the first wave, followed by the Fuseliers Mont-Ryal in the second wave were bogged down on the beach in front of the AT-wall with high casualties.
  • The South Saskatchewan in the first wave, the Camerons of Canada in the second wave managed to land at Pourville, but then for some unknown reasin did not advance, with the exception of a recce troop to Hautot. 200 men were captured by the divisional reserves, the others could escape.
  • 4 Commando carried out its mission (Battry 813) and re-embarked.

9. General assessment

The action was a failure, mainly because the landing at Puys was repulsed, because the tanks at Dieppe did not get over the AT-wall and because the enemy at Pourville did not push inland.

2. After-action report by the 302 Infanteriedivision  (25 August 1942)

On 25 August 1942 the 302 Infanteriedivision, too, released a detailed after-action report. The report contains 7 sections. Some sections will be processed here, others not or only partially and again some others in the overall chronology below.

I. The coastal sector under attack
A. Terrain (processed partially, omitting terrain details)
The focal point of coastal defences in the sector is the Stützpunktgruppe Dieppe, which includes the heights on either side of the Arques-valley and east the Scie-valley with a depth of some 2.5km. The StpGr is defended all-round by obstacles and (combat) bunkers in concrete. Some 60% of first-priority planned construction has been completed.
Near Berneval there was an artillery strongpoint for the HKB 2/770 and a resistance nest for the Luftwaffengerät Gleiwitz. In addition, a feldwache was located on the heights to the west of Pt Berneval. The beach of Pt Berneval and the and the valleys leading to Berneval and the southeast were strongly wired and mined. Due to the width of the sector the division had been unable to make Pt Berneval into a strongpoint with a permanent infantry force. The battery 2/270 and the Gerät Gleiwitz were, as ordered , in permanent contact with the I/IR 570, a company of which was located in Assigny.
For the same reason the coastal stretch between Pourville and the Wn Quiberville-Ost, was, with the exception of valley wiring, only secured by patrols. Loctaed in this sector was the strongpoint of the HKB 813 and the Widerstandsnest at the lighthouse, occupied by the Beobachtungsstelle 813, Marinesondergerät, Marinesignalstation and the Flugmeldetrupp. For the Batterie 813 which had been put under concrete by the navy in the summer of 1941, transfer inside the StpGr Fieppe had been planned (to a new location near Neuville-lès-Dieppe). One valley here (Möwenslucht) was secured by a squad of infantry (Gruppe). The Wn Quiberville-Ost was protected by all-round obstacles and field bunkers.
B. Deployment of German forces (along the coast from Criel to St-Aubin) before the attack
I Western part of the sector of the Infanterieregiment 572
1. Criel
a) Divisionseinheiten
1/IR570
1 Zug 4/IR 570
b) Heeresküstenartillerie
3/778 Mesnil-Val
east of Criel (4x 15cm K16 (t) + 4x 10.5cm K35 (t)
Abteilungsgefechtsstand HKAA 770 in Mesnil-Val
2. Berneval
a) Divisionseinheiten
Feldwache 1/IR570 (1 Uffz + 9 Mann)
b) Heeresküstenartillerie
2/HKAA 770 (3x 17cm Kanone K in M-Lafette + 4x 10.5 cm K35 (t) + 2x 2cm Flak (= 127 Mann)
c) Luftwaffe
Luftwaffengerät Gleiwitz + 1 Zug 2cm Flak der Flakuntergruppe Dieppe (1/16/97 Mann incl. Landesschützenbataillon)

II Abschnitt IR571
1. Stützpunktgruppe Dieppe
a) Divisionseinheiten
Regimentsstab IR 571
II/IR 571
III/IR571
III/AR305 (mit 7. und 8. Batterie)
Batterie A und B (je 4x 10cm FH 14/19 (t))
Stellungsbatterie 265 (Küste)
Stab Pionierbataillon 302 (mit 1. und 2. Kompanien)
b) Heeresküstenartillerie: -
c) Luftwaffe:
Fliegerhorstkommandantur Dieppe (mit Hortskompanie und Verfügungskompanie)
23. schwere Flugmeldekompanie
Flakuntergruppe Dieppe (mit 1 Batterie 3.7cm (mit 3 Züge 3.7 und 1 Zug 5cm), 2 Züge 2cm, 1 Batterie 7.5cm (f) (je 6 Geschütze und 2x 2cm)
d
) Schutzpolizei: 60 Mann
e) Marine:
Hafenkommandantur mit Wachkompanie und Hafenartzt (etwa 72 Mann)
Hafenschutzboote, Hafenüberwachungsstelle, Marinevermittlung, Seenot, 4./6. Flottillenstammabteilung, Marinesignalstation (etwa 200 Mann)
3. /Versuchsbataillon (1/15/43)
2. Batteriesrtützpunkt Heeresküstenbatterie 813 (mit 6x 15cm Kanonen K16 Krupp und 1x KwK (93 Mann))
3. Widerstandsnest Leuchtturm Phare d'Ailly
Marinesignalstation und Marinesondergerät
Flugmeldetrupp der 23 schwere Flugmeldekompanie
B-Stelle der Batterie 813
= 77 Mann
4. Widerstandsnest Quiberville
3/IR 571 (ohne 1 Zug)
1 sMG Gruppe der 4/IR571
5. Widerstandsnest St-Aubin
1 Zug 3/IR 571
1 sMG Gruppe der 4/IR571
6. Regimentsreserve im Raum um Ouville
I/IR 571(ohne 3. Kp und 1 Zug 4/IR571
Infanteriepanzerjägerkompanie (Offranville)
IG-Zug (Offranville)
III Divisionsreserven
1. IR 570 in Eu (mit I/IR570, II/IR570, InfanteriePzJgKp, IG-Zug, III/IR570 in Korpsreserve in Raum um Bacqueville)
2. Panzerjäger- und Aufklärungsabteilung 302 in St Nicolas- d'Aliermont und Notre Dame (mit Panzerjägerkompanie und Radfahrschwadron)
3. 3./Pionierbataillon 302 in Arques-la-Bataille
4. 3/AR302 in Friaucourt; 6/AR302 in St- Quentin-Lamotte; 9/AR302 in Anneville
5. Kolonnen:
I/T Kolonne (Arques-la-Bataille) (OT Fahrzeugen)
II/T Kolonne (Boscrocourt)(Fahrzeugen aus der Division)
V (Arques-la-Bataille)(OT Fahrzeugen)
6. Verfügungskompanie (Leichtverletzten aus Lazarett St-Aubin) (117 Mann)


3. Chronological overview of the battle and its aftermath from a German point of view (various army sources)


19 August 1942
4.45am
Feldwache Berneval hears sea fight

4.57am
Soldiers manning the Luftwaffensondergerät at the eastern boundary of Berneval occupy the resistance nest.

5.05am
IR 571 reports heavy sea fight some 20km off Dieppe.

5.10am
IR 572 reports sea fight some 15km off Criel-Plage.

5.25am
IR 571 reports that since 4.45am a German convoy, some 14-16km off Dieppe has been under attack from enemy naval forces.

5.30am
The 302 Infanteriedivision reported the sea fight to the LXXXI Armeekorps. Beobachtungsstellen of the divisional artillery observe enemy Schnellboote in front of Puys.III/AR 302 fires Sperrfeuer in front of Puys.

5.35am
III/AR 302 observes large numbers of Schnellboote heading for Pourville. Two batteries were directed to fire Sperrfeuer by radio, since the telephone was not working. No report to the division, since the telephone was not working. Bombing raid on the StpGr Dieppe.


5.38 am
The 302 Infanteriedivision reported that a German convoy sailing some 20km northwest of Dieppe had been under attack from fast boats since 5am. The divisions's troops were put in a state of erhöhte Aufmerksamheit and the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine were informed.

5.50am
Feldwache Berneval 9 and Beobachtungsstelle 2/770 near Berneval observe the approach of 4 small boats and a freighter, which answers the ES-signal. At the same time 4 Sturmlandungsboote appear from behind the freighterand head fast towards Petit Berneval. The battery cannot fire at them, but the Feldwache opens fire with rifle and MG.

5.55am
2 larger Prähme are firing on the Feldwache Berneval. Under this covering fire the enemy lands in the dead angle of the cliff and climbs it, moving towards the Ostschlucht, which has been mined.

5.58am
The 302 ID requests the Flugmeldezentrale Dieppe to confirm that an own convoy is underway, confirmation of which is received. Now FMZ hears infantry fire from the Pourville area.

6.00am
IR 571 reports British landing attempt at Pourville. Gefechtsbereitschaft is ordered for the regiment. Enemy naval artillery firing on Dieppe and the heights on both sides.
2/770
is unable to make contact with Feldwache Berneval. It sends 4 men with an MG to the Schlucht at Pt Berneval.At the same time the battery contacts its batallion headquarters reporting the situation and requesting infantry reinforcement. After having arrived the 4 soldiers are immediately fired upon from the direction of the Ostschlucht. The NCO is wounded, but continues to lead. The Wn Gleiwitz also sends a Stosstrupp (8 men) to the Schlucht. The 5 soldiers of the Peilerbesatzung of the Peiler on the eastern side of the Westslucht are ordered to withdraw into the strongpoint.
From 6am air attacks and shelling from naval artillery on Dieppe and the heights north and south of Dieppe.

6.01am
The divisions orders Gefechtsbereitschaft and Alarmstufe II for all headquarters and units in the KVA. There was already erhöhte Aufmerksamheit since sunrise, with various special measures ordered.

6.05am
Attack by fighter aircraft with canon fire Wn Gleiwitz: defence by 3x 2cm Flak (1 Zug 3/237), Flak MG and rifles.

6.10 am
The Ia of the 302 Infanteriedivision, Oberstleutnant Sartorius telephoned LXXXI Armeekorps and reported an enemy landing attempt near Pourville -Quiberville after bombing attacks on Dieppe.
Enemy boats land near Pourville, under fire from 7 and 8/AR 302. Enemy boats land at Puys. One boat destroyed by Pak. The attack is broken up by own fire.

6.12am
First report to LXXXI AK from division.

6.15am
Dropping of some smoke bombs (20 minutes thick smoke) and 3 phosphor canisters. As a result fire in an ammo depot and living quarters of Gleiwitz. Explosion of some 1000 riflle cartridges, French hand grenades and signalling munition. 2 soldiers injured by bomb drop. Hit on a Hampton by the Flak, which crashes some 6km south of Berneval. The Stosstrupp Gleiwitz and the Peilerbesatzung join up. .


6.17am
The enemy has broken through at Pourville-West.

6.20 am
The Ia of the LXXXI Armeekorps, Oberstleutnant Kolbe, reported the above to AOK 15.
Enemy boats prepare to land on the western beach of Dieppe and attempt to enter the port. The latter fails due to fire from Pak, Flak and LAG.

6.21am
The Regimentspionierzug 571 in Petit Appeville dispatches a recce troop towards the Hautot watertower and the road to Ouville.

6.22am
The HKAA 770 reported enemy landing at Berneval to the 302 ID.

6.25am
The division informed the Regimentsstab IR570 about landing attempts are Berneval, Pourville and Quiberville and ordered the batallions to assemble: I/IR570 near Assigny; II/IR70 near St-Remy (except the 7.Kp which was to remain ready to move by bicycle at Eu). A recce mission with a strong officer recce troop was to be directed towards Berneval. The Stosstrupp Gleiwitz meets up with the Stosstrupp from the 2/770 in the Westslucht. Opens fine on the enemy in the Ostschlucht. Since the Feldwache Berneval of the 1/IR 570 cannot prevent the enemy from climbing the middle and right Schlucht, it withdraws to the high ground west of the Schlucht and continues combat against the enemy from the Schlucht to the southeast.

6.30am
Feldwache Berneval
had 3 injured soldiers, 2 of whom will later die at the Truppenverbandsplatz Gleiwitz. Unteroffizier Dally reports to the 1/IR 570. The company had already ordered Gefechtsbereitschaft at 6.20. Luftwaffenlandesschützen from Gleiwitz successfully take part in the defence. 5 killed. Meanwhile the British have climbed the Schlucht and are fighting from the houses, where vthey tru to secure themselves by mines. Direct Flak dire is ordered towards the houses. 2/770 sends out a second Stosstrupp which meets with the 2 other troops at 6.55am at the bridge across the Westschlucht.
The corps is further informed on the enemy landing near Berneval.
Radfahrzug receives the order to occupy Westhang Höhe 4 Vents Ferme and thus link up with the left wing of 6/IR 571. The division reports to the corps: landing attempts at Pourville and Quiberville and ships appraoching towards Dieppe.

6.32am
Radio contact between division and IR571 still in working order.

6.35am
In front of the Stp Pourville-Ost some 20 boats approach the beach. Larger ships some 4km offshore.

6.40 am
LXXXI Armeekorps reported to AOK 15 that the enemy attempted to land om both sides of Dieppe, near Berneval, Pourville and Quiberville.
Report from the IR 571 to division: Dieppe covered by artifical smoke from smoke shells fired by ships.

6.41am
Division sends a liasion officer to the IR 571 to ascertain if and in which direction I/IR 571 has started to counterattack.

6.43am
Attack by enemy combat aircraft on Eu.

6.45 am
LXXXI Armeekorps informed the 332 and 711 Infanteriedivisionen. These units reported back that everything was quiet in their respective areas.
LXXXI Armeekorps ordered erhöhte Alarmbereitschaft for the corps reserve:
  • Regimentsstab
  • I und II/IR 676 and III/IR 570
  • verstärktes Jägerregiment Gollé
    • Jägerbataillone 1-4
    • Batterie West (4x 8cm (t), 2x sFH 18)
Report from the HKAA 770: new Schnellboot attack on Berneval. 3/770 fires Störungsfeuer in that direction.
Enemy landed on the western beach at Dieppe. Neighbouring division on right informed. about situation. At the request of the infantry the 7/AR 302 and the Flakzug north of the 4 Vents Ferme fire at landed enemy at Pourville beach.

6.46am

The 5/IR 571, Abschnittsreserve in Dieppe prepares itself for counterattack at the Standordkommandantur.

6.49am
Neighbouring division on left informed. about situation.

6.50 am
The Korpsreserve (see above) is put on the highest alert Alarmstufe II. Jagdfliegerführer 3 and the 13 Flakdivision are also alerted.
Order to the IR570: 3/IR 570 to St-Martin; from there recce to Berneval.
The 14/IR 571 is directed from Ofranville to Janval. Surprised by low-level air attack causing losses. The enemy lands tanks on the western beach at Dieppe. The division informs the corps on the situation in an around Dieppe.


6.55am
The Unteroffizieirsanwärterlehrgang is ordered to advance towards the western part of the Scie valley, through Pt Appeville. and then to Pourville and establish contact there with a platoon of the 6/IR571. The Unteroffizieirsanwärterlehrgang dispatches a recce troop ahead. Air attacks continue.

7.00 am
The 302 ID called the LXXXI AK and reported the enemy having landed near Berneval. The Heeresküstenbatterie 2/770 was engaged in close combat. The situation was quite in front of Le Tréport and the Somme estuary. No enemy had landed in Quiberville.
Further ships appraoch Dieppe and are fired at by Batterie A, 7/AR 302, Stellungsbatterie 265 and the Flak. The recce troop of the Pionierzug 571 which had been sent to Hautot reports enemy in the area of the Hautot watertower (strength +/1 1 platoon). The recce troop had casualties: 1 dead and 1 injured.

7.05am
Renewed approach by 3 small boats und cover of fire from a gunboat. One small boat is destroyed by 3/770 and remains lying at the beach. The IR 572 ordered the 1/IR 570 in Criel to to repair the contact with the Feldwache Berneval and to secure the Schluchten between Criel and Berneval. The corps was informed on the situation at Berneval. Order to Major von Blücher: Radfahrschwadron and 3/Pionierbataillon 302 form the Abteilung Blücher and are to move immediately to Graincourt. Its mission was to push the landed enemy at Bernaval back into the sea. The Panzerjägerkompanie was to be moved forwards to St-Nicolas. The company commander was to keep contact with the division from the headquarters of the Panzerjäger- und Aufklärungsabteilung there. Blücher was to take his own radio troop.

7.10am
Batterie 2/770
was firing at pont-blank ranges at the enemy attacking the battery position.
A new wave of landing boats prepares for landing at Dieppe, west of the jetty. The IR571 orders the I/IR571 to prepare for an attack on Pourville in the southern part of Hautot. The order can only be communicated by messenger. This deployment was not reported to the division.

7.15am
Radio message to Abteilung Blücher: 3/570 brough forward to St-Martin; to be subordinated to the commander of Blücher.


7.16am
The Generalkommando was informed about the situation.

7.25am
Report from the Unteroffizieranwärterspähtrupp sent to Pourville: the enemy has occupied the garage of the Grand Hotel, some 600m south of Pourville.The enemy was fired on by the Spähtrupp some 800m south of Pourville on the eastern bank. Strength: some 2 platoons. This enemy is turning against the recce troop which is simultaneaously receiving fire from the direction of Hautot.
Air attacks on Höhe 102 and the Arques-valley.

7.26am
Message from the Generalkommando that the III/IR 570 is subordinated and will be sent towards Ouville. The Korpsreserve, Regiment Klemm, will be advanced towards Bacqueville.

7.30 am
Jagdfliegerführer 3 reported that 30-40 own planes had been engaged on a recce mission over the see northwest of Dieppe.
The spähtrupp Hautot comes under attack. Its leader (from the Pionierzug 571) is injured.

7.40am
IR570
reported: enemy marches on foot from Berneval along the cliffs to Criel. with a strength some 150-200 men. Facing these were: from 1/570 in Criel, independent, 21 troops (subordinate to IR570); from IR 570 by 3/570 an Offizierstosstrupp, which make contact with the enemy at 7.50am and reached in combat the southern slope of the Höhe 101 east of Berneval

7.41am
The liaison officer of the division has returned from the IR 571 and informs the division on the situation at Dieppe.


7.45 amThe
LXXXI Armeekorps informed 302 ID that III/IR 570 of the corps reserve, had been subordinated to the division and had been ordered to move forward to Ouville. Also IR 676 was moved forward to Bacqueville. Further, I/AR 302 was subodinated to the 302 ID. Finally, Panzerkompanie 81 would be subordinated to IR 676 and moved forward to Bacqueville as well.
The 302 ID reported that the strength of the enemy which had landed near each point (see above) was of battalion strength
The Luftwaffe Sondergerät Gleiwitz had not been attacked.
Heavy combats were reported ongoing in Dieppe itself.

7.50am
A second wave of boats lands at Puys.All batteries of the III/AR 302, except the Batterie B, are firing on a larger group of approaching boats.

8.00am
Between Puys and Dieppe some 20 troops climb the cliffs.  A further 25 troops pass through the wire obstacle (equipped with charges) suffering casualties in the process. At 8.15am these units are destroyed by a Stosstrupp of the 23. (schwere) Flugmeldekompanie.
At Pourville-Ost a 4.7cm Pak position is overrun by the enemy and has to stop firing. The crew is killed. The enemy advances to the Schreibstube 6/IR 571 where it is stopped. 1 LAG and 1 heavy MG have been rendered unserviceable. 1 platoon 3.7cm and 1 platoon 2cm Flak support the infantry.


8.03 am
302 Infanteriedivision called and reported that an enemy landing had taken place in front of Puys, that Heeresküstenbatterie 813 was engaged in close combat and that 100-150 enemy were moving towards Criel and were approaching the western heights of Criel.

8.09am
The first prisoners are brought to the divisional headquarters.

8.10am
3/Pionierbataillon 302 makes contact with enemy at Berneval

8.11am
The Generalkommando communicates that combat aircraft are on the way. The troops are ordered to lay Fliegertücher.

8.14am
The division orders the I/IR 571 to establish contact with the III/IR571 coming to Ouville.
The division orders the commander of I/IR 571 by phone that, in case Batterie 813 was threatened, a reinforced company was to counterattack in the direction of the battery.
The III/IR 571 was to arrive soon. In case of absence of contact, contact was to be established by motorcycle messenger. The division wanted immediate information with tespect to the situation of the Batterie 813. The telephone connection to the battery had been cut. The order was no longer executed since there was already an order from the IR 571 to prepare for an attack towards Pourville.


8.15 am
Jagdfliegerführer 3 called with the message that the own fighter aircraft wanted to pitch in towards Dieppe. This was refused by the corps.
3/IR570 has reached St-Martin.

8.17am
The Flakregimentskommandeur was present at the Divisionsgefechtsstand. He was informed of the situation and reported that the Flak was firing at naval targets off Dieppe.

8.30am
Offizierstosstrupp 3/570
establishes contact with 3/Pionierbataillon 302, which progresses from the SW to Berneval.
Enemy bomber aircraft over the Divisionsgefechtsstand were fired at by the Unterstab.
The Spähtrupp Hautot from the Pionierzug 571 conducted a counterattack towards the enemy at the Hautot water tower and captured one officer and nine soldiers.

8.35am
The divisions orders III/IR570 that the unit was to immediate move via Bertreville-Auppegard-Colmesznil to Offranville. A liaison officer was to be dispatched towards the divisional headquarters immediately.
Enemy tanks are moving across the beach at Dieppe whilst firing.

8.40am
The division ordered that the II/IR570, at the disposal of the division, was to be transported immediately to the Foret d'Arques (Westecke). The Stab, 5-6 and 8. Kompanie were to be transported by the Transportkolonne II/T, while the 7. Kompanie was to travel by bike. The Transportkolonne was to remain with the batallion. The batallion commander was to to report toi the Divisionsgefechtsstand.

8.45am
Abteilung Blücher
receives a report about a new enemy landing near Petit Berneval, as well as report that the area and the Schlucht west of Berneval until the coast is free of enemy. The Radfahrschwadron is directed to move past Grand Berneval (by the east) towards Petit Berneval. IR 572 reinforces the Spährtrupp, which moves from Criel-Plage to the southwest along the beach to a strength of 1 officer and 40 men.
The corps communicated that the Regimentsstab Klemm (with the I/IR676, I/AR332, Panzerkompanie 81), had been directed towards Tourville at the disposal of the division.
A Canadian unit (Stosstrupp) at the Dieppe city hall was captured by the 5. Kompanie.


8.48 am
Ia  LXXXI Armeekorps, Oberstleutnant Kolbe, issued the following order to the commander of IR 676, Oberst Klemm: the Regimentsstab, 1 Bataillon, Panzerkompanie 81 and I/AR 332 were to be moved forward via Bacqueville to Tourville-sur-Arques, the last battalion at the corps' disposal in Bacqueville. Regiment Gollé would be moved forward to the area of Totes (with 2 battalions and Batterie West) and Yvetot (with 2 battalions). The Sturmgeschützabteilung 226 was to remain ready for departure in Motteville.

8.51am
The IR571 reported by phone to the division about the situation. The enemy had entered Dieppe and tanks were present on the western beach.

8.53 am
The 302 Infanteriedivision was informed on the orders issued to the corps reserve.

8.55am
The navy FMZ reported that Schnellboote were moving towards the Somme estuary. The division passed on this message, which was not confirmed, to the infantry regiments 572, 570 and the 321 ID.

8.58 am
Ia  LXXXI Armeekorps, Oberstleutnant Kolbe, issued an order to the bevöllmachtigter Transportoffizier, Aussenstelle Rouen, to prepare trains for transport and to remain with the Quartiermeister.

9.00am
The division puts the Panzerjägerkompanie 302 at the disposal of the IR571 and the unit is directed towards Dieppe. An officer is to report to the Regimentsgefechtsstand.
The Spähtrupp dispatched by the IR 571 reports enemy presence in Varengeville.
The commander of the II/IR 570 (Divisionsreserve) arrives at the Divisionsgefechtsstand for orientation. He receives parts of the Transportkolonne  I/T to replace lost trucks from the II/T. The whole transport unit II/T  is ordered to move from Arques-la-Bataille to the Arques forest  and to remain there, so that transport of the enture batallion, including the 7. Kompanie, is guaranteed.
III/AR302 occupies observation positions for for Batterie A and the 7/AR302, so that these batteries can operate in the Scie valley and the slope of the Stp Purville-ost and 4 Vents Ferme.


9.02 am
Artilleriekommandeur 117 reported that Heeresküstenbatterie 813 had fallen into enemy hands.

9.15am
Report to the corps: at Berneval the Abteilung Blücher attacks the landed enemy. Puys was attacked, but no reports were available yet. Tanks were reported to have entered Dieppe. The eastern and western heights are firmly in our hand. On the western side of the Scie valley the enemu occupies the heights and the Batterie 813 was taken by the enemy. The canons have been blown up. The II/IR570 will arrive at the Arques forest around 9.45am. At Quiberville an attack was repulsed; everything was quiet ndear St Aubin, as well as in the remainder of the divisional sector.

9.16am
The Versuchskompanie of the Marine, deployed with 8 Pak at the west beach of Dieppe, has heavy casualties, with 1 Pak out of action; succeeded in throwing back the enemy from the Hafenbahnhof (100m from the beach). The city of Dieppe is clear of enemy all the way to the Standortkommandantur.

9.30 am
The Ic of the 302 Infanteriedivision reported that St-Aubin and Quiberville were firmly in own hands and that all attacks had been repulsed. Further, between the wings of the 302 and the 332 Infanteriedivisionen, liaison recce troops were operating.
Abteilung Blücher attacks the enemy at Petit Berneval with the Radfahrschwadron from the SW and the reinforced 3/570 and 1 leichte Flakkampftrupp from the SE, upon which the enemy makes artificial smoke.
The division requests the corps to deploy the promised aircraft on the boats still landing off Dieppe and Pourville, not on the Dieppe beach but on the western part of Pourville and the houses on the slopes, west of the Scie-Anstauung.
The division sends a liasion officer to the I/IR571 to clarify the situation, provide support for the Batterie 813 and determine the position of the III/IR570.
The Marinesignalstation reports to the IR571 that new landing forces (10 boats) are approaching Pourville.

9.35am
The Generalkommando communicates that the 10 Panzerdivision will depart from Amiens at 10am to intervene at Dieppe.
The IR571 reports that Puys is firmly in own hands, with the enemy losing some 500 prisoners and casualties.
The IR571 receives a report that Varengeville is in enemy hands and that the Batterie 813 was taken by the enemy. The enemy was also reported in Hautot. The Pionierbataillon was ordered to reinforce the western side of Höhe 102.

9.40am
The HKAA 770 reports to the division that 3 larger ships off Pourville are firong at Dieppe. This is also observed by the II/IR571.

9.45am
3/Pionierbataillon 302
has reached the Batterie Berneval and chases the enemy withdrawing to the Schlucht NW of Berneval.

9.48am
The II/IR 571 sends the Reservezug of the 8. Kompanie to secure the Golfstrasse towards the west.


9.50 am
10 Panzerdivision was subordinated to the LXXXI Armeekorps and was ordered to move forward a Vorausabteilung (1 reinforced battalion) without delay to the area of Torcy-les-Petites, 14km south of Dieppe. The rest of the division was then to move to the area Neufchatel-Londinières. The division commander was to move to Envermeu to meet the commander of the 302ID  and the corps commander at 12am.
The IR 571 to the Flakuntergruppe: fire on 1 transport ship in the directoon of the Dieppe casino.

9.51am
The Hafenkommandantur Dieppe reports to the IR571 that 6 boats are landing on the beach in front of the Dieppe citadel.

9.55 am
Fluko Rouen reported that one transport ship, 10 smaller vessels, 4 cruisers and 30 light craft were approaching the coast near Dieppe and were making artificial smoke.
6 landing ships are appraoching Pourville. 1 ships has already beached, 4 others are about to beach and 1 is still at sea.
Report from the Flugmeldezentrale: 1 light transport ship tries to reach the Dieppe beach  under covering fire.
Ten smaller landing craft; at a distance of 2km: 3 light cruisers, 30 smaller units are creating artificial smoke some 5km off the coast.


10.00 am
The commanding general of the LXXXI Armeekorps informed the commander of the 302 Infanteriedivision. Firstly, the 10 Panzerdivision would be subordinated to the corps and would be moved with its main forces west of the Béthune river to the area to the south of Dieppe. Secondly, the Verteidigungsbereich Dieppe was to remain subordinated to the 302 ID. It was planned to subordinate the other forces engaged there to the 10 Panzerdivision later for attacking purposes.
Marinebefhelshaber, Kapitän-zur-See Hennecke, passed on a message from the Hafenkommandant Dieppe. The latter reported the following: at 9.15am another 6 boats had landed near the citadel. The enemy tanks landed were unable to break through the obstacles and 2 of them had been destroyed. Further, 4 enemy aircraft had been shot down. Finally, there were multiple fires in the city
The IR571 has deployed the Panzerjägerkompanie 302. One platoon at Dieppe-Ost, 1 platoon at the turn bridge in the port of Dieppe, 1 platoon on the western heights. The reserve company of the III/IR571 was repositioned from the eastern part of Dieppe to the part west of the port and  put at the disposal of the IR 571. The report on this reaches the division at 10.10am. The beach and Dieppe itself are strongly covered by smoke.

10.12am
The I/IR571 repoted to the division that the Batterie 813 had been surrounded by the enemy. A recce troop was sent by the batallion to the battery location.


10.13am
The Flugmeldezentrale reports to the IR 571 that the ship which had approached Pourville had departed again. At a distance of some 10km small shipping units are readying to sail to Dieppe.

10.16am
Own fighter aircraft attacked transport ships off Dieppe and Pourville. The IR571 reported further landings.


10.20am
The Radfahrschwadron took possession of Petit Berneval and reached the coast. It received orders to chase the enemy towards the NE. In Petit Berneval, the Radfahrschwadron and parts of 3/570 met.
The III/IR571 observed 6 landing boats in the direction of Puys. 

10.22am
In order to enable the IR571 to extract one engineer company from the defence of Dieppe-South, the Verfügungskompanie of the division (consisting of able wounded) with a strength of 1 officer and 116 other ranks was put at the disposal of the regiment and transported by truck to Janval and the Stab Pionierbataillon 302.

10.25am
The Flugmeldzentrale reported to the IR571 that an auxiliary cruiser was turning north and that all other (naval) units had laid a protective smokescreen some 8km off Dieppe.


10.26am
The division radioed the Abteilung Blücher with the order: when the enemy has been defeated, it is planned to extract the Abteilung Blücher - 3/570
to be tasked with further chase.

10.28am
The
II/IR571 reported to the IR57 that there were no further enemy landings at Pourville.

10.30am
The LXXXI Armeekorps communicated that at 10.30am and 11.45am the deployment of German Schlachtflieger would be expected.

10.34am
The Ordonnanzoffier of the division was sent to the III/IR570 zur Orientierung. The unit remained at the disposal of the division.

10.36am
According to a corps order the reinforced Korpsreserveregiment Klemm (- 1 Batallion) had to assemble near Tourville at the disposal of the division. The division commander, accompanied by the Divisionsartillerieführer in order to start the regiment in its counterattack against the enemy landed at Pourville.

10.37am
Oberst Klemm called the division from Bacqueville and was informed that he was expected at the Tourville church to discuss the attack.

10.40am
The Artillerieführer 332ID discussed with the 302ID the transport of the I/AR332 in St-Hélène east of Fecamp and requested the Korpstransportkolonnen to be direct to this location, instead of the location determined by Oberst Klemm.

10.45am
The Flakuntergruppe Dieppe communicated to the IR571 that the deployment of Flakkampftrupps could be expected by 11.30am.

10.55am
The Ordonnanzoffizier of the division, who had been sent to the I/IR571, returned and reported that the batallion had received orders from the regiment to assemble at Hautot to prepare for an attack again Pourville and that, in doing so, it had made contact with the enemy. The batellion commander wanted to attack this enemy with 2 companies. The 5/IR571 and 2/3 of the 2/Pionierbataillon 302 were ordered to advance towards Dieppe to round up the enemy still engaged there. The 6/IR571 reported that there was only weak combat activity at Pourville and that the situation in Varengeville was unclear.

10.58am
Observation of the heights at 4 Vents Ferme had shown that the enemy with a strength of 1 company had withdrawn  from Hautot to Pourville.


11.00am
The remainder of the enemy were taken prisoner in the
Schlucht NE of Belleville and on the Höhe 101 east of Petit Berneval.The HKAA 770 reported that the Batterie 813 was again clear of enemy. The division ordered that the battery personnel would try to find contact with the 1/IR571 in the western part of Hautot.

11.01am
The
II/IR571 observed the arrival of 3 landing boats at the Dieppe beach protected by the cliffs.

11.05am
The 6/IR 571 at Pourville-Ost reported to the IR571 that the position was being held with 25 men and that all heavy weapons, with the exception of an LAG, had stopped functioning.


11.20am
The
Abteilung Blücher reported that the enemy has been completely cleared from Berneval and the Höhe 101. The division ordered extraction of the Radfahrschwadron  with Stab Blücher at the disposal of the division to Graincourt. The Pionierkompanie replaced the obsctacles at Berneval, after which it was also to move to Graincourt. The security of Petit Berneval was taken in hand by 3/570.

11.26am
The 9/AR302, provisionally made mobile with horses, and in a firing position at Maison Blache was ordered to support the attack of the I/IR571.

11.30am
The I/IR571 ordered the attack on Pourville, although the time for the attack was still to be decided. However, the batallion had been suffering casualties as a result of enemy air attacks, but when the Oberfeldwebel Prögler, acting as B-Uffz of the batallion, advances at his own initiative towards Pourville with 4 men and returned with 200 prisoners, the companes of the batallion advanced towards Pourville without waiting for an attack time. The division commander ordered that the Korpsreserveregiment Oberst Klemm was to ready itself near Offranville with the I/IR 676 and the III/IR 570 for an attack on Pourville. Both Pourville and the Pourville beach were to be taken from the enemy. The arrival of the regiment was to be expected by 1pm. The 9/AR 302 was subordinated to the Oberst Klemm and took up firing positions near Offranville.

11.32am
The II/IR 571 reported to the regiment that 23 landing boats off Dieppe appeared to turn away from the coast. The fire of the III/AR302 was directed at the enemy tanls on the Dieppe beach, with the 7/AR302 firing at ships approaching the coast near Varengeville and St-Marguerite.

11.40am
Pourville was completely covered in artificial smoke. The commander of the 10 Panzerdivision was informed at the headquarters of the 302 ID.

11.45am
According to a report by the Regiment Klemm the following units arrived at Tourville: I/IR676, Panzerkompanie 81, 1 Panzerjägerzug. The III/IR676 was in Bacqueville. Also the IR571 informed the division about the situation. The Wn Puys was firing at boats attempting to evacuate enemy solders. Two boats were destroyed.

11.50am
The Marinesignalstelle reported to the IR571 that 5 transport ships 5km off the Dieppe casino were turning north. The division ordered the Regiment Klemm to direct III/IR676 to the southern limit of Offranville.

11.55am
The division commander arrived from the headquarters of the IR571 to find the commander of the 10 Panzerdivision and the Ia of the 302ID at the division headquarters. The division commander explained his plans for the deployment of the 10 Panzerdivision. The division was to deploy onlt to the west of the river Scie. The 302ID would keep command in the entire sector until the 10 Panzerdivision had arrived with an advance batallion in the Torcy area. The advance unit was expected at 3pm, the infantry regiments at 5pm and the tanks at 6pm. Later the sector would be divided between the two divisions. The Hafenkommandantur Dieppe reported that there were again multiple ships 3km off Dieppe; they were being fired at by the artillery.

12.00 am

Heeresküstenartillerieabteilung 770 in Le Tréport reported: 30 enemy vessels, larger transport ships and barges 10km northwest of Le Tréport and moving from southwest no northeast are being fired at by the Heeresküstenartillerie.The commander of the LXXXI Armeekorps issued the following orders by mouth to the commanders of the 10 Panzerdivision and the 302 Infanteriedivision:
  • The 10 Panzerdivision will first attack with its Vorausabteilung and the units of the 302 ID and corps reserve already engaged towards the heights west
  •  of Pourville and destroy the enemy. If necessary, it will then intervene from the west in the Dieppe fiighting
  • The boundary between the 10 PzD and the 302 ID is: Westrand Pourville - Janval - Scietal.
  • Units of the 302 ID  and the corps reserved engaged west of the above boundary are subordinated to the 10 PzD.
  • A reinforced Panzergrenadierregiment at the disposal of the corps will initially remain near Londinières and to the south of this town.
  • The two divisions will settle the time of the takeover among themselves.

The division informed IR570 of the following plan: Regimentstab IR570 was to take over command of the coastal sector between Criel and Belleville from the IR 572. The relevant order was issued at 12.36am. The Flugmeldezentrale reported to the IR571 that 20 small boats were approaching Pourville, at a distance of 500-1000m. All Flak guns were again operational.

12.05am

30 ships were observed, 10km off the coast, sailing from NW to SE, probably transport ships. They were fired at by the 10cm canons of the 3/778 (the 15cm canons out of use)

 

12.12 am

The Ia of the 302 Infanteriedivision, Oberleutnant Bechlin, reported that the guns of the Heeresküstenbatterie 813 were out of action. Further, the attack by the I/IR 571 was making good progress. Finally, 45 prisoners had been taken near Berneval.

12.20am
The Offizierspähtrupp which had moved from Criel-Plage to Berneval joins up with the parts of the 3/IR571 which had proceeded from Berneval along the coast to the northeast.
Enemy planes dropped smoke bombs on the heights of 4 Vents Ferme.

12.25am
German Schlachtflieger dropped bombs on the western beach at Dieppe in the area of the casino and Pourville-West.

 

12.28 am

The Ia of the LXXXI AK reported to Oberleutnant Hänschel of Jagdfliegerführer 3 that the situation east of Dieppe was bereinigt. In Dieppe itself, the mopping-up process was making good progress. An intercepted enemy radio message read: "Many tanks destroyed. Dieppe situation very serious". Further, the enemy was still holding tight west of Dieppe, in Pourville. A counterattack in progress appeared to be making good progress. Finally, it was reported from Dieppe that the impression existed that the enemy was withdrawing. It was important now not to let the enemy get away on the sea.

 

12.20am

The 7/AR302 and the Batterie 265 were firing on ¨Pourville West in support of the German infantry attack. The other batteries were firing at the Dieppe beach and later at the departing boats.

 

12.35am

The Infanterieregiment 571 ordered: the II/IR 571 with its 6. Kompanie and a Zug of the 11. Kompanie was to conduct a recce from Pourville-Ost towards Pourville-West. It was to establish contact with the I/IR 571 which attacked Pourville West from the direction of Hautot.

 

12.36am

The 302 Infanteriedivision ordered: the Stab IR570 was to assume command of the sector from Criel to Belleville. In addition to the I/IR570, 14/IR570, Infanteriegeschützzug 570 and the Regimentsradfahr- und Pionierzug, the battalion could also make use of the 3/Pionierbataillon 302 to again repair the barbed wire defences at Berneval. However, the company would soon be moved out.

 

12.38am

The Funkmeldezentrale reported to the IR570 that 4 enemy ships were firing at Pourville. The division also communicated to the IR570 that the clearing up of the situation near Varangeville was planned to be undertaken by the III/IR 676 coming from the direction of Offranville. The batallion would be able to starts its attack by 2pm.

 

12.40am

The Radfahrschwadron and the 3/Pionierbataillon 302 are subordinated to the Stab Blücher and are the disposal of the division near Graincourt. The division commander arrived back from the Regimentsstab Klemm. The regiment was detailed to attack towards Pourville on the western bank of the Scie. The regiment was currently made up of the III/IR 570, I/IR 676, Panzerkompanie 81 and the subordinated 9/AR 203. Contact was to be established with the I/IR 571. The regiment could probably start its attack at 2.30pm.

 

12.50am

The following divisional order was sent to Oberst Klemm by an Ordonnanzoffizier: the III/IR 676, arriving at the southern boundary of Offranville, was to immediately attack in the direction of the Chateau Varengeville Höhe 74 near Le Haut le Mesnil. It was to push through to the coast and establish contact with the 3/IR 571 at the strongpoint Wn St-Marguerite - Quiberville-Ost and the Batterie 813 near Höhe 74. The Fernsprechstelle in the Wn Quiberville was to be used for reports to the division.

 

12.56am

The corps was informed about the plannd attack by the Regiment Klemm.

 

1.20pm

The II/IR 571 reported to the IR 571 that there was an air attack on Pourville-Ost (Caude Cote) and the Höhe 4 Vents Ferme. The enemy was observed to be entering boats at Pourville.

 

1.30pm

The IR 571 reported that around 100 prisoners had been made. Off Dieppe there was strong smoke apparently used by the enemy to evacuate.

 

1.33pm

Report of the above by the division to the corps.

 

1.40pm

The corps commander ordered that the 10. Panzerdivision was not to proceed beyond the current Torcy area. The navy also reported that a new convoy was on its way from the UK towards Dieppe.

 

1.45 pm

The commander of LXXXI Armeekorps issued an order to the 10 Panzerdivision through the 302 Infanteriedivision.  The former had to prepare itself in the area ordered, but would not yet attack. The 302 Infanteriedivision would remain in command of all the units engaged. The Oberbefehlshaber West issued the following order: the enemy which had landed near Dieppe was withdrawing. It was now important to destroy as much as possible of what was left of the enemy forces. For this purpose, especially tanks and artillery of the 10 Panzerdivision were to move forward. Each available gun was to contribute to the full destruction of the enemy. The entire front, in which the enemy had landed, was to be mopped up in the shortest possible time. The division ordered the IR571 to inform the Wn Quiberville about the Klemm attack on Pourville and on the Chateau Varengeville, firing position 813 and the lighthouse.

 

2.10 pm

On the Dieppe beach the mopping up was procerding favourably.

 

2.20pm

A Lagebesprechung was held between the Ia 10 Panzerdivision and the 302ID at the headquarters of the latter. Support by the Panzerdivision was not required. The 302ID would remain in command in the entire sector.

 

2.37pm

The IR571 reported to the division that the Dieppe beach had been cleared of enemy. The 6/IR 571 had pushed through to Pourville, where there were no more landings. The impression is that the enemy is evacuating along the entire front. Pourville was again firmly in Germabn hands.

 

2.45pm

The division reported to the corps that the enemy attach had been as good as repulsed along the entire front and that only mopping up was still ongoing.

 

2.47pm

The division informed the Jagdfliegerführer 2 about the situation and thanked it for its support. Aircraft were asked to only attack landing or departing boats.

 

2.55pm

The II/IR 571 reported the Dieppe beach to be cleared of the enemy.

 

3.04pm

The division ordered the NA 302 to lay a direct telephone connection to the Regimentsstab Klemm via Arques-la-Bataille to complement the currently existing radio connection.

 

3.14 pm

The Ic of the 302 Infanteriedivision reported on the situation in the divisional area at 3pm. Isolated enemy troops were still present only near Varengeville. Dieppe and Pourville were firmly controlled by the division. 1100 prisoners had already been taken.

 

3.30pm

An enemy radio message was intercepted by the Luftwaffe saying that as of 3.30pm strong enemy air attacks would be launched against Dieppe. All units were informed of this.

 

3.45pm

The daily report to the corps stated that all attacks had been repulsed with own units, whilst suffering limited losses. Over 1100 enemy had been taken prisoners, several tanks had been destroyed and heavy losses had been incurred by the enemy.

 

5.20 pm

The commander of LXXXI Armeekorps issued an order to the 10 Panzerdivision through the 302 Infanteriedivision. The former was not to cross the line Arques-la-Bataille - Tourville to the north and was to prepare itself as corps reserve in the area Tourville - Londinières - Neufchatel - St Saens.

 

5.35 pm

LXXXI Armeekorps issued the following orders to the 302 and 332 Infanteriedivisionen, Regiment Gollé, Korpstransportkolonne Sandkühler and the Quartiermeister:

  • An renewed enemy attack on Dieppe and surroundings during the night was deemed possible, as the enemy might try to evacuate the marooned troops.

  • Jägerregiment Gollé  was to remain as corps reserve in Totes (Regimentsstab, 2 Bataillonen, Batterie West) and Yvetot (2 Bataillonen).

  • The Kolonne Sandkühler was to move to to Totes and Yvetot with one company, respectively. The Regiment Gollé was to tale all necessary preparatory steps to be transported off with these transport units if and when necessary.

  • The arrival in Totes and Yvetot as well as the completion of the above-mentioned preparatory measures were to be reported.

6 pm

The Chef des Generalstabes LXXXI Armeekorps informed the Ia of Heeresgruppe D. The situation on the coast in and around Dieppe was now bereinigt. Isolated enemy troops were presumbaly left only in the Varengeville woods. These woods were being searched at the time. Overall, 28 tanks had been destroyed and 60 officers and 1500 men had been captured.

 

6.01pm

The Abteilung Blücher was ordered by radio to St-Nicolas, where it would rest at the disposal of the division.

 

20 August 1942

8.40am

Oberbefehlshaber West ordered Alarmstufe II for all units involved to be ended. Secondly, the subordination of the 10 Panzerdivision to the LXXXI Armeekorps was to be terminated. Finally, the corps reserve, IR 676 was ordered to regain its former locations.

 

untimed:

The Oberbefehlshaber AOK 15, Chef des Stabes Heeresgruppe D, Kommandierender General LXXXI AK, Chef des Stabes LXXXI AK and Ia LXXXI AK visted the 302 Infanteriedivision and Dieppe.

 

21 August 1942

untimed:

Kommandierender General LXXXI AK visited Dieppe.

 

22 August 1942

untimed:

Oberbefehlshaber West, Generalfeldmarschal von Rundstedt, Oberbefehlshaber AOK 15, Kommandierender General LXXXI AK  visted the 302 Infanteriedivision and Dieppe.

 

24 August 1942

untimed

Kommandierender Admiral Frankreich (located at the Hotel Plaza in Paris) visited Dieppe

 

26 August 1942

untimed:

Kommandierender General LXXXI AK visited Dieppe.

 

29 August 1942

untimed:

Reichsminister Speer, Kommandierender General LXXXI AK, Generalmajor Fichtner und Oberst Thomale (beide vom Waffenprüfungsamt), Kdr 1 SS-AH visited Dieppe and the Panzerkompanie 81.

 

3 September 1942

untimed:

Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine, Grossadmiral Raeder in Dieppe.

23 September 1942
untimed:
Generaloberst Dollmann, OB AOK 7, visited the LXXXI AK and Dieppe.

4. Grundlegende Bemerkungen OBWest Nr. 10 (die Abschlusserfahrungen über das Zerschlagen des feindl. Landungsversuches bei Dieppe)
(13 September 1942)


1) The main experience
The main experience was that the prepared German defence and combat operations had worked as planned.
2) The time of an enemy landing
The enemy could execute a landing attempt at any time; no specific or likely time can be predicted. So far landings had taken place at high tide and by bad weather or at night. However, the enemy can land at ANY moment.
3) Recognizing an enemy landing
The early recognition of an enemy landing is of paramount importance, but also difficult. In the case of Dieppe the recognition was not without problems. Even though
Luftwaffe radar had spotted unidentified ships and had passed on this info to the Marine-Ortungszentrale the duty officer here had not passed on that information. Also, an artillery battery had not engaged two large ships, believing that they were own ships. At Dieppe, it was luck (contact with a German convoy) that led to the early recognition of an enemy landing., as a result of which the coastal units could be alerted.
4) The alert procedure
Some units and soldiers claimed not to have been alerted. It was ordered that whomever called the alert would be responsible for the alert until others had repeated and confirmed it.
5) The enemy combat operations
A localised landing operation with numerous landing boats on a wide frontage enables the enemy to land many soldiers with a short period. For the defenders, it is of the utmost importance to make use of the two moments of weakness of the attackers: the actual landing when the boats open their ramps and the first moment after the landing, when the landed soldiers have no cover whatsoever. For troop commanders it is importance to quickly identify the valuable targets and engage them with heavy weapons, i.e. tank landing ships or landing boats with many soldiers on them. Initially a landed enemy will not be supported by heavy weapons. Even fire support from ships or aircraft will still leave many gaps. The defenders thus need to realize that they outpower and outgun the landing enemy and must effectively use this superiority. At Dieppe the enemy commandos performed well. However, the defenders have to realize that they are superrior to these commandos on account of their well-constructed strongpoints fully equipped with heavy weapons.
6) The own combat operations
There were many examples at Dieppe of individual well-positioned soldiers who kept fighting or shooting and who managed to create havoc within the enemy ranks. This shows the importance of earlier orders to keep a position at all cost. The counteratta cks by the local reserve were also very successful., showing the importance of the latter.
7) Every German soldier and man as combattant
The existing orders to this effect have been shown to be effective. However, the combat value of these combattants should not be overestimates. They cannot be compared with hardened troops and should only be deployed in conjunction with the latter.
8) Anti-tank combat operations (see Grundlegende Bermerkungen Nr 11)
9) Engineer combat operations (see Grundlegende Bermerkungen Nr 12)
10) Communications
11) Intelligence: captured equipment and enemy
12) Final conclusion
Even though we gained useful experience from the Dieppe assault, so did the enemy. It is therefore to be expected that next time the enemy will return in a better way and with more forces. However, Dieppe has shown that an enemy landing can be repulsed.

5. Documents from the Kriegsmarine

Report by the Kommandierenden Admiral Frankreich to the Marinegruppenkommando West (20 August 1942)

On 20 August 1942 the Admiral Frankreich reported to the Marinegruppenkommando West. He first cited a report from the Marinebefehlshaber West and then added his comments. The latter briefly described the actions of 2 distinct groups: Kampfgruppe II (under the command of Lt Goebel, killed, made up of Stabszug Hafenkommandant, Wachkompanie, smalle numbers of 4/6 Flottillenstammabteilung) and the Kampfgruppe Signalstation. The Marinebefehshaber requested better artillery and better weapons (AT and machine guns)? Special praise was given to the Hafenkommandant Fregattenkapitän Wahn. Casualties were said to be 14 dead, 21 wounded and 10 missing)

List of casualties (20-21 August 1942)

On 20-21 August 1942 the Kriegsmarine reported the following casualties (in various versions, the following showing the end version): Hafenkommandant - Stabskompanie (4 dead, 4 wounded), Hafenkommandant - Wachkompanie (3 dead, 7 wounded, 1 missing), Hafenüberwachungsstelle (-), FS-Stelle (1 missing), Signalstelle (1 wounded), Marinevermittlung (-), Hafenschutzflottille Le Havre - Gruppe Dieppe (3 dead, 5 wounded, 1 missing), 38. MS-Flottille (-), Flottillenstammabteilung (5 dead), 3. Kompanie der Versuchsbataillon (12 dead, 9 wounded), unknown command (1 killed)? Thus the total was 28 killed, 26 wounded (25 in document) and 3 missing (2 in document).

Short comment by the Marinebefehlshaber after his visit to Dieppe on 20 August 1942)

This officer started his comments by pointing out that he did not yet possess all the information for a real reports; these were just his first thoughts and conclusions on the basis of what he had see and heard during his visit. However, he already mentioned that no reconnaissance (naval or air or rader) had seen the invasion fleet approach. Only because the invasion fleet had run into a German convoy was it detected. The Marinesignalstelle Dieppe fired an alert flare at 5.35am thus warning all defences. When the first landings had taken place was still unclear; however, the Marinestellen had first observed a landing at 6.15am. It was also still unclear why Batterie 813 called Sperrfeuer only at 6.58am. It would seem that a 7.5cm Flak gun had initially been responsible for effective artillery fire. Also the Heeresbatterie in the vicinity of the Signalstelle apparently engaged the enemy earlier on the directions of the Marinesignalstelle. Once the enemy had landed, it had been predominantly Heer and naval units that had engaged it. Especially the naval soldiers had suffered high casualties. Decisive for the failure of the allied attack was that the tanks had remained stuck on the beach. Only one tank had made it off the beach and had moved in the direction of the headquarters of the Hafenkommandant. It had been troops of the Hafenkommandant and the Flottillenstammabteilung who had destroyed the tank. Due to local difficulties only single Pak guns could be deployed. The Marinebefehslaber had formed the impression that the enemy attack had remained stranded on the beach. A critical moment for the defenders had been between 9 and 10.30am when the artillery had used a lor of ammunition and the combat could only be continued with infantry weapons.The Luftwaffe had arrived only very late at the scene. The Heeresküstenbatterien 813 and 2/770 initially fired Sprrefeuer on request and only later fired at single targets. Even though the enemy succeeded in taking the Batterie 813 it did not exploit this success. Also in other places the enemy did not show the will to attack and withdrew very quickly. A decisive role had been played by the Marinesignalstelle under the command of the Stabssignalmeister Heinz Wilhelm. During the fighting the MSS had been the only Stelle which had kept communicating with other headquarters of both the navy and the Heer. The MG of the Signalstelle fired on the attacking enemy and even shot down a Spitfire. In conclusion, the Marinebefehlshaber was of the opinion that the ultimate aim of the attack had been to advance to Le Havre and take that port. Consequently, he concluded by saying that Le Havre would remain at risk in the future.

Strength of navy personnel in Dieppe (20 August 1943)

Hafenkommandant (152 Köpfe), Hafenüberwachungsstelle (44 Köpfe), Marinesignalstelle (11 Köpfe), Hafenschutzflottille (ca. 100 Köpfe), Gegenfunkstelle (4 Köpfe), 6. Flottillenstammabteilung (ca. 45 Köpfe) = ca. 360 Köpfe.

Report by the Hafenkommandant Dieppe on combat action on 19 August)

1) weather

On the basis of the (good) weather drohende Gefahr was in effect.

2) naval fight

At 4.50am the Signalstation informed the Hafenkommandant of an ongoing naval fight off the coast. This report was forwarded to the MNO Le Havre and the Flugmeldezentrale. The fight was more intense than usual an appears to have ended at 5.25am. At the same time the B-Stelle of the 8/AR 302 was informed of the observation. The sentry on the jetty noticed a naval fight at 4.50am and informed his officer. Thereafter, communication was taken up with the Signalstationi.

3) Situation off the port

Three HS-Boote were in position. A tug was stating by in front of the port for the planned passing convoy. Around 5.45 the latter noticed destroyers and many other boats. As this was clearly not the expected convoy, the tug returned to port, together with 2 HS-Boote. At 5.30am eingine noises were heard and at 5.35am the Signalstation observed ships off Pourville not responding to requests to identify themselves.

4) Situation of the naval units in the port

In the port area two patrols were operation (each consisting of 7 men). In the avant-port there was the Hafenwache with the crew of the vessels in port. The sentry post on the jetty was manned by 2 soldiers. There were no sailing units in port.

5) Measures taken by the commander of the StpGr

According to the commander of the StpGr Gefechtsbereischaft was ordered at 5.40am on the basis of a report that strong air units were approaching. The latter report did not reach the naval units. The NCO allocated to the jetty offiicer had warned the latter in a timely way. Further, the jetty officer was in direct contact with the Signalstation. According to the Sperrfeurleiter, Major Hesse of the III/AR 302 the battery was ready to fire at 5.30am. and the Sperrfeuerleiter was present in person at the Gefechtsstand. The Alarmbefehl of the commander of the StpGr reached him at 5.40am. At the same time contact was made with the HKAA 770. At 5.50am Sperrfeuer was ordered for Pourville; shortly thereafter for Puys. Towards 6am Sperrfeuer was moved to Dieppe but shortly thereafter discontinued and replaced by Beobachtungsfeuer on individual ships. Even though there is some discrepancy between the observations of the Signalstation and the details provided by the Heereseinheiten, there is every indication that Sperrfeuer was ordered in good time.

6) Initial positions of the naval units at the time of the landing

At 5.35am the Signalstelle and a HS-Boot fired alarm flares, since unidentified ships were approaching Pourville and not responding and fire was observed in the two directions. The firing of these flares was immediately reported to the Hafenkommandant, StpGr and the MNO Le Havre. Shortly thereafter, the signal for Sperrfeuer was fired in the direction of Pourville. Meanwhile the naval personnel had taken shelter in the air-raidbunkers in full combat gear due to the air attacks. Meanwhile the naval pilot on the tug, when entering port, observed many landing boats. At around  5.50am he observed 2 landing craft on fire at Pourville. Through artificial mist the visibility then decreased. At around 6am the Signalstation reported that enemy was probably trying to land at Pourville. At 6.15al landing ships and destroyers were sighted off Dieppe beach itself, while Dieppe itself was being attack from the air and the sea. By 6.20am around 40 landing ships were observed heading for Puys under cover of artificial smoke. At 6.25 landing ships were observed aproaching Dieppe itself. Faced with imminent attack the naval personnel took up its fighting positions.

  • The Stabszug Hafenkommandant with 25 men occupied positions immediately north, east and west of bunker no. 67 near the casino in support of the 7/IR 571.

  • The 4/6 Flaottillenstammabteilung (25 men) and the Wachkompanie Hafenkommandant under the command of Leutnant Göbel occupied positions in front of the Metropole hotel over a stretch of some 100m

  • Kapitänleutnant Meinhardt arrived in the port and took over command of the Hafenwache and the crews of the ships.

  • The three HS-Boote safely arrived in port and continued firing at aircraft until the weapons could no longer be used, after which they reinforced the Gruppe Meinhardt and the Stosstrupp of the Gruppe Oldenburg, which later cleared the beach of the enemy.

  • The Hafenkommandant himself took up his observation position on the heights opposite the castle. His Gefechtsstand was in a small bunker near the quarters in the area of the Regimentsgefechtsstand 571. The otherwise planned Gefechtsstand  at the Hafenkommandantur was not used since there were no sailing units and his current position was better.

  • The Hafenüberwachungsstelle was deployed as Kampfgruppe 15 in the Abschnitt Süd  for rear security purposes

  • Present in the Hafenkommandantur were the Büropersonal, Telefonwache and a Sprengkommando under the command of Marinebauingenieur Weiss of the Hafenbauabteilung.

  • Finally, the Marinevermittlung worked from 6.05am with an Alarmbesetzung. All available soldiers were deployed to secure the area.

7) Chronology of combat events

 

At arouind 6am the units of the Hafenkomandant reported Gefechtsbereitschaft.

 

first assault wave

 

The first assault wave was preceded by a heavy air and naval bombardment on the Dieppe beach. The intention of keeping down the defenders failed. On the orders of the Artilleriekommandeur 4 batteries opened Sperrfeuer at 6am. Since enemy landing craft were quickly identified this was changed to observed fire, targeting ships and the beach. The enemy landing itself took place 1 hour after high tide, thus a a very inconvenient moment. Presumably the attackers had been delayed. The main landing effort was located at the western end of the beach close to the casino. Between 6.25 and 6.45am no landing craft could be observed due to artificial smoke. At 6.45am the Signalstation was able to observe 3 tanks on the beach. Due to a timely defence the first wave was already seriously reduced. Only a few tanks managed to pass the barbed wire defences; the majority had become stuck in the stones on the beach. as had indeed be our own experience from past exercises. The attacker succeeeded in taking hold of the casino. From there the attacker could have rolled up defences from the side. Thus, the kampgruppe 2 undertook a counterattack towards the casino, which was unsuccessful due to the fire of some tanks which had broken through.  Part of the Kampgruppe was forced to withdraw to the houses. From there, however, it succeeded in halting the attackers even before the wire obstacle. Only about 10 men or so succeeded in making it through to the church St-Remy, where they were stopped.

 

second assault wave

 

At around 7.20am the enemy again started to create heavy artificial smoke. 11 mighty Flugboote overflew the city and port. A second wave of landing craft beached near the casino. By artillery fire a large transport ship was destroyed near the casino, while also the other landing craft suffered substantial losses.

 

third asault wave

At 9.05am fighter again attacked an prepared the third asault wave with the help of destroyers (012, 013, 015, C20). These ships also created artificial smoke, while also targeting the houses at the beach. At 9.20 new landing craft appeared. One transport ship headed straight for the casino. Still, a landing attempt with new tanks failed. At around this time the Signalstelle sent a message to the Hafenkommandant saying that Puys had been cleared off the enemy with 400 taken prisoner. While forwarding this message to the commander of the StpGr the Hafenkommandant learned that the enemy had broken through a Pourville, but that there was no imminent danger since substantial reserve had meanwhile arrived. Towards 11am geramn air support, repeatedly requested by the Hafenkommandant, finally arrived.

fourth assault wave

When our own air support again weakened, at 11.50am a fourth landing attempt was made. To create smoke 3 large ships headed for the port entrance. The Hafenkommandant was able to observe a brisk landing attempt by 6 boats which headed for the casino without being engaged by our artillery. Stiil, at 12.30am several ships turned back. Shortly thereafter, a transport ship was sunk at the western jetty.