History of LXXXIX Armeekorps (October 1942-June 1944)

 

1942    1943    1944

 

1. 1942

The history of LXXXIX Armeekorps starts on 25 October 1942, date on which the former Generalkommando Schelde was given its name and final name. At that moment the unit was commanded by General der Panzertruppen Dr. Alfred Ritter von Hubicki with headquarters in Antwerpen (Nachtegalenpark). The Chef des Generalstabes was Oberstleutnant i.G. Hans-Dietrich von Boeltzig as of January 1943. The corps was made up of 2 divisions:
  • Küstenverteidigungsabschnitt A1: 65 Infanteriedivision (Walcheren und Nord- und Süd-Beveland)
  • Küstenverteidigungsabschnitt A2: 712 Infanteriedivision (Terneuzen bis Wenduine)

At this moment in time the remainder of the Belgian coast was under the operational control of the LXXXII Armeekorps. Mention should also be made of the Abschnitt Antwerpen, where the 39 Infanteriedivision was located, over which the corps had tactical control.

For the histories of individual KVAs (with Luftwaffe/Kriegsmarine units) and divisions the interested reader is referred to the individual pages detailing the history of these units. The remainder of this page will consider the history of the corps itself, as well as that of (independent) corps units. A separate page has also been created for the Alarmeinheiten of the corps.

The LXXXIX Armeekorps was given the task of defending the Schelde estuary, both banks of the river Schelde and (the port of) Antwerp. In order to to be able to do this, it worked in close cooperation with the Abschnitt Antwerpen. The corps only exercised tactical control over this area, the administrative control being assumed by the Militärbefehlshaber Belgien- Nordfrankreich.

On 15 October 1942 the AOK 15 ordered its subordinated corps to establish Alarmeinheiten or security troops from the supporting units in the rear.and to report on these. For more information on the Alarmeinheiten of the LXXXIX Armeekorps see here.

On 26 October 1942 the LXXXIX Armeekorps had the following subordinated Heerestruppen:

 

 

An important change took place on 10 November 1942, when the 39 Infanteriedivision was posted on the coast between Wenduine and the French-Belgian border, relieving the 306 Infanteriedivision there, with control officially being handed over on 18 November. Interestingly, it was initially decided to put the 39 Infanteriedivision under the operational control of the LXXXII Armeekorps.

However, on 11 November 1942 this decision was changed and the division would come under the operational control of the LXXXIX Armeekorps in the newly-created Küstenverteidigungsabschnitt A3. This move resulted in a request by the corps for the forces then present in the port of Antwerp to be relieved by forces of the Militärbefehlshaber. The 306 Infanteriedivision, which was planned to go to the Russian front, concentrated in the area Lokeren-Torhout-Tielt-Kortrijk-Oudenaarde with temporary headquarters in Gent. While in this area, the division was also under the operational control of the LXXXIX (from 13 November). On 2 December the division left the corps area.

On 12 November 1942 the LXXXIX Armeekorps issued its Korpsbefehl for the 306 Infanteriedivision to be relieved by the 39 Infanteriedivision. It also stipulated that command of the sector had to be officially transferred on 18 November.

On 13 November 1942 the Generalkommando LXXXIX Armeekorps reported the successful takeover of the KVA of the 306 Infanteriedivision on the same day. Most interestingly, the relavent document also explains the decision to keep the headquarters of the corps in Wilrijk, far away from the coast. The main reason for this decision was that Antwerp was well situated in terms of communication lines, especiallu with the fixed (underground) telephone cable to The Netherlands. Locations closer to the coast would have to make do with provisional and improvised (behelfsmässig) connections, which also be vulnerable to air attack. Also, connections with the Militärbefehlshaber and Wehrmachtsbefehlshaber would be more difficult. Even though the city of Gent was also considered as a corps headquarters, this location had been rejected as the city was not located in the Gefechtsgebiet.

Also on 13 November 1942 the LXXXIX Armeekorps issued a Korpsbefehl concerning the forces in the Abschnitt Antwerpen. With the 39 Infanteriedivision leaving for the coast, there wouild no longer ben corps forces present in the city and port. Thus, the Korpsbefehl stipulated that the 65 Infanteriedivision on Walcheren was to send one bataillion of the Grenadierregiment 146 on South-Beveland to Antwerp, where it would have to arrive on 19 November.

Due to the decision to put the 39 Infanteriedivision under the operational control of the LXXXIX Armeekorps the corps boundaries were also changed, the French-Belgian border now being the dividing line. As a result of this change, the most important higher artillery headquarters, the Heeresküstenartillerieregiment 940, headquartered in De Haan, with many units in Belgium, was fully subordinated to the LXXXIX Armeekorps on 15 November 1942. On 22 November it was precisized that while the corps had administrative control, tactical control was exercised by the 39 Infanteriedivision.

The document below details the organization of the Heeresküstenartillerieregiment 940 at around this time:

On 15 November 1942 Oberbefehlshaber West issued an order that in order to place too big a burden on the troops an new alarm stage would be introduced. The introduction of the stage Vorwarnung meant that the until then first alarm stage, Alarmstufe I, was not to be ordered too many times.

On 18 November 1942 command of KVA A3 was officially tranferred from the 306 Infanteriedivision to the 39 Infanteriedivision.

On 19 November 1942 the batallion from the 65 Infanteriedivision (see above) arrived in Antwerp. It was subordinated to the Abschnitt Antwerpen and was organized as follows:

  • one companiy in Oorderen (Stp Kreuzschansschleuse)

  • one company as security company for the corps headquarters in Wilrijk.

  • batallion headquarters and remainder of the batallion in Ekeren

Also on 19 November 1942 the Generalkommando LXXXIX Armeekorps issued an important document, it which it clarified the (complex) situation concerning the use of artillery in KVA A2 and KVA A3. More details can be found on the relevant KVA history pages. Also, on this the LXXXIX Armeekorps reported the planned arrival (from 20 November) of the Baubataillon (SF) 128 in Antwerp. The batallion came from the Krim area and was economically and administratively subordinated to the corps. Eventually, the latter unit never came to Antwerp.

On 21 November 1942 the LXXXIX Armeekorps issued its Korpstagesbefehl 9/42. Firstly, In it a number of subordinations were decided on. Thus the Heeresküstenartillerieregimentsstab 940 was subordinated tactically and economically to the 39 Infanteriedivision but administratively and displinarily to the corps; I/GR 146 was subordinated tactically to the Abschnitt Antwerpen and the Baubataillon 128 directly to the corps. Secondly, a number of new officers had been appointed: Oberstleutnant iG von Boeltzig as Chef des Generalstabes, Major Zimmermann as Quartiermeister, Major Götze as Korrpsnachrichtenführer and Oberleutnant Brenner as Ic.

On 22 November 1942 it was reported that from 1 December 1942 onwards the 338 Infanteriedivision would be located in the Antwerp area. Originally, it had been intented to use the division to replace the 39 Infanteriedivsion at the coast, with the latter again becoming Heeresgruppenreserve. However, a few weeks later this plan was abandoned and the unit left the area on 3 January 1943. Also on this day, the AOK15 informed all its corps, inclusing the LXXXIX Armeekorps, that the Kriegsmarine had decided on 20 November to disestablish the following Hafenkommandanturen: Nieuwpoort, Gravelines, Le Treport and Trouville. The reason for this move was to free personnel to occupy the newly-acquired ports in the south of France. As only the Hafenüberwachungsstellen would remain in these ports, the corps were asked to take over the tasks of the Hafenkommandanturen. 67 sailors were withdrawn from Nieuwpoort.

On 23 November 1942 the corps commander held talks with the Abschnitt Antwerpen (the reportes is dated 25 November). Firstly, the new organization of the Abschnitt Antwerpen was discussed. Specifically, it was decided to send two of the four Belgian guns which had never been used on the Truppenübungsplatz Maria-ter-Heide to the Krezuschanzschleuse (Kruisschanslock). Secondly, flak use was discussed with the Flakgruppe. Joint exercises with the Flak units were ordered and the absence of a flak liaison officer was deplored. It was stated that 2 Flakkampftrupps could be built from the 4 light batteries present. Land targets had also been determined for the heavy flak batteries. It was further noted that the searchlight batteries had been demotorized and could not be used in a mobile way. It was also ordered that the leichte Flakkampfgruppen were to be motorised. Thirdly, the situation of the Fliegerhorst Deurne was discussed. It was said to have the following organisation:

  • Fliegerhorst Deurne: 6 Widerstandsnester, 3x 60cm Scheinwerfer, 12x 2cm Flak, 28x MG, 300 Mann, selbstänige Feuerwehr und technische Betriebsgruppe, 2 Panzervernichtungstrupps, LKW, 1 Zug auf Fahrräder.

On 26 November 1942 the Generalkommando LXXXIX Armeekorps informed its subordinate units of a decision taken by AOK 15. This decision concerned the construction of field fortifications and training. As far as the former was concerned, the troops were ordered, in addition to permanent fortifications, to primarily focus on field fortifications. Since troops were thus able to spend less time on military training the number of monthly exercises was to be reduced to a minimum of 4 and were to be mainly held in a company context.

On 27 November 1942 the corps was informed of the ongoing occupation by German forces of the thus far unoccupied part of France Since these actions could have consequenced for the Atlantic and Channel coasts as well, all units were placed on Alarmstufe I. On 29 November 1942 the alarm phase was brougt back to nights only and entirely discontinued on 2 December, after which it was replaced at night by the phase Vorwarnung (until

 

On 2 December 1942 the LXXXIX Armeekorps informed the 65 Infanteriedivision that the I/GR 146 was to return from Antwerp to its parent unit between 10 and 12 December. Only the 2. Kompanie was to stary in Antwerp as Wachkompanie for the corps headquarters.

On 4 December 1942 the LXXXIX Armeekorps sent a message of complaint to the AOK 15. The reason for this was two-fold. Firstly, the Hafenkommandant Oostende had been forced to shed the troops and (heavy) weapons defending the western jetty. Since no naval replacement troops were available, the army was forced to take over the defence of this important position. Secondly, the weapons platoon of 5/MAA 202 in Vrouwenpolder (Walcheren) had also been withdrawn. In the message the corps complained that, while it understood the position the navy was in, in the end it was always the army that was forced to bear the consequences.

On 5 December 1942 the LXXXIX Armeekorps ordered that the Grenadierregiment 758 of the 338 Infanteriedivision was to be subordinated to the Abschnitt Antwerpen from 8 December onwards. The headquarters of this regiment were in Zwijndrecht. Further, the I/GR 146 (without its second company) was to be withdrawn from Antwerp from 10 December at the earliest. On the same day the corps also sent a message to the AOK 15 it which it pojnted out that, with the 306 Infanteriedivision having been relieved, the 39 Infanteriedivision had taken over a combat area which had been originally conceived for a 9-batallion division. As the 39 ID was composed of only two regiments/six batallions, the corps now requested the most southern part of the division's combat area (around Poperinge) to be taken away from the division. Units located in Poperinge at this point in time were 2/Jägerabteilung 23, Stabsbatterie 2/PzAR 95 (both of the 26 PzD) and Bäckereikompanie 182. This request was granted on 9 December 1942.

On 6 December 1942 the corps sent a message to the 712 Infanteriedivision ordering that, for the sake of fortification work and in order to make the troops more familiar with their duties at the coast, each regimental sector of the division would have 2 batallions on the coast, while a third (reserve) batallion would be especially trained as Eingreifreserve. Concretely, this meant that batallions could no longer be switched.

On 7 December 1942 the LXXXIX Armeekorps released its important document Korpsbefehl für die einheitliche Kampfführung der Scheldeverteidigung. In view of the possibility of an enemy amphibious landing on either side of the Schelde estuary, coupled with an airborne attack near Antwerp, the corps was given the following tasks:

  • foiling enemy landings (by sea and air) on Walcheren, North and South Beveland, the Belgian coast and the Schelde estuary

  • protecting the inner Schelde access to Antwerp as well as the city of Antwerp, especially its and port and the Schelde tunnels.

  • in close cooperation with the 65 and 712 Infanteriedivisionen the I/Grenzwachregiment Clüver was to deny an enemy penetration into the river Schelde as well as a landing in the Unterabschnitt West.

In the document particular attention was paid tho the defence of Antwerp The latter task fell to the Abschnittskommandant Antwerpen, Generalmajor Krech, who commanded 3 sub-sectors. The task of defending important objects and crushing potential internal unrest in the city was entrusted to the Feldkommandant 520. Ouitside the port area the defence of Antwerp was to be hinged on the belt of old forts surrounding the city. However, the majority of the available forces were to be kept as a mobile reserve.

The Korpsbefehl also reveals which other units, besides the Abschnitt Antwerpen, were under the tactical control of the corps:

 

Sind dem Generalkommando taktisch unterstellt:

I Heer:

Armeeübungsverband Vlissingen (Oberstleutnant Zühlsdorf): 17 kl Sturmboote (Unterstellung: taktisch GenKdo, sonstiges: 65ID)

Hochseelehrkommando Terneuzen (Oberstleutnant Gantke): 2 gr Sturmboote, 3 S-Fähren, 5 Landungsboote (Unterstellung: taktisch GenKdo, sonst OKH)

II Marine:

Admiral der Seebefehlsstellen:

12-15 mot Prähme in Antwerpen/3-4 in Breskens; Führer: Antwerpen (Oblt z S Schuhmann) (Antwerpen: Luchtballschule); Breskens: wird jeweils bestimmt

5 Marinefährpräme in Antwerpen (Führer: Oberleutnant Reedehase).

Unterstellung: taktisch 89AK, sonst 2 Flottillenstammabteilung unter dem Admiral der Seebefehlsstellen)

Seekommandant Süd-Holland:

Rheinflottille Vlissingen (Kapitänleutnant Krämer) (6 Boote) (Unterstellung: taktisch GenKdo, sonst Seekommandant)

32 Minensuchflottille Vlissingen (Kapitänleutnant Jacobi): 2 Fischdampfer, 8 gr Logger, 16 dänische Fischkutter (Unterstellung: taktisch GenKdo, sonst 1 SD in Utrecht)
III Luftwaffe:
Fähren-, Lehr-, und Ergänzungsabteilung Antwerpen
Oberstleutnant Schiller: 4 J-Transporter, 2 S-Fähren (Unterstellung: taktisch GenKdo, sonst General der Luftwaffe beim OKM

On 8 December 1942 the alarm phase Vorwarnung at night was cancelled. Also on this day the Generalkommando LXXXIX formulated a request to the AOK15 concerning the access defence of ports in its area of command, also against heavily armoured ships.Thus, the request was for 2x 12-15cm canons under concrete each for the ports of Breskens, Zeebrugge and Oostende, which were to be transformed into Panzerstützpunkte.
On 10 December 1942 the corps commander visited the troops of the 338 Infanteriedivision in Antwerp. He found the troops of I/GR 146 still in their locations, with transfer planned for 11 December. The troops of the /GR758 (commanded by Hauptmann Sievert) were deployed as follows: 2. Kompanie in Ekeren; 4. Kompanie in Sint-Mariaburg; 1. Kompanie am Kreuzschanzschleuse. Artillerieregiment 338 (commanded by Oberst pirker) was also visted. It was deployed as follows: I Abteilung in Tunrhout, II Abteilung in Maria-ter-Heide; III Abteilung in Merksem.

On 15 December 1942 the LXXXIX Armeekorps was made up of the following units:


On the same day the LXXXIX Armeekorps was deployed as follows:


Until 16 December 1942 the following officers made up the headquarters staff of the LXXXIX Armeekorps:


On 17 December 1942 the recently appointed interim commander of the Armeeoberkommando 15 General der Panzertruppen von Vietinghoff inspected the sector of the 39ID in the morning and that of the 712ID in the afternoon. On 18 December the 65 Infanteriedivision on Walcheren was inspected.
On 20 December 1942 the Generalkommando requested the AOK15 to fully motorize the Infanteriepanzerjägerkompanien of the 39 and 65 Infanteriedivisionen, who were still partly equipped with horses. This was deemed necessary as the reserves, with whom these companies were supposed to cooperate, were already motorized.

On 23 December 1942 the AOK 15 informed the corps that the Brigade 999 woiuld enter the area of command of the LXXXIX Armeekorps and was to be stationed for further training on the Truppenübungsplatz Maria-ter-Heide, north of Antwerp.
On 25 December 1942 the LXXXIX Armeekorps ordered the Abschnitt Antwerpen that the Grenadierregiment 758 of the 338 Infanteriedivision was to be withdrawn from Antwerp and would be replaced by just one company(!), namely the 1. Kompanie/Grenzwachregiment Clüver. The company was to be located to the north of Antwerp so that it could defend the strongpoints Kreuzschanzschleuse and Scheldetunnel. It was to be tactically subordinated to the Kampfgruppe Hafen. Further, the organisation of the 13-14 Kompanien in the Abschnitt West was to be changed in such a manner (by weaking the strongpoints) that each company would have one mobile platoon in reserve.
Thus at the end of December 1942 the following units were under the tactical control of the LXXXIX Armeekorps:


To finish the year a document of 31 December 1942 offers an excellent overview of the progress made in fortifying the coast:

Tätigkeitsbericht der Abt Stopi des Gen.Kdo. LXXXIX AK bis 31/12/42
Arbeits- und Materialschwerpunkte: A1: Middelburg; A2: Zeebrügge und Breskens; A3: Ostende (von LXXXII AK)
Ständige anlagen zugewiesen: A1 Vlissingen (180), freie Küste (65); A2: Breskens (40), freie Küste (160); A3: Ostende (60), freie Küste (100)
(insgesamt 605)
Bis 25/12/42 betoniert: A1: 33; A2: 95; A3: 111
Bis 25/12/42 im Bau: A1: 40; A2: 71; A3: 85
Bis 25/12/42 eingewiesen: A1: 139; A2: 231; A3: 297
Panzerstützpunkten: Nettelbeck, Breskens, Fischereihafen, Ostende
Bis 30/12/42 eingebaute 5cm KwK: A1: 43; A2: 34; A3: 30
Einsatz von für Mitte März zugesagten RAD: A1: 2 Gruppen (12 Abteilungen); A2: 1 Gruppe (6 Abteilungen); A3: 1 Gruppe (6 Abteilungen)
Minen bis 29/12/42 im KVA A1: 4160 T-Minen, 675 S-Minen, 189 Beh. Minen, 1916 Pz Minen
Minen bis 29/12/42 im KVA A2: 1739 T-Minen, 1699 S-Minen, 1307 Beh. Minen, 3244 Pz Minen
Minen bis 29/12/42 im KVA A3: 396 T-Minen und mehrere Minenfelder vorbereitet

More information on the activities of the above staff section can be found here.

2. 1943


On 2 January 1943 the 338 Infanteriedivision left the corps area.
On 3 January 1943 first transports of the Afrika-Brigade 999 arrived in the same area. The brigade was subordinated to the Generalkommando in every respect, with the last units arriving on 7 January. It was renamed Afrikadivision 999 on 2 February and left the corps areao on 20 February.
On 10 January 1943 the Armeeübungsverband Vlissingen (see above) was officially dissolved.
On 14 January 1943 measures were ordered to make the artillery batteries 1/652 and 2/652 transportable. For the latter the grosse Kraftwagenkolonne of the 712 ID and for the former the Kraftfahrkompanie of the 39 ID would be used. On the same day measures were ordered for strengthening of defensive capabilities. Thus, the divisions had formed Alarmeinhiten with the combat troops (from the rear units) and the logistics troops. Of the Alarmeinheiten formed by the combat troops, the following numbers were permanenetly deployed on coastal defence duties: 39ID (143 soldiers), 65 ID (261 soldiers), 712 ID (88 soldiers) and the Generalkommando (14 soldiers). Also, the corps reported the following Gefechtsstärke/Verpflegungsstärke ration: 78.2%. With the Alarmeinheiten included, this ration increased to 80,15%.
On 15 January 1943 the corps again addressed the issue of defensive strengths. Firstly, it acknowledged that the overall (manpower) situation (on the Russian front) demanded an extreme level of transferring forces to the Rast, even at the risk of further weakening defences in the West. Then, the corps expressed its approval of every kind of improvisation to boost defensive strength in the corps area.
On 16 January 1943 the corps reported that measures to increase the combat strength of the Infanteriepanzerjägerkompanien had been completed.
On 20 January 1943 the Stab Heeresküstenartillerieabteilung 823  was moved to Wenduiine in KVA A3 to Duinbergen in KVA A2, where it assumed the seatactical command of the Artillerieuntergruppe Zeebrügge.
On 23 January 1943 it was reported that the Hochseelehrkommando Terneuzen was tactically subordinated to the corps, while economically and judicially to the 712 ID.
On 25 January 1943 2/GR 146 of the 65 ID was relieved by the 6/GR 146 as Sicherungskompanie at the corps headquarters in Antwerp.

On 28-29 January 1943 Generalfeldmarschall von Rundstedt visited the area of the Generalkommando.

On 1 February 1943 the corps commander visited the Abschnitt Antwerpen. He ordered that, in the event of an attack the Alarmeinheiten would have to relieve the Landesschützenbataillon 736, which would then act as a tactical reserve for the sector. The corps commander further expressed his wish that from I/Grenzwachregiment Clüver only 1 company would defend the strongpoints, so that that other company (thus released) could be trained and simultaneous act as a reserve unit. By also transferring this company to the Abschnitt Mitte, this sub-sector (currently without forces) would also be secured.
On 2 February 1943 Artilleriekommandeur 189 was established as a static command by OBWest.

Important changes took place on 10 February 1943. Firstly, the order was given for the 39 Infanteriedivision at the coast to be relieved by the 171 Reservedivision, with the former concentrating in the area Oostkamp - Diksmuide - Tielt - Izegem - Roeselare as Heeresgruppenreserve. Secondly, the Afrikadivision 999 was ordered to be tranferred to the south of France. On 18 February 1943 the LXXXIX Armeekorps was given a new task. In an effort to rebuild the 6 Armee which had capitulated and had perished in Stalingrad on 31 January the corps was ordered to provide forces to newly establish the 44 Infanteriedivision, with cadre units to be drawn from all the corps' divisions. The headquarters of this division were established in Lokeren. The Aufstellungsstab was led by Major Birsak.
On 23 February 1943 the 171 Reservedivision started to relieve the 39 Infanteriedivision on the Belgian coast, with the latter destined to be transferred to the Russian front, leaving the corps area on 7 March. With the former unit being a reserve division, a number of its units still had to be set up. Also, it was only under the tactical command of the corps.
On 26 February 1943 the 39 Infanteriedivision officially handed over command of its sector to the 171 Reservedivision and transferred to the area Oostkamp - Diksmuide - Tielt - Izegem - Roeselare as Heeresgruppenreserve, before being transferred to the East.

Operational on 1 March 1943 the LXXXIX Armeekorps was given a bodenständige artillery headquarters, namely the Artilleriekommandeur 189, with Oberst Nieper as its first commander. The headquarters were located in Antwerpen, Eglantierlaan 15 and could be reached through the Hauptvermittlung 1 Antwerpen. Subordinated to these headquarters were:
  • Heeresküstenartillerieregiment 940
  • Stellungsbatterie (Küste) 308
  • Stellungsbatterie (Küste) 323
  • Stellungsbatterie (Küste) 343

On 2 March 1943 a document discussed the troublesome engineer situation with the 171 Reservedivision. Specifically, the division was said not to possess trained engineer forces. The available Infanteriepionierkompanie 216 was assessed as nicht fähig. To make matters worse, engineer units from other divisions could not be made available. The corps thus requested the allocation of a Stamme (cafre) to form an engineer company. Further, on this day another document ordered measures for the creation of reserves and their mobility. The document started by acknowledging that with the current disposition of forces along the coast line the outcome of combat actions would be dependent on and decided by the deployment of mobile reserves. In this respect, the following measures were ordered. Firstly, all established Alarmeinheiten were to be deployed in the KVAs from the start of combat operations. Secondly, the Alarmeinheiten were to be deployed in such a way that complete units were freed to act as reserves. Thirdly, these freed up units were to be withdrawn to the rear area where they were to be kept ready as reserves. Fourthly, all such reserve units were to be made mobile. Fifthy, in every KVA the pulling out of a reinforced regiment was to be prepared in such a way that said regiment could be deployed to other sectors. Sixthly, the 712 ID was orederd to prepare 350 tons of corgao space, 250 horses and available bicycycles so that the entire division could be pulled out. It the latter case, the Belgian part of its sector would be taken over by a regiment of the 171RD while the Dutch part would be talken over by a battalion of the 65 ID.

The 171 Reservedivision did not only have problems with its engineer unit (seeabove), but also with its headquarters units. A document of 3 March 1943 reveals that the headquarters of the division ware assessed as being unable to perform their allocated tasks. Thus the corps asked AOK 15 for the headquarters units to be upgraded from their reserve status to those of active units. Interestingly, this request was rejected by the army on 4 March 1943 and on 7 March 1943 the division was told to upgrade their headquarters using own forces.

On 5 March 1943 an earlier decision with respect to the deployment of the Alarmeinheiten (see 2 March above) was apparently made. It was decided that only the corps would decide on their deployment at the coastal front. More importantly, the Alarmeinheiten would not be deployed in sectors being attacked.

On 7 March 1943 details were provided about what would happen if some units had to be pulled out for front-line duty elsewhere. Two contingencies were prepared: the extraction of an entire division and that of individual infantry regiments. In the former case the 171 Reservedivision was earmarked to be pulled out. To defend KVA A3 the 712 Infanteriedivision would give up the Dutch part of KVA A2 and send the Grenadierregiment 745 and the Artillerieabteilung 652 to KVA A3, where it would be joined by 3 companies of Alarmeinheiten built from Wehrmacht units in the sector. To defend the Dutch part of KVA A2, the 65 Infanteriedivision would transfer 1 batallion of Grenadierregiment 146 and 1 battery of II/Artillerieregiment 165 to the sector, where it would be joined by Alarmeinheiten. Finally, in KVA A1 3 1/2 companies of Alarmeinheiten would replace the departed troops. In case a reinforced regiment was to be pulled out, the following units were earmarked: GR146 (KVA A1), GR 745 (KVA A2) and GR 71 (KVA A3), supported by artillery units. Finally in the Abschnitt Antwerpen the following Alarmeinheiten were said to be present: 1 Bataillonsstab, 6 verst. Schützenkompanien and 1 Schützenzug.

Also on 7 March a further problem concerning the 171 RD was addressed by the corps. Being a reserve division, the 171 RD was only subordinated to the corps tactically and not administratively or for training purposes (for which purposes it was subordinated to the LXVII Reservekorps). It was therefore requested to subordinate the division to the corps also on these levels.

On 11 March 1943 changes were made in the Abschnitt Antwerpen. In addition to a new suborganisation (with further changes to the Kampfgruppen tadt and Hafen on 20 March), a new overall commander was appointed: Generalmajor Schmidt, in addition to staying on the commander of Feldkommandantur 520 in Antwerp, became the overall Abschnitt commander, with the former overall commander, Generalmajor Krech being relegated to command the Unterabschnitt Ost.

On 19 March 1943 the sub-sectors Kampgruppe Stadt and Hafen of the Abschnitt Antwerpen were re-organized. Thus, Kampfgruppe Stadt was given 2 power centres (Machtzentren), i.e. today's centre and the Kielshoekschans in the south. The commander of this sub-sector was Oberstleutnant Machnig, at least until an Oberst zbV would arrive from the Militärbefehlshaber. The Kampgfruppe Hafen was sub-divided into the sub-sectors Mitte, Ost and Süd.and commanded by the Hafenkommandant Kapitär-zur-See Franck. The important Stp Kreuzschansschleuse was suboedinated to the commander of the Pionierwerftbatallion, Major Werner. Overall commander of the Abschnitt Antwerpen remained Generalmajor Schmidt.

On 24 March 1943 the LXXXIX Armeekorps requested the 'officialising' (Etatisierung) of the headquarters KVA Antwerpen with the Militärbefehlshaber Belgien-Nordfrankreich.

On 26 March 1943 the status of the newly-established 44 Infanteriedivision was reported on. The Kampfgruppe was reported as being fully operational, apart from 2 light artillery batteries. There was, however, a great shortage of officers.

On 27 March the headquarters of Festungspionierstab 12, the unit in charge of coordinating the construction of Atlantikwall defences along the Belgian coast, was moved from Bruges to Antwerp, in order to guarantee closer cooperation with the corps headquarters. The unit was located in the Bosmanslei 24.

 

 

On 1 April the headquarters of the Abschnitt Antwerpen were moved from Merksem to Brasschaat.

On 8 April 1943 it was decided to rotate units of the SS-Panzergrenadierdivision Hohenstaufen (the later 9 SS-Panzerdivision), which functioned as Heeresgruppenreserve, through the Truppenübungsplatz Maria-ter-Heide, near Brasschaat. These units also were also tasked to protect the area against paratroopers. Actually, the division had only been established as recently as January and was still being formed (interestingly with great difficulty owing to the shortage of recruits).

On 12 April 1943 the then Sicherungskompanie at corps headquarters in Antwerp, 6/GR 146 was relieved by 7/GR 146.

On 15 April 1943 Oberstleutnant i.G. Hans-Dietrich von Boeltzig was replaced by Oberst i.G. Fritz Ulrich as Chef des Generalstabes. One day later General der Artillerie Wilhelm Stemmermann was appointed to evaluate the defence capabilities (Abwehrbereitschaft) in the corps area. Stemmermann had returned injured from the Russian front and was in the Führerreserve when he received the appointment. Later he was also tasked with overseeing and leading the training of the 44 Infanteriedivision.

Also on this day, the headquarters of the corps consisted of the following officers:

9

 

On 25 April 1943 the corps informed its divisions that OBWest was planning the allocation of Festungsstammtruppen to man static weapons. In this context, the divisions were instructed to list thenumber and kind of available static weapons.

On 26 April 1943 the corps reported that the newly-established 44 Infanteriedivision was ready for attack missions, but in a limited way.

On 27 April 1943 the corps was informed by the Militärbefehlshaber that the official establishment of a headquarters for the Abschnitt Antwerpen had been approved, with a maximum strength of 5 officers, 2NCOs and 18 soldiers.

On 30 April 1943 the corps reported that 2 Panzerkampfwagen III tanks were allocated by the 26 PzD for training the troops in close-range anti-tank tactics.

 

On 5 May 1943 the LXXXIX Armeekorps took measures in execution of the Grundlegender Befhel OBWest 24 concerning the establishment of Kampfkommandanten. Major Birsak of the 712 ID  was appointed as Kampfkommandant with a headquarters of 3 officers, 2NCOs and 6 soldiers. In the event of an enemy attack and on orders of the AOK 15 the Kampfkommandant was initially to aseemble in Bruges, in the premises of the Kreiskommandantur, Twijnstraat 4-6 and would then move to an ordered location. The command of Kampfkommandant was conceived as an all-services Wehrmacht command with the folloiwng duties:

  • keeping discipline and order by any means possible and prevent panic in the locations entruseted to him and their immediate surroundings

  • supporting combat actions with all means and forces

  • defending his location to the last bullet with all available soldiers

To enable the Kampfkommandant to perform these dtuties he was granted absolute power over all military personnel in his location, but also over the civilian population. Finally, the Kampfkommandnat was to cooperate closly with the Strasenkommandant(en) in his location, who he was to give orders to keep the roads open for military traffic.

On 8 May 1943 it was decided to establish Festungsstammtruppen in KVA A1 and KVA A3 (no mention was yet made of KVA A2) to man the bodenständige Waffen.

On 9 May 1943 further details were released with respect to the organization of the Festungsstrammtruppen. A Festungsstammabteilung couild consist of up to 8 Kompanien with each company consisting of between 200 annd 350 men. The folloiwng units were set up:

  • 65 ID: 1 Festungsstammabteilung with 5 companies and total strength of 8 officers, 150 NCOs and 874 soldiers.

  • 171RD: 1 Festungsstammabteilung with 8 companies and total strneth of ? offcers, 256 NCOs and 1374 other ranks

The first troops (956 for the 65ID and 1208 for the 171RD) could be expected towards the end of May/beginning of June.

On 10 May 1943 the corps was informed by the Seekommandant Südholland that the OKM had decided to withdraw the 8/MAA 202 from Dumburg without replacing it. The corps expressed its wish to keep this unit in this location, otherwise the fire power in this area would be considerably weakened. Assuming that the withdrawal was planned to free personnel for the planned heavy naval battery at Knokke the corps suggested disbanding the Batterie Hamilton on the jetty of Zeebrugge and using these soldiers for the 8/MAA 202. The Hamilton guns would then be transferred as static guns to the 65 ID.

On 13 May 1943 the LXXXIX Armeekorps ordered measures to increase the combat strength of the Abschnitt Antwerpen. The folloiwng measures were ordered:

  • Troop levels at the important Stp Scheldetunnel would be raised to full company strength by tranferring a reinforced platoon from the Stp Kreuzschansschleuse to the Schelde tunnel. The company was to be deployed on both sides of the tunnel/Schelde river

  • Six Vf bunkers were to be constructed: 2 for mediam Pak (4.7cm) at the western tunnel end, 2 machine-gun bunkers at the eastern tunneld end and 2 MG-bunkers on the western river bank with the ability to fire in all directions

  • Both tunnel entrances were to be secured by strong tank obstacles

  • The current field positions on the western river bank were to be expanded and surrounded by a ring of mines.

  • All traffic using the tunnel would have to be constanctly surveilled

  • Two  medium pak guns (see above) would be allocated

  • Stp Kreuzschansschleuse was ti be occupied by a reinforced platoon, the soldiers of which would have to drawn from less important straongpoints in the former Unterabschnitt West.

Further, the sub-sectors were renamed. Thus, the Abschnitt Antwerpen would now be subdivided into the Unterabschnitte Hulst, Scheldetunnel, Stadt, Hafen and Ost.

On 15 May 1943 the corps headquarters consisted of the following officers:

 

 

On 20 May 1943 the combat mission of the Abschnitt Anwterpen was redefined. The mission was now defined as the defence of the inner Schelde access to Antwerp and the port and city of Anwterpe in the event of enemy action or unrest. The main defensive effort was to be developed in the port area and at the Schelde tunnel. For this purpose the Abschnitt Antwerpen was subdivided into the Unterabschnitte Hulst, Scheldetunnel, Stadt, Hafen and Ost (see also above). The most important objects to be defended were the Schelde tunnel, the Kruisschans locks and the Schelde bridge at Boom, which objects were to be defended against sabotage and commando actions at all times. In addition, other economically important objects were to be secured in sufficient measure. Positions were not to be given up until overrun by the enemy, allowing sufficient time for reserve to arrive. Outside of the port area the defence of Antwerp was to be based on the old fort ring around the city. These forts were already to be turned into strongpoints, so that the main access roads to the city could be defended. However, the majority of the garrison was to be kept back as a mobile reserve.

On 26 May 1943 we get a first overview of the operational deployment of the Festungsstammtruppen:

  • I Abteilung (19 Luftwaffenfelddivision)

    • 1. Kompanie (Serooskerke)(14 Uffz, 170 Mannschaften)

    • 2. Kompanie (Westkapelle)(11, 144)

    • 3. Kompanie (Koudekerke)(25, 227)

    • 4. Kompanie (Vlissingen)(26, 234)

    • 5. Kompanie ('s Heerenhoek)(8, 106)

  • II Abteilung (171 Reservedivision)

    • 6. Kompanie (De Haan)(21, 168)

    • 7. Kompanie (Oostende)(20, 168)

    • 8. Kompanie (Mariakerke)(14, 109)

    • 9. Kompanie (Westende-Dorp)(16, 130)

    • 10. Kompanie (Westende-Bad)(14, 122)

    • 11. Kompanie (Koksijde)(30, 245)

    • 12. Kompanie (Nieuwpoort)(9, 93)

    • 13. Kompanie (Koekelaere)(6, 34)

On 2 June 1943 General der Panzertruppen Dr. Alfred Ritter von Hubicki was given a new assignment (general commanding the Auffrischungsstab Mitte) and replaced by Generalleutnant von und zu Gilsa.

On 3 June 1943 the LXXXIX Armeekorps reported on its request to OBWest to declare the island of Walcheren as Verteidigungsbereich. This request was rejected since that would weaken the VB Vlissingen. Instead, however, the northern and northwestern coasts were to be reinforced with semi-permanent constructions and the Arnemuiden isthmus was to be reinforced with permanenet constructiions. Strongpoints were to be kept small in number and size but effective.

On 5 June 1943 7/GR 146 was relieved by 11/GR 745 as Scherungskompanie at the corps headquarters in Antwerp.

On 6 June 1943 the LXXXIX Armeekorps reported that, in a change to previous orders, the 65 Infanteriedivision (in the process of being replaced by the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision) was to be transported by train to the LXXXII Armeekorps, and more specifically to the area Bailleul-Wormhout-Watten-Lillers with headquarters in Blendecques. Here, the division would be Armeereserve and re-equip by 20 July for transfer to the Russain front.

On 9 June 1943 the Korpsbefehl detailing the mission of the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision on Walcheren was issued. The division was ordered to defend Walcheren, as well as North and South Beveland, with the main effort concentrating on the the Verteidigungsbereich Vlissingen, followed by the northern and northwestern coast of Walcheren. To be especially defended from paratroop/glider forces were the Arnemuiden Isthmus, the crossings over the South Beveland canal and the Bath isthmus.

On 11 June 1943 the LXXXIX issued order for the defence of its own headquarters in the Nachtegalenpark in Antwerp. The strongpoint commander was Major von Schenkendorff. Subordinated to him were various (alarm) units: the Sicherungskompanie, the two Alarmzüge of the headquarters staff and the Alarmeinheiten of the Korpsnachrichtenabteilung, Flakregimentsstab 95, Sicherheitsdienst, Feldgendarmerie and the Admiral der Seebefehlstellen.The mission of these forces was the defence of the corps headquarters in close cooperation with the nearby strongpoint of the Korpsnachrichtenabteilung. When Alarmstufe II was declared or by special order of the Chef des Generalstabes the following actions were planned:

  • The Sicherungskompanie was to man the outer security perimeter with two if its three platoons, while the third platoon was to be kept in reserve. The two guns (Pak?) were to be placed in position.

  • Both alarm platoons of the corps headquarters staff (55 men) were to assemble under Hauptmann Dieter at the two predifined Alarmplätzen: the first platoon at the park entrance opposite the Ia building and the second platoon at the Kasinoeingang (i.e. entrance close to the officers' mess). After assembly, and in the absence of specific orders, the two platoons were to be kept in reserve in the air-raid cellars of the Ia and Ic buildings.

  • The Alarmeinheiten of the Sicherheitsdienst, Feldgendarmerie and the Admiral der Seebefehlstellen were to be kept in reserve in their quarters. The unit of the Flakregimentsstab 95 was initially to be reserved for air force missions. In the absence of these, the unit was to take cover in the cellar of the headquarters building. As soon as the personnal bunkers in the park were completed, the various alarm units would take cover here.

  • In the event of an overwhelming attack it might become necessary to give up the outer defence perimeter and withdraw to the inner defence perimeter. The latter perimeter was to be kept at all cost.

  • The military personnel allocated the bunkers at the time of an attack were to defend their bunker, led by the Ia in the Führungsbunker  and the Quartiermeister in the Quartiermeisterbunker.

  • A medical post was to be established in the Quartiermeisterbunker and after completion of the sanitary bunker in the latter.

  • The Gefechtsstand of the strongpoint commander was to be located in the Führungsbunker.

On 12 June 1943 the corps was briefly put in Alarmstufe I, since agent reports had mentioned the possibiliy of enemy attacks against the coast. This was repeated for the night 15/16 June.

 On 13 June 1943 the 44 Infanteriedivision was ordered to establishe a corps reserve, consisting of a fully motorized reinforced infantry battalion. Its planned operational area was Goes - Middelburg.

On 17 June 1943  the first units of the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision started to relieve the 65 Infanteriedivision on Walcheren, the former unit taking full control of KVA A1 on 19 June. Being a Luftwaffe unit, the division was only under tactical control of the LXXXIX Armeekorps The 65 Infanteriedivision left the corps area 4 days later, bound for France.

On 18 June 1943 the Sicherungskompanie at corps headquartes, 11/GR 745 was replaced by 7/GR 134 of the 44 ID.

On 19 June 1943 the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision officially assumed command of KVA A1. From the same report we also learn that in KVA A2 6/GR 745 was deployed in the PzStp Breskens and the 11/GR 745, which had been Sicherungskompanie at corps headquarters, was now deployed in Sluis, with 7/GR 134 now acting as Sicherungskompanie.

On 21 June 1943 the 65 Infanteriediviison had completely left the area of the LXXXIX Armeekorps.

On 22 June 1943 the corps reported that, since cadre personnelto form the headquarters staff of the Festungsstammabteilkungen and -Kompanien was not to be expected in the foreseeable future, the staff headquarters were to be set up by existing personnel means.

A Luftwaffe order of 28 June 1943 made the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision subordinate to the LXXXIX Armeekorps tactically and territorially, as well as in terms of training. However, the division remained a Luftwaffe unit administratively, subordinated to the local Luftgaukommando.

On 29 June 1943 the corps reported on  the establishment of Festungsstammtruppen in KVA A1. The creation of these troops was a direct result of a decision taken by Generalfeldmarschall von Rundstedt to establish a second line of defence 5-10 kilometres behind the coastline. Behind this so-called zweite Stellung a mobile reserve, the Abschnittsreserve, was stationed. However, this reserve was built from the troops of the divisions themselves, so that the Hauptkampflinie at the coast was severely weakened. These shortages were remedied by the Festungsstammtruppen. These were older soldiers of inferior quality who manned the bodenständige weapons in the armoured bunkers and enjoyed a relativelu quiet time. The Festungsstammtruppen were first deployed in KVA A1. Thus on 29 June the corps reported to the army the creation of the following units: Stab Kdr Festungsstammtruppen LXXXIX, Stab I Festungsstammabteilung, 1 Kompanie (in Serooskerke: 184 Mann), 2 Kompanie (in Westkapelle: 155 Mann), 3 Kompanie (in Koudekerke: 252 Mann), 4 Kompanie (in Vlissingen: 260 Mann) and the 5 Kompanie (in 's Heerenhoek: 114 Mann)

In June 1943 a german document also shows us the buildings constituting the headquarters of the LXXXIX Armeekorps in Park Den Brand in Wilrijk. The Google Earth animation below is based upon that document:

From January until June 1943 the following officers constituted the headquarters staff of the LXXXIX Armeekorps:

Between 1 January and 30 June 1943 the following units had joined or left the corps area:

On 1 July 1943 the 712 Infanteriedivision received new artillery units. Until then, the division only had the Artillerieabteilung 652 assigned. Now, the division was given the Regimentsartilleriestab 652 and the II Abteilung/AR 652. The old Artillerieabteilung 652 was renamed I Abteilung/AR 652. On the same day the corps informed the AOK15 that it had chosen an area west of Terneuzen (actually the Braakman polder east of Biervliet) as corps firing range

On 4 July 1943 the corps was informed that the reserve divisions were to remain deployed in coastal defence for the time being. and that the time for their planned relief would be communicated. Nevertheless, the establishing of the 264 Infanteriedivision was tio proceed.

On 6 July 1943 a document asseses the combat value of the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision. Despite the good human material the division was deemed to be unprepared to perform the tasks of an average army duivision due to its insufficient training and lack of practical experience.
On 7 July 1943 Alarmstufe I was ordered. Interestingly, this decision was taken by AOK15 on the basis of an intercepted enemy radio message 'predicting' the commencemnt of allied operation that night. The (44) Reichsgrenadierdivision Hoch und Deutschmeister was ordered to have its units in erhöhte Marschbereitschaft. The alarm phase was cancelled the following day. Also on this day, the corps expressed its concern with respect to the combat strength of the 712 Infanteriedivision. It had calculated that no fewer than 8 officiers, 127 NCOs and 541 other ranks were on missions outside the division. With so many troops missing, it was felt that the division was unable to perform its tasks in the event of an allied attack. This weakness was exacerbated by the situation of the 19 LwFD and the dire situation in the KVA Antwerpen. The AOK 15 was therefore requested to put an end to the majority of these detachments.
On 8 July 1943 the above-mentioned Hochseelehrkommando Terneuzen left the corps area. On the same day the Auffangsstab LXXXIX was disbanded.
On 13 July 1943 an important reduction in the number of people working on the Atlantikwall was ordered. More specifically, ten per cent of all foreign workers who had been working on constructing the Atlantikwall were ordered to transfer to the Ruhr area by 20 July.
On 14 July 1943 the LXXXIX Armeekorps was tasked with overseeing the training of the (44) Reichsgrenadierdivision Hoch und Deutschmeister, which was located to the west of Antwerp. This division was in the process of reconstruction after having been destroyed at Stalingrad the previous year. Also on this day AOK15 ordered the establishment of Feldersatzbataillonen in all divisions.

On 20 July 1943 the 1/HKAA 823 was reported to be ready for action with 6 guns in a new firing position (Stp Prinz Eugen, KVA3).

On 21 July 1943 the 9/MAA 202 left the Stp Rheingold in KVA1. The occupation of the strongpoint was taken over by one platoon of the 2/Jägerregiment 38 and 28 soldiers of the naval artillery.

On 22 July 1943  the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision was officially subordinated to the LXXXIX Armeelorps for tactical, training and territorial purposes. However, it remained subordinated to the Luftgaukommando administratively and economically.

On 26 July 1943 the Generalkommando reported on the organisation and strength of Feldersatzbataillone and Ausbildungsbataillone to be established.

On 27 July 1943 the (44) Reichsgrenadierdivision Hoch und Deutschmeister started leaving the corps area, which it had left completely on 31 July. Since this unit had provided the Korpsreserve, the latter was now newly composed of the Reservegrenadierregiment 71 and the II/Reserveartillerieregiment 252 of the 171 Reservedivision.

On 27-28 August 1943 a heavy air attack took place of the railway battery E655 and the cokes factory in Zeebrugge. The guns and bunkers were also damaged, as well as the plant itself. Seven civilians were killed and 40 seriously injured.

With an order of 30 July 1943 three artillery units were ordered to leave the corps area (for LXXXII Armeekorps): the Heeresküstenartillerieregiment 643 (formerly in KVA A2), the Eisenbahhartilleriebatterie 655E (formerly based in Zeebrugge) and the Gerätebatterie 676 (formerly in Duinbergen).

On 30-31 July 1943 the Flugplatz Koksijde was attacked and 2 Me-190s were damaged.

 

On 3 August 1943 the corps informed its division that the commander of the AOK15 had pointed out the importance of freeing a large number of regulat troops for local and mobile reserve by deploying the Festungsstammtruppen. Also, the strength of individual companies was fived at 200-300 men. The divisions were to report, by 8 August, on the new organisation of the Festungsstammtruppen in their sector, so that that new organisation could take effect on 15 August. Also on this day, Batterie E655 and the Gerätebatterie 676 (corps reserve) were pulled out in the area of the 712 Infanteriedivision.

On 6 August 1943 the 712ID reported the creation of the Feldersatzbataillon 712.

On 8 August 1943 a reorganisation within the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision was carried out. Thus the Radfahrkompanie 19 and 2 platoons of I/Jägerregiment 37 took over positions of II/Jägerregiment 37. Also the batallion boundary of III/Jägerergiment 38 was shifted about 4km to the east (east of the Stp Johannistal).

On 11 August 1943 the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision reported the creation of the Unteroffiziersausbildungsbataillon 19(L).

On 14 August 1943 the corps informed the 171 Reservedivision that the newly-organized companies of II/Festungsstammabteilung LXXXIX were to receive as of that day the denomination 6-10 Kompanie

On 15 August 1943 some 100 bombers attacked the Vlissingen airfield as well a several strongpoints and towns on Walcheren. The death toll was 9 soldiers and 37 civilians, while 11 soldiers and 50 civilians were injured.

On 18 August 1943 AOK15 ordered Alarmstufe I to be instigated each morning between 4 and 6am (though without fuel consumption). This order was recalled on 9 September.

On 25 August 1943 The AOK15 informed the corps that the 242 Infanteriedivision, which had been established in Germany on 9 July, would be moved within the corps area, more specifically in the area Lokeren-Eeklo-Brugge-Torhout-Tielt-Deinze-Gent. More importantly perhaps, the division was subordinated to the LXXXIX Armeekorps in all respects. The actual movement of the division took place between 28 and 30 August. Individual batallions of the division conducted live firing exercises on the Truppenübungsplatz Wachtebeke. The (planned) headquarters for the division was Bellem.

On 28 August the Generalkommando provided answers to a number of questions of the AOK 15 with respect to the general readiness of the corps. The document is entitled Generalüberprüfung. Due to the detailed and extensive nature of the document it is reproduced in its original form here.

On 1 September 1943 the 3/Pionierbataillon 19 was moved to Ostend and subordinated tactically to the 171 Reservedivision. On the samz day  a report mentions the existence of an Übungsplatz Wachtebeke for the 242 Infanteriedivision.In another message on the same day the corps expresses its approval for the move of one batallion of the Grenadierregiment 719 of the division to the Übungsplatz Wachtebeke. Still on the same day the corps reported to the AOK15 the completion of the preparatory actions for the pulling out of either the 171 Reservedivision or a reinforced regiment from each of the KVAs. This document is so detailed that we produce it in full here. Still on 1 September the corps ordered the 242 Infanteriedivision to establish a Feldersatzbataillon.

On 2 September 1943 the corps orderered its units to keep the closest of contacts with all units of the Kriegsmarine  and the Luftwaffe both within the own KVA but alsio with those of the neighbouring KVAs. All information gathered by the latter were to be passed on to the corps through the Ic (intelligence) network. On the same day the corps issued Alarmstufe I on account of an increased minesweeping activity by allied ships in the Channel. Also on this day the AOK 15 sent a message to the corps ordereing it to improve the mobility of the heavy anti-tanks guns and the artillery with all possible means.

Between 2 and 5 September a special assessment group headed by Generalleutnant Macholtz travelled through the corps area assessing the defensive efforts put in place by the corps thus far. On the same day, all army commanders were ordered to keep close personal contact with all Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine commanders in their area. This way, local commanders tried to make up for the lack of a unified command at the higher levels.
On 4 September 1943 all headquarters were ordered to move into their wartime command bunkers and barracks, in order not to be surprised by sudden air attacks, a clear example of the increasing anxiety a a result of the growing air superiority of allied air forces. On the same day, the 242 Infanteriedivision was ordered to establish Fallschirmjagdkommandos in its area of responsbility.Further on this day, the corps informed its division that the daily Alarmstufe I ordered by the AOK 15 would now be ordered vy the corps until further notice.
On 6 September 1943, no doubt as a direct result of the visit by Generallautnant Macholtz (see above) the corps ordered heavy anti-tank and artillery units to be made mobile in order to increase defensive strength. On the same day the 242 Infanteriedivision reported on the composition of its Feldersatzbataillon, commanded by Hauptmann Röske. The batallion was to be assembled on 20 September.
On 7 September 1943 AOK15 ordered the withdrawal of all personnel that was ostverwendungsfähig, i.e. fit for service on the Russian front. These troops would be replaced by conscripts of the 1925 birthyear. On the same day the corps reported to the AOK 15 that the creaion of a Feldersatzbataillon for the 242 Infanteriedivision encountered the same problems as for the 712 Infanteriedivision, namely a lack of officers. Also on this day, the corps informed its divisions that, according to SD intelligence a major action of the French resistance in connection with an Anglo-American landing could be expect ed in the coming days. Finally on this day, the AOK 15 ordered the corps to prepare to hand over its sector to a reserve corps.
On 8 September 1943 I/GR 917 of the Grenadierregiment 917 (242 Infanteridivision) was  moved to the area Ktabbendijke-Bath-Woensdrecht to guard the Bath isthmus, where it would be subordinated to the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision. The latter would reinforce this unit with a platoon Panzerjäger and a platoon 2cm Flak  The batallion was to be billeted as follows: the HQ and 1 company in the eastern part of Woensdrecht, 1 company in Separatiedijk, one company and an AT-platoon in Stationsbuurt, one and a half company in Rilland with the Flak guns and 1 platoon in Bath polder

The Flakregiment 129 in Bruges and the Fliegerhorst Woensdracht were requested to provide Flak cover.The batallion returned to its parent unit on 25 September. The 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision was to guard the rail and road bridges avross the South Beveland canal near Schore by a reinforced platoon. Finally on this day Alarmstufe I was ordered. The reason for this was the fact that heavy air attacks in the Boulogne area could be seen as a precursor to a possible invasion. The Alarmstufe ended on 9 September.

On 9 September 1943 the corps received orders that the 244 Infanteriedivision would be established in the Antwerp area (replacing the 242 Infanteriedivision). The division would be subordinated to the corps for training, building and logistical purposes. This division was to be operational on 1 November 1943. On the same day the corps was informed that for 'special purposes' a static batallion would be established and subordinated to the LXXXIX Armeekorps. It would be called Bataillon LXXXIX and would initially be used for replacing the batallion of the 242 Infanteriedivision in the Woensdrecht area (see above). Companies were to be provided by the 242 and 264 Infanteriedivisionen. The latter division had been established on 19 May 1943 and was built in the Liège-Charleroi-Mons-Nivelles area as part of the LXVII Reservekorps. The commander of the Bataillon LXXXIX was Major Hanold. It took up positions in the Woensdracht area on 24 September. Also on this day the I/GR 917 was given its combat mission. The batallion was to be located on both sides of the Bath isthmus along the line Prins-Woensdrecht-Schutlakenshaven-Bath-Bathpolder-Separatiedijk in such a way that it could block the isthmus from the east and west an destroy an air-landed enemy in immediate counterattack. Further on this day, the 242 Infanteriedivision reported to the corps that the room allocated to the division (Antwerp area) had been divided into 5 Fallschirmjagdbezirke.
On 11 September 1943 the corps was informed that in case it should it should be withdrawn from the coast for use elsewhere its duties were to be taken over by the LXVII Reservekorps. On the same day, the corps informed its divisions that the 244 Infanteriedivision was to be built. This woild be done by the Atbeitsstab with headquarters in Maria-ter-Heide. Initially, a Kampfgruppe was to be created.

On 13 September 1943 the corps commander made an inspection visit of the KVA Antwerpen, visiting specifically the strongpoints Scheldetunnel, Kreuzschanzschleuse and Fort Merksem. He noted that good progress was being made in building these strongpoints. He was also asked by the Abschnitt to make the Stopi  Hauptmann Schmidt available as an adiviser.

On 14 September 1943 the Ausbaustab for Bataillon LXXXIX had arrived. Also on this day LXXXIX Armeekorps provided an overview of all boats in the corps area. The full overview can be found here.

On 16 September 1943 one company of the 242 ID hjad arrived for the Bataillon LXXXIX

On 17 September 1943 one company of the 264 ID had arrived for the Bataillon LXXXIX

On 18 September 1943 the corps released an order with respect to the deployment of the Festungsstyammtruppen. It did this as it had noticed that wrong ideas still existed about their deployment. Thus the officers and NCOs of the Festungsstammtruppen  were not to be used as strongpoint commanders. Also the troops themselves were not to be used for other purposes than detailed (i.e. the operation of one or more static weapons). Finally, the trrops were not to be moved from one weapon to another or from one strongpoint to another.

On 20 September 1943 Major Hanold has assumed command of the bataillon LXXXIX. After operational readiness the unit was to relieve I/GR 917.  The 19 LwFD was responsible for its further thraining. The batallion was also to carry out construction work on positions defending the Bath isthmus.

On 21 September 1943 the corps ordered the 712 and the 242 Infanteriedivisionen to shed troops for building the cadre of the 244 Infanteriedivision.

On 23 September 1943 the order for headquarters to relocate to their command bunkers was partially revoked.

During the night of 23/24 September 1943 the Grenadierbataillon LXXXIX relieved the I/GR 917 and took over responsibility for the defence of the Bath isthmus. One platoon of the Panzerjägerabteilung 19 as well as the 2cm Flakzug stayed and became subordinated to the batallion. The Bataillon LXXXIX consisted of 11 officers and 604 NCOs and other ranks.

On 24 September 1943 an important change was ordered to the deploument of the Festungsstammtruppen. It was ordered that, if a strongpoint was occupied uniquely by Festungsstammtruppen, the commander of the strongpoint was also to belong to these troops.

On 25 September 1943 the I/GR 917 had returned to its former quarters in Eeklo.
On 27 September 1943 LXXXIX Armeekorps ordered the building of the Marschbataillon "Inf West Nr 17", destined for the Russian front. Two companies for this batallion were to be drawn from the 242 Infanteriedivision. On the same day the corps commander visited the Grenadierbataillon LXXXIX. Here we find out more about the transport company provided for the batallion by the Waffen-SS!  The company consisted of 3 transport and 1 maintenance platoon, which were located in Rilland, Krabbendijke and Hoogerheide. Two of these transport platoons (with 24 vehicles each) were at the disposal of the batallion, as well as 10 trucks of the 19 LwFD. The document also shows us where the companies of the unit were located: HQ and 1. Kompanie in Woensdrecht, 2. Kompanie in farms between the Bath isthmus and Woensdrecht and the 3. Kompanie in Bath. At this time the 2. Kompanie diid not have a real mission, so that the possibility was mentioned of moving it to the South-Beveland Canal.
On 30 September 1943 Generalfeldmarschall von Rundstedt visited the 712 Infanteriedivision and the KVA Antwerpen.

From 1 October 1943 the daily Alarmstufe I introduced on 18 August (see above) was cancelled. Also on 1 October the Sicherungskompanie at the corps headquarters in Antwerp, 9/Jägerregiment 37, was relieved by the 11/JR 37.

On 2 October 1943 the 242 Infanteriedivision started transferring to the AOK 19 area (minus 1 Grenadierregiment and an artillery batallion, which were transferred to the AOK 7 area). It was replaced in the Abschnitt Antwerpen by the 244 ID
On 4 October 1943 the LXXXIX Armeekorps was assigned a transport unit destined to make the 244 Infanteriedivision mobile. Interestingly, this unit was called Armeekraftfahrkolonne Abteilung Nachtigall, with the latter word referring to the location (Nachtigalenpark in German) of the corps headquarters. It would thus seem that this order changed the function of this unit. On the same day, an extra total of 828 Italian Hilfswilligen (or Hiwis) were assigned to corps units to man static artillery. Further on this day, the corps communicated its positive position to the AOK 15 on the use of reserve division (notably the 171RD) for coastal defence, mentioning numerous advantages of 'on the spot' training. However, the corps also acknowledged that training objectives could not be reached for the full 100% in these circumstances. Most importantly on this day, the corps issued a document containing the conclusions of the Überprüfungskommission lead by General Macholz (see above). The divisions were ordered to report back before 1 November on which measures they had taken to meet the conclusions. Finally on this day, the corps also provided its additions to an AOK 15 order on an Endplanung (final planning) for the construction of the Atllantikwall. The details can be found here.

On 5 October 1943 the corps reported to the AOK 15 on the defensive capabilities of the units in its coastal defence sectors in a lengthy document. In addition, the corps formulated numerous issues and proposals to improve defensive capability. The details can be found here.
On 6 October 1943 the recently established Bataillon LXXXIX was already cannibalised with an order from AOK15 to transfer the 2. Kompanie to the 264 Infanteriedivision. The company, which was guarding the South-Beveland canal, was to be replaced by 2. Kompanie/Ausbildungsbataillon 19 of the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision, being transferred from Goes. 1. Kompanie/Ausbildungsbataillon 19 was transferred to Maria-ter-Heide.
On 9 October 1943 the Marschbataillon "Inf West Nr 17" (see above) was transported to the East.
In the period 11 to 17 October 1943 some Luftwaffe Flak units departed: Stab leichte Flakabteilung 668 mit 1. und 4. schwere Flakabteilung 665 and 4. schwere Flakabteilung 428. The 1. und 3./Flakabteilung 668, which still remained in Woensdrecht became tactically subordinated to the leichte Flakabteilung 847 in Goes.
On 13 October 1943 the Generalkommando ordered the 244 Infanteriedivision to have its Kampfgruppe A combat-ready by 20 October. The Kampfgruppe would function as Armeereserve. After the allocation of anti-tank guns a Panzerjägerkompanie  was to be attached. The units of the Kampfgruppe were to be stationed as follows: Stab and II. Bataillon in Schoten, I. Bataillon in Sint-Niklaas, III. Bataillon  in Destelbergen, Artillerieabteilung in Borsbeek, Panzerjägerkompanie in Ekeren and the Pionierkompanie in Burcht.

On 15 October 1943 the corps reported to the AOK 15 that the Kampgruppe A would be operation on 20 October. Motorized transport for the unit would be provided by the Armeekolonnen Nachtigall and Brieftaube. On the same day the 712 Infanteriedivision  was informed that it might lose another full grenadier batallion for the Russian front, in return for which it would receive double the number of eastern and Turkish batallions. The 712 ID was ordered to nominate one batallion for the Russian front.

On 16 October 1943 the 171 Reservedivision was assigned the Armenierbataillon 809. Until a decision about its use was made, the unit was stationed in Zedelgem - Jabbeke.It had arrived on 15 and 16 October. On 4 December the corps ordered the division to instruct the batallion in coastal defence duties.

On 17 October 1943  more insight was provided in the planning for the final fortification of the Atlantikwall, the Endausbauplanung. Thus the planning for all 3 Wehmacht services would be located at the offices of the Festungspioniestab 12 for viewing in the period 11-16 November. The corps ordered all units to check the plannings for their sector, specifically the new plannings with their priority phases. The units were also asked by 17 November to communicate to the corps either agreement with the planning or proposed changes.In any case, everything would have to be finished before 20 November, on which date the planning would be passed onto the AOK 15.

On 18 October 1943 the 3. Batterie/Marineartillerieabteilung 204 was dissolved. Three of the four guns were re-assigned as Hafensperrfeuer, while tye fourth was operated as LAK (Landeabweherkanaone) by the Wachkommando.
On 21 October 1943 the AOK15 named III/Grenadierregiment 745 (712 Infanteriedivision) as the batallion that would have to be given off for the Russian front. In exchange, the divsion would be given two Ostbataillonen. Also on this the corps released a document regarding the current status of the eastern and Turkish batallions. Firstly, the document mentioned that the AOK 15 would be allocated a Kommander der Osttruppen as Sachberabteiter for these foreign troops. Secondly, the folllowing units had already been allocated to the corps: Armenierbataillon 809 (arrived on 16/10 and provisionally subordinated to the 171 Reservedivision) and Ostbataillon 628 (to arrive in the next few days and provisionally subordinated to the 712 Infanteriedivision). The document further stated that it was planned to integrate these batallions fully into the organisation of the static divisions. Further, the 712 ID had named III. /GR 745 as the unit to be sent to the Russian front.

On 23 October 1943 the corps then ordered a further reinforcement of the Kampgfruppe of the 244 ID from 1 November. The Kampfgruppe now consisted of 2 regiments (A and B).

On 25 October 1943 the corps requested that the Schelde ferry boats, which could be needed by the corps in an emergency, would be equipped with Flak guns and, while subordinated to the Seekommandant, could be called upon by the corps of necessary.

On 30 October 1943 the corps ordered 12 radio-operators to be sent to Antwerp to reinforce the communications personnel of the KVA Antwerpen. Also on this day the corps issued its additions to the AOK 15 additions (Zusätze) to the Grundlegendem Befehl OBWest Nr. 31 of 21 October concerning the organisation of a coastal defence in depth, otherwise known as the 2. Stellung. This line, which was also supposed to act a a stop line and a line behind which reserves could assemble for a counterattack, was to consist of field fortifications organised in resistance nests. Initially, prior emphasis was to be placed on so-called Kernstücke. Importantly, construction on this line was to begiin no later than 18 November.

On 1 November 1943 the corps was tasked with the establishment of a company consisting of convalescing soldiers. The company was called Genesendenkompanie 15. The company was tactically subordinated to the LXXXIX Armeekorps as Korpsreserve. Also on this day the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision was officially transferred from the Luftwaffe to the Heer. Furtther on this day, the Generalkommando reported the operational readiness of the Kampfgruppe 244ID  with 2 grenadier regiments. Additionally, the corps ordered the 244 ID to be fully combat ready by 11 November.

Further on this day, the Luftwaffenfelddivisionen were officially transferred from the Luftwaffe to the Heer, retaining their names, however.

Finally, on this day a reorganisation of the Unterabschnitt Stadt of the KVA Antwerpen  was addressed. Considering the importance of the sub-sector the Generalkommando supported the request of the Feldkommandantur 520 to replace the current Ortskommandant, Major Hübner, for an officer (preferably Oberstleutnant) with sufficient recent combat experience, since, after the end of the temporary allocation of Oberstleutnant Machnig, the Ortskommandant would simultaneaously assume the responsibilities of commander of the Unterabschnitt Stadt. Importantly, the corps also requested that, until a new officer was appointed, the recalling of Oberstleutnant Machnig would be postponed, as otherwise the overall defensive strength of the KVA Antwerpen would be seriously weakened.
On 2 November 1943 the corps was informed of an order by Oberbefehlshaber West to shed a batallion-strength unit for AOK19. AOK15 had decided that the 712 Infanteriedivision was to release a batallion headquarters and 2 companies, which it was it replace itself! Also on this day,  the Generalkommando informed its divisions that a total of  897 Italian volunteers (Hilfswilligen) had arrived in the corps area and were to be used as follows:

  • in Middelburg (19 LwFd): 152 soldiers

    • 30 to be sued for the static artillery batteries of the 19 LwFd

    • the others to be used as Stellungsbaukompanie for construction the 2. Stellung. The unit was to be called 1./Stellungsbaukompanie 89.

  • in Brugge (712 ID): 263 soldiers

    • 42 to be used for the static artillery batteries of the 712 ID.

    • The remainder at the disposal of the division

  • in Maria-ter-Heide (244 ID): 350 soldiers

    • all soldiers at the disposal of the division

  • in Oostende (HKAR 940): 130 soldiers

    • 20 for the static batteries of the 171 Reservedivision

    • remainder at the disposal of the HKAR 940 for use in army coastal and railroad batteries

On 5 November 1943 the AOK 15 released a message concerning the deployment of the Italian volunteers. It informed the Generalkommando that it could expect 865 soldiers (2 fewer than above) Of these 674 would actually be allocated: 190 for the army coastal, railroad and static batteries, 362 in the divisions and 122 for the unit 1./Stellungsbaukompanie 89. This left 221 soldiers not yet allocated. Interestingly, it was also reported that 55 soldiers refused to work under German supervision. These were to be trated as POWs and the corps requested their removal. We further learn that the corps planned to establish another unit, i.e. 2./Stellungsbaukompanie 89 with some of the remaining troops, as well as reinforce the 1st company. Of paramount importance was also the fact that through the deplyment of the Hiwis 404 German trrops could be freed.

In a document of 6 November 1943 we find some more information about the Armenierbataillon 809. The headquarters, headquarters company, as well as the second and fouth companies were billited in Zedelgem, while the first and third companies were housed in Jabbeke.The document also ciontains the assessment of the commander: the unit was considered fully capable for defensive actions, but alsofor offensive purposes, athough in a limited way.

On 8 November Stab III/732, 5/732 and 3/745 departed (now said to depart for the LXXXI AK). Also on this day, the Generalkommando wrote that it planned to restructure the Luftwaffenfledivision into regular infantry divisions as soon as possible.

On 9 November 1943 the Generalkommando requested the area naval commands to take a stance with respect to the corps' request for the navy searchlights to  also be used to light the so-called Vorfeld, i.e. the area immediately in front of the beach. Also on this day, the corps ordered the 244 ID to have all of its commanding personnel introduced to the duties of a coastal defence division. On the same day, the corps also informed the division that its current state allowed the start of systematic training for coastal defence (with end date 10 December). Thus the division was to exercise at the Truppenübungspl¨tze Maria-ter-Heide a nd Vossenbergen. Simultaneously, the division was also to be introduced to the coastal sectors and train to act as Armeereserve.
On 10 November 1943 the 3./Pionierbataillon 19 was transferred from Oostende to the Armeepionierschule in Angers. Also on this day, the Generalkommando released guidelines to the divisions and the KVA Antwerpen for the construction of the 2. Stellung. Thus, in tactically important locations so-called Anklämmeringspunkte were to be established. In a later stage these so-called Kernstücke were to be interconnected. Also natural barriers and obstacles were to be used as much as possible. Further, it was advised not to start work on too many locations at the same time, but rather to finish a limited number of locations as soon as possible. Further, the labour forces employed were not to be grouped together. Finally, work was to start on 15 November. Finally, on this day, a visit of the corps commander to the boundary between the 171 RD  and the neighbouring 18 LwFd (of the LXXXII AK) revealed that this so-called Naht was not yet sufficiently protected. Thus the distance between the Stp Schlieffen  and the Stp Adolf was 1100m. It was therefore planned to add 3 resistance nests in between these strongpoints.
In the period 8 to 14 November 1943 the 1./Ausbildungsbataillon 19 was moved from Goes to Schorebrug, while the 2./Ausbildungsbataillon 19 was relocated from Schorebrug to Kloetinge.
On 13 November 1943 the Bataillon LXXXIX was officialized, initially consisting of a batallion headquarters, three companies (1,2 and 4) and 1 anti-tank platoon. Also on this day, the corps released a document with respect to flooding measures. It argued that, since the documents thus far submitted to the divisions were only of a general nature, the existing (general) plans would have to be checked and completed by the Wassersachverständigen of the army, the corps and the divisions. The latter would also have to divide planned local floodings into priority phases (Dringlichkeitsstufen), so that the tactically most important ones could be dealth with first. Thus the divisions were ordered to submit these priority phases before 29 November.

On 14 November 1943 the re-organisation of the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision was addressed again. Under the circumstances it was more difficult than expected. The constant readiness of the division meant that the reorganisation could only take place platoon per platoon. To make this possible, a Zwischenlösung would be used.
On 15 November 1943 the first work was carried out for the construction of a 2. Stellung.
On 16 November 1943 2./Ausbildungsbataillon 19 was relocated from Schore to Korpsschiessplatz.
On 17 November 1943 the LXXXIX Armeekorps communicated that the pulling out of every division in the corps was to be prepared. The resulting planned  relocation of forces in the event of a division being pulled out can be found in detail here.
On 18 November 1943 the headquaretrs of II/AR19 were transferred from Zoutelande to Hof Grijpskerke. Also on this day, the Generalkommando reported to the AOK 15 with respect to the construction of the 2. Stellung.  Firstly, the corps expressed its approval of the proposals made by the divisions for the position of the line as well as the creation of Kernstücke. Secondly, the corps expressed its plan to group the latter into strongpoint groups (Stützpunktgruppen) and to integrate the artillery positions into these, so that the strongpoint units would have all-round defensive capabilities. Thirdly, however, the corps did have doubts about the plans proposed by the KVA Antwerpen. These plans were said to be too bold in view of the smaller significance of this sector overall. The Abschnitt had, therefore, been instructed by the corps to initially only fortify the sub-sectors Hulst, Axel and Kieldrecht  so that the other forces could be deployed in tactically more important locations. The requested priority phases were fixed as follows:

  • KVA A1:

    • Phase 1: positions along the Walcheren  and South-Beveland canals

    • Phase 2:: positions near Arnemuiden and Bath

    • Labour forces currently employed: 400 soldiers

    • Labour forces planned: 900 soldiers and 2600-3000 civilians (WBN)

  • KVA A2:

    • Phase 1: sector canal triangle (Kanaldreieck) from Damme unti Brugge (Kernstücke 6-12)

    • Phase 2: positions at the canal from south of Watervlet to east of Moerkerke (Kernstücke 2-5)

    • Phase 3: sector Sas-van-Gent (Kernstück 1)

    • Labour forces currently employed: 730 soldiers and 60 civilians

    • Labour forces planned: 800 soldiers and 3000 civilians (OFK 750)

  • KVA A3:

    • Phase 1: from right-hand side divisional boundary to Diksmuide (inclusive) (Kernstücke 1-12)

    • Phase 2: Ijzer-position (Kernstücke 13-17)

    • Labour forces currently employed: 500 soldiers and 450 civilians

    • Labour forces planned: 2500 soldiers and 3000 civilians (OFK 750)

  • KVA Antwerpen:

    • Phase 1: sectors Hulst (Kernstücke 16-18) and Axel (Kernstücke 23-28)

    • Phase 2: sector Kieldrecht (Kernstücke 3-7)

    • Labour forces currently employed: 60 soldiers and 163 civilians

    • Labour forces planned: 100 soldiers and 1000 civilians (Arbeitsamt Hulst)

On 19 November 1943 the Generalkommando stated that the Reststab of the 39 Infanteriedivision was needed to form a headquartters on the Russian front. Other units of the division which had already arrived (Feldgendarmerie, Feldkasse, Feldpostamt) or would still arrive were to be subordinated to an integrated into the 244 Infanteriedivision.

In the period 15 to 21 November 1943 a number of units were relocated in the KVA A2: II/GR732 from Westkapelle to Moerkerke; 12/745 from Sluis to Middelburg; 10/745 as Wachkompanie to Oostburg; finally, 10/732 was now located in Dudzele. In  the sector of the 171 Reservedivision (KVA A3), Reserveinfanteriegeschützkompanie 216 was moved from Gistel to Snaaskerke.

On 22 November 1943 (and until 18 December) II/GR 932 and 6/AR 244 were moved to Sissonne as Lehrtruppe. Also on this day, the Stab 39ID was transferred to Germany and the Restteile 39ID were integrated into the 244 ID.

On 29 November 1943 orders were issued with regard to the pulling out of a division from a coastal sector to act as Armeereserve. How this would affect the various sectors and units is shown in the following table:


Also on 29 November 1943 we find the following overview of units within the LXXXIX Armeekorps:


Also on 29 November the Stab Scheinwerferabteilung 469  and the 2/leichte Flakabteilung 993 left the KVA A3. Finally, also on 29 November the Armenierbataillon 809 was transported from the 171 Reservedivision area to the Truppenübungsplatz Sissonne. It returned from there on 19 December.
On 30 November 1943 the Generamlkommando send instructions to the divisional commanders to follow up more close the still too frequest accidents with mines and weapons, as well as the unusually high number of suicides and soldiers running off without permission.

On 1 December 1943 the main artillery unit in the area of the LXXXIX Armeekorps, the Heeresküstenartillerieregiment 940 was organized as follows:

Also on 1 December 1943 the LXXXIX Armeekorps wax organized as follows:
 
On 2 December 1943 the Ostbataillon 628 arrived in Brugge. It was to be assigned to the 712 Infanteriedivision.
On 4 December 1943 the Generalkommando issued an order for the Armenierbataillon 809 to be made familiar with coastal defence duties, after having returned from Sissonne and being positioned in the reat of the I/RGR 216 sector, so that the batallion would be ready to take over the sector from 5 January onwards.
On 7 December 1943 the LXXXIX Armeekorps requested the AOK15 to be given another 1000 troops to beef up its Festungsstammtruppen LXXXIX, as the present number was said to be insufficient for manning the static weapons.
On 8 December 1943 the Generalkommando issued instruction for the deployment of the Festungsstammreervekompanie LXXXIX in the event of an emergency. Thus, in the event of the codename Middelburg or Oostburg being declared the unit was to be ready for movement from Antwerp within three hours. It was then to be transport within 6 hours to Middelburg or Sluis, respectively.
On 9 December 1943 the Generalkommando issued orders for the training of the Ostbataillon 628, which was to achieve operational readiness by 20 January.

On 12 December 1943 the corps was informed that the 272 Infanteriedivision was to be established in the Antwerp area from units of the 216 ID. Also on this day, the Generalkommando released the information that the Pionierlandungsbataillon 86 was to be transferred from the Russian front to Antwerp, where it would be subordinated to the Abschnitt.
On 13 December 1943 the 244 Infanteriedivision was transported off to the Artmeeoberkommando 19. This move was completed on 16 December.
On 15 December 1943 the Generalkommando informed the 171 Reservedivision that the AOK 15 had approved the detaching of troops from the division to give infantry training to the units of the Hafenschutzflottillen of the navy and also ordered this detaching of troops.
On 16 December 1943 the corps was ordered to prepare yeat another batallion to be sent to the Russian front, the Marschbataillon "Infanterie West Nr 287". This unit left the corps area on 25 December.
On 19 December 1943 the remaining units of the disbanded 216 Infanteriedivision arrived for the formation of the 272 Infanteriedivision. Also, the Armenierbataillon 809 from the 171 Reservedivision returned from the Truppenübungsplatz Sissonne to its old quarters. Maybe most importantly on this day, the commander of the LXXXIX Armeekorps sent a message to the AOK 15 with proposals for bolstering the combat strength of the infantry. Several proposals were made with respect to the organization, armament, equipment and training of the infantry units in coastal defence. Concerning organisation three proposals were made: the static divisions should have 3 regimenst and 9 batallions, 1 Radfahrkompanie each and 1 MG company for each regiment.
On 20 December 1943 the Generalkommando ordered the Fall Möwe (i.e. the extraction of the RGR 71 and II/RAR 252 to be given up.
On 21 December 1943 the corps ordered that, in order to assess the preparatyions for the pulling out of units, units would actually be pulled out in January and February, followed by a 2-day tactical training for each of these units. On the same day the corps also informed its divisions with respect to a passage on coastal defence from one of the orders by Hitler. Thus, it was said that in the spring of 1944 at the latest an allied invasion wasexpected. Consequently, each sector commander was fully responsible for achieving full defensive readiness and camouflaging of positions by 1 March. Also, bunkers were to be built only from a tactical point of view, meaning that the construction of large permanent personnel bunkers would no longer be allowed and that only gun bunkers, bunkers for anti-tank guns and small personnel bunkers could still be built.
On 22 December 1943 the commander of the LXXXIX Armeekorps request Flak protection from the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe for crossings of the river Schelde in the context of the planned exercises (see above). Also, the Kriegsmarine was asked to provide sea rescue facilities.
On 23 December 1943 the Generalkommando informed its divisions that new additions (Zusätze) by the AOK 15 were to be expected addressing the necessary completion of the overal new bunker construction programme (gesamtenNeubauprogrammes). The divisions were, therefore, ordered to start tactical recces fo all allocated new construction and, in as far as these were completed, to carry out the allocation.
On 25 December 1943 the Marschbataillon Infanterie West Nr. 287 was transported to the Russian front.

On 30 December 1943 Hitler ordered all soldiers able to serve in combat to be tranferred to front-line service. Also on this day, the corps releaed additions (Zusätze) for the contingency plans or Aufmarschbewegungen 2A and 2B. Thus the corps communicated that the code word orders (Stichwortbefehle) Middelburg, Oostburg or Dixmuiden would in any case be preceded by the code word order Alarm Fall Aufmarschbewegung 2A (bezw. 2B) Abtransport (bezw. Abmarsch) vorebereiten. Finally on this day, the Generalkommando informed its divisions of an order by Hitler to send all soldiers suitable for combat to the fronts. This meant that the Jahrgänge 1914 and older would be drafted into the fighting troops. Also, headquarters units from the diviosional level upwards were to be reduced in number. Finally, the Trosse units were to be cut by 20%.
On 31 December 1943 the corps ordered the Ostbataillon 608 to be reorganized into a batallion of a static division. Also the AOK 15 had requested the integration of the unit onto the 712 ID as the I/GR 745, which unit was then to become the Füselierbataillon 712.

In the period July-December 1943 the Wochenberichte of the corps gave detailed information with respect to units arriving, leaving, moving and reorganizing in the sector of the LXXXIX Armeekorps, as well as detailed information on the construction of the Atlantikwall. This detailed information can be found in the document below:
3. 1944

On 3 January 1944 the 3./Fahrschwadron 137 arrived with the 171 Reservedivision.
On 4 January 1944 Generalfeldmarschall Rommel visited strongpoints in the sectors of the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision and 712 Infanteriedivision. During this visit Rommel remarked that the Divisionsreserve of the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision was located too far to the rear. Also, more artillery was to be massed in the Schwerpunktsabschnitt. We also learn that the commander of the Sturmbataillon - Armeewaffenschule 15 was Hauptmann Hühne).
On the same day the LXXXIX Armeekorps issued orders for the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision in KVA A1 to be relieved by the 165 Reservedivision, with the former division transferred to the area Gent-Bruges as Armeereserve. The move was to commence on 6 January. However, some units of the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision were to remain in the KVA A1 until further notice; III/LAR 19 (mit 30t Munitionskolonne), 3/LAR 19, Luftwaffenpionierbataillon 19 (ohne eine Kompanie), eine Kompanie Luftwaffenpanzerjägerabteilung 19, einzelne Teile von Luftnachrichtenabteilung und Versorgungstruppen und einzelne Kommandos der Versorgungstruppen. In addition, the I/Festungsstammabteilung LXXXIX and the Heeresartillerieabteilung 1140 also were located in the KVA. On the same day, the corps also ordered the complementation of the cadre personnel of the Armenierbataillon 809 up to 25% of the total strength by the 171RD. Finally on this day, the corps reported to the AOK15 on the setting-up of reserves.More specificaly, in case of the pulling out of the 712 Infanteriedivision the following (main) units would remain: II/Grenadierregiment 745 and a Marschbataillon 712 (consisting mainly of the Feldersatzbataillon 712). In case of the pulling out of the Reservegrenadierregiment 71 the following (main) units would remain: 2 Marschkompanien.
On 5 January 1944 the first units of the 165 Reservedivision arrived in KVA A1. On the same day the LXXXIX Armeekorps wrote to the AOK 15 with respect to bolstering the combat strength. In the document the corps mentioned logistical centres of other Wehrmacht parts and the Militärbefehlshaber which would also be used by the Heer in the event of a division being pulled out of the coastal front. The document is also interesting in the sense that it provides a nice overview of the logistical structure within the corps area. The units are listed in the document below:


On 6 January 1944 it was reported that the 272 Infanteriedivision would be transferred to the Militärbefehlshaber Frankreich, more specifically to the area St-Etienne - Lyon - Bourg.
On 7 January the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision had completed its transfer and the 165 Reservedivision had arrived in KVA A1 with all its units. Also, the corps requested the AOK15 for the officialisation (Etatisierung) of the ad-hoc established Panzerjägerkompanie (Sf) and its integration as the 1. Kompanie into the Panzerjägerabteilung 148.
On 8 January 1944 parts of the Pionierlandungsbataillon 86 arrived in Antwerp. On the same day Armenierbataillon 809 was transferred to KVA A1 (South-Beveland). Also on this day, the corps ordered the training of crews for the 2cm Alarmflakgeschütze. These Flak guns were to arrive soon. Finally, the corps reported to the AOK15 on measures taken and to be taken to bolster combat strengths by removing troops from non-essential support and staff positions.
On 11 January 1944 the Chef des Generamlstabes of the corps Oberst iG Ulrich went for a meeting with the army commander to Tourcoing. Subjects discussed were a proposal for flooding, use of reserves and fortification matters.

On 15 January 1944 the LXXXIX Armeekorps ordered the continued transfer of 1 batallion each time of the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision to Maria-ter-Heide for training purposes.from 20 January onwards. On the same day the corps issued an important order to its divisions with respect to a number of issues: the forward deployment of reserves, the construction of the 2. Stellung, the pulling out of units and the preparation for the deployment of the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision in the KVA A2/A3. An important issue was the move from reserve units in the rear to locations just behind the coastline in order to be able to respond faster to any allied landing (and in accordance with Rommel's) orders. Separate orders were given for each division:
  • 165 Reservedivision:: the following units were to be sent forward:
    • II/Reservegrenadierregiment 260  to the area Domburg-Westkapelle
    • I/Reservegrenadierregiment 215 to the Verteidigungsbereich Vlissingen
    • one company of I/Reservegrenadierregiment 260 was to move to the current location of II/RGR 260
    • Armenierinfanteriebataillon 809 was remain subordinated to the division as corps reserve and was to be moved to the location proposed by the division (?)
  • 712 Infanteriedivision:
    • The reserve companies of the battalions were to be moved forward immediately nehind the HKL as well as both reserve battalions (III/GR 745 and III/GR 732)
    • Ostbataillon 628 was to be integrated as I/GR 745 with the latter being renamed Füselierbataillon 712.
  • 171 Reservedivision:
    • all three regiments of the division were to man the Hauptkampflinie
    • one reserve battalion each  was to be deployed in the StpGr Ostende and immediately behind the HKL on the left wing

Also addressed in this document was the 2. Stellung.  Essentially, work on this second line of defence was scaled down. Thus, the companies working there were to be moved back to the coast and the divisional troops deployed to be pulled out to resume their normal duties. It was determined that only the local civil labourers would keep on working in the 2. Stellung.

With respect to the pulling out of units in case of an allied attack, one of the three contigencies, Fall Middelburg (165 RD) was inactivated. Thus, the division would not be pulled out. The other two contingencies (Fall Oostburg and Fall Dimuiden) were to be revamped by way of temporary solution (until the reorganisation of the divisions had been completed). Thus, the Fall Oostburg was now defined as follows:

  • To remain in the KVA A2: II/GR 745 and II/AR 712

  • To be transported into the KVA A2: 1 regimental HQ with 2 battalions of the 171RD and I/RGR 215 of the 165 RD, as well as a light artillery battalion of the 171 RD

Finally, the above document stated that the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision was to prepare for deployment in both the KVA A2 (Zeebrugge-Blankenberge) and A3 (either side of Ostend and south of Nieuwpoort).

Also on 15 January 1944 an addition (Ergänzung) to the Kriegsrangliste of officers in the corps headquarters was issued for the period 1 July-31 December 1943:

 

 

On 16 January 1944 the corps handed over a proposal to the AOK15 concerning the execution of permanent inundations and requested a decision as to whether the inundations would be carried out in the manner proposed.

On 17 January 1944 1 infantry company, 1 light Infanteriegeschütz platoon and one artillery battery of the 171 Reservedivision were transferred from KVA A3 to KVA A1 for the establishment of the Armeesturmbataillon 15.
On 19 January 1944 the corps; on the orders of the AOK15, ordered that all independently-made transfers of personnel saved from logistics and staff functions into the combat troops was prohibited. From now on, all freed-up troops were to be transferred to the Feldersatzbataillon 712.
On 20 January 1944 the corps ordered that, for a large-scale enemy attack which did not affect the corps sector, the pulling out of the 712 Infanteriedivision (Fall Oostburg) or the 48 Infanteriedivision (Fall Dixmuiden) to be used as  Armeereserve were to be prepared calendrically. Thus, a new version of these contingencies was issued.
  • Fall Oostburg
    • To be pulled out: 712 Infanteriedivision (without II/AR 712)., but including the heavy AT-unit
    • To be transported into the assembly area in KVA A2:  light battalion of AR 148
    • 48 Infanteriedivision was to be take over the KVA A2 with HQ in Bruges
    • Troops from the 48 ID to be transported onto the KVA A2: 1 regimental HQ and 2 grenadeer battalions
    • Troops from the 165 RD to be transported into the KVA A2: 1 grenadeer and 1 light artillery battalion
    • Troops from the Kommandeur Festungsstammtruppen LXXXIX to be transported into the KVA A2: a Festungsstammreservekompanie from the I and II Abteilungen
    • Main sectors to be defended: PzStp Breskens, Zeerbugge, Blanlenberge
    • The 712 ID was to prepare a mobile advance battalion (Vorausabteilung) for which it would be allocated 1000 bicycles
    • The Vorausabteilung was to be ready to march within 8 hours (assembly area: Knesselare - Sint-Joris); the while division within 36 hours (assembly area Brugge-Aardenburg-Eeklo)
  • Fall Dixmuiden
    • To be pulled out: 48 Infanteriedivision, including the heavy AT-unit and the Feldersatzbataillon 148
    • Remaining in KVA A3: II. Abteilung/Festungsstammtruppen LXXXIX
    • The 712 Infanteriedivision takes over the KVA A3 (HQ in Bruges)
    • Troops from the 712ID to be transported into the KVA A3: 1 grenadeer regiment (with 3 battalions and regimental units) and a light artillery battalion
    • Troops from the 165 Reservedivision to be transported into the KVA A2: 1 grenadeer battalion and 1 light artillery battalion
    • Troops from the Kommandeur der Festungsstammtruppen into the KVA A3: Festungsstammreservekompanie
    • Main sectors to be defended: sector De Haan - Oostende and Nieuwpoort
    • The 48 ID was to prepare a mobile advance battalion (Vorausabteilung) for which it would be allocated 1000 bicycles
    • The Vorausabteilung was to be ready to march within 8 hours (assembly area: Gistel - Sint-Pieters Kapelle); the while division within 36 hours (assembly area Zedelgem-Torhout-Diksmuide)
Also on this day the Generalkommando LXXXIX  issued further orders to the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision:
  • 1 Battalion each of the division was to be trensferred to the sectors of the 712ID and the 48ID  to work on the 2. Stellung, each for a period of 1 week (21/1-5/2 with 712 ID and 7/2-12/2 with 171RD)
  • The Pionierbataillon 19 was to be subordinated with 2 companies to the 171 RD as of 1 February and to be used to lay large-scale minefields. For the same purpose the 1./Pionierbataillon 19 was to be subordinated to the 712 ID. Duration in both cases: 3 weeks.
Further on 20 January the corps ordered the setting-up of the Brückenkolonne B 832, under the command of Leutnant Maiwald. The unit was subordinated to the 171 Reservedivision for training, administrative and supply purposes and to be attached to the Pionierbataillon 148. Tactically, however, the unit was to remain subordinated to the corps. Finally on this day, the corps ordered the setting-up of the Panzerjägerabteilung 19. The unit was to consist of a Stab and 3 companies (1 (Pz Jg Sf) Kompanie with 14x 75mm Pak, 2 (Pz Jg Stu Gesch) Kompanie with 10 Sturmgeschütze and the 3 (Flak) Kompanie with 12x 2cm Flak guns).
On 21 January 1944 AOK 15 ordered that the 171 Reservedivision would be tactically subordinated to the LXXXIX Armeekorps and would be renamed 48 Infanteriedivision (bodenständig). In contrast, the 165 Reservedivision was to remain a training division and would remain administratively subordinated to the LXVII Reservekorps. Further, the corps added its comments for the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision on the AOK15 order of 9 January concerning training, the construction of the 2. Stellung and the deployment of engineers. Also, the corps ordered the creation of a Sicherungskompanie for special duties. The current Sicherungskompanie (3/Jägerregiment 45) was to be relieved by the newly-established company on 1 February. Finally on this day, the corps issued an order concerning the Luftraumbeobachtungsdienst and the expansion of the Flugmeldenetz. Briefly, every soldier wa now responssible for observing the skies and reporting extraordinary activities as defined in the document.
On 22 January 1944 the corps issued its order for the renaming of the 171RD into the 48 Infanteriedivision (see also above). The change was to take effect on 1 February.

On 23 January 1944 ordered the establishment of the Feldersatzbataillon 148 with a headquarters and 5 companies for the 171 Reservedivision. Also on this day we find an overview of all headquarters, troop parts, units and the like which had been established unofficially (Kommandomässig) following OKH/OBWest/AOK15/LXXXIX AK orders:

Finally on 23 January the corps released its orders additional to the Führerweisung 51. Firstly, it ordered that all headquarters to be used during combat were to be made ready so that the most important parts of headquarters could function in them (deadline 15 February); also the construction of Gefehctstände and Ausweichgefechtsstände was to be completed before 1 March. Secondly, all weapons and equipment were to be built-in and camouflaged feldmässig, even when a festungsmässig use had been planned, for as longer as the latter had not materialized. Thirdly, construction work on the 2. Stellung was to be carried out by local civilians and the Truppe. Thirdly, Baracken inside strongpoints were to be removed.
On 24 January 1944 the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision was ordered to start preparing for operations outside the corps area. More specifically, the division was to prepare in such a way that it would be ready and waiting in an assembly area to be transported by train within 24 hours. Also on this day, the corps reported once more to the AOK15 on the strengthening of the combat strength. The first issue discussed was the reorganization of the static divisions into infantry division (new type); this was siad to be possible only for the 48 Infanteriedivision. The 712 Infanteriedivision had been made similar to an infantry division (new type) by turning the batallion freed up by the integration of the Ostbataillon 628 into the Füselierbataillon 712. Secondly, it was pointed out that the request 20% reduction in support troops was deemed impracticable for the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision, as this would heavily affect the mobility of the division; Such a 20% reduction was only possible with the two other divisions, but here too, the AOK15 was requested not to carry out the reduction.
In the night of 25/26 January 1944 a storm caused major damage to strongpoints, minefields etc.
On 27 January 1944 the corps issued an order to the 165 Reservedivision concerning the move of the Sturm-Btl. Armeewaffenschule.and the deployment of I (Ost)/GR 745. As concerns the latter, the unit would be tactically subordinated to the 165 Reservedivision, while remaining administratively subordinated to the 712 ID. The arrival of the unit had been ordered for 30 January.

On 31 January 1944 it was ordered by the AOK15 that the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision was freed of any construction work for the 2. Stellung and was to spend all its time training for operations.

From 1 February 1944 onwards 10 radio operators were made permanently available to the KVA Antwerpen, who would be integrated in the Nachrichtenzug of the KVA Antwerpen. Also on this day, the 171 Reservedivision was renamed into the 48 Infanteriedivision and fully subordinated to the corps.
On 2 February 1944 the corps issued an order showing (on a map) the roads to be taken by reserves and supply columns in the event of combat (Umgehungsstrassen).
On 3 February 1944 the corps issued an order for the deployment of the Baupionierbataillon 798 and the Festungspionierbataillon 12. The former unit was to prepare for departure within 24 hours following the code word Hanna. The latter unit was to take into account that, in the event of combat, it would be given a new mission. All orders would be given by the Festungspionierstab 12. As a consequence the sector commanders were informed that these units could not be used as permanent troops for strongpoints or even as reserve, but only as temporary Alarmeinheiten.

On 15 February 1944 the following officers made up the headquarters staff of the LXXXIX Armeekorps:


On the same day the corps reported that, following AOK15 orders, the corps headquarters troops had moved to their combat bunkers and that all parts of the Generalkommando had been accommodated on a wartime footing (kriegsmässig). Further on this day, the corps informed the division by telex of an order from the Heeresgruppe B. All headquarters were to make sure that, in the event of an enemy attack, all reserves could intervene within the shortest possible delay. Also, the units of the Panzergruppe West were to be put on erhöhte Marschbereitschaft from 15 February onwards.
On 16 February 1944 the following changes to the Fälle Oostburg-Dixmuiden were made with respect to the orders of 20 January above:
  • Fall Oostburg:
    • I(Ostbataillon 628)/GR 745, at the moment in KVA A1, is to be taken along by the 712 ID
    • The Festungsstammreservekompanie will have been transported to Sluis by 20 February
  • Fall Dixmuiden:
    • In addition to the heavy AT-unit: the III (Armenierinfanteriebataillon 809)/GR 126, which in the Fall Dixmuiden will be pulled out from the 165RD area and transported to the 48 ID.
    • The Festungsstammreservekompanie will be suboerdinated to the 48 ID and is to be drawn from Sluis.
  • Addition for the 165 Reservedivision: the division is to prepare the extraction and assembly of the I(Ostbataillon 628)/GR 745 and the III (Armenierinfanteriebataillon 809)/GR 126 within 12 hours around Middelburg and Goes and arranges for the occupation of the sectors vacated by these units with own units. For these two batallions transport is also to be prepares by sea, in conjunction with the 712ID, Sturmbootzug Terneuzen, Seekommandant Südholland and the 12. Landungsflottille
  • Addition for the Kommandeur Festungsstammtruppen LXXXIX: this unit is to transfer the Festungsstammreservekompanie into the sector of the 712ID  in Sluis.and to prepare deployment in the two contingency cases.
On 16-17-18 February 1944 the 3 corps divisions were ordered to start calendrical preparations for the pulling out of one infantry regiment each, to be put at the disposal of the Generalkommando within 12 hours. The units affected were the Grenadierregimenter 127 (48ID), 260 (165RD) and 745 (712ID). In each case artillery units would be added. and the sector vacated was to be taken over by other units of the division The code words were Möwe for the 48ID, Feyerabend for the 165RD (assembly area Goes) and Baldur for the 712ID (assembly area Schoondijke-Breskens-Lissewege-Sluis)
On 19 February 1944 the corps commander inspected the area of the 165 Reservedivision. The report drafted after this inspection visit contains some interesting information. Firstly, Flak forces in the area of the division were discussed. Instead of 24x 2cm Flak from the Flakregiment 35 (part of the Flakbrigade 19), the folllowing Flak forces (19 guns) were said to be deployed:
  • 1 Batterie der Flakabteilung 847 (bisher Flugplatz Vlissingen) mit 2 Züge (6x 2cm) Enge bei Arnemuiden (Sloedam) und 1 Zug (3x 2cm) an der Vlakebrücke (Süd-Beveland Kanal)
  • 10x 2cm Alarmflak: 6x Enge von Bath, 2x Vrouwenpolder, 2x gegenüber Vrouwenpolder
Secondly, it was reported that only the divisional headquarters and that of the VB Vlissingen were accommodated in permanent bunkers, with all other headquarters in field fortifications. Thirdly, the VB Vlissingen was discussed in detail.
  • As a replacement for the airfield unit (Fliegerhorstbesatzung) 1 company was to be allocated
  • Also medical facilities were to be housed in permanent bunkers
  • The following details were provided with respect to the Landfront:
    • The wet AT-ditch was ready
    • 200 meters of the AT-wall were still not finished and 120 metres were ready to be poured. The two companies working on this day could complete 40 metres a day. The entire AT-wall was estimated to be completed in 8-10 days. The order was also given to to start preparing Kleinstunterstände so that the AT-wall could also be defended in between the pak-positions.
  • With respect to the Panzerstützpunkt Nettelbeck it was reported that the 9/MAA202 would be occupied with personnel from 21 February onwards and operational on 25 February.
  • Also discussed were the Vorstrandhindernisse at the Stp Fidelio.
On 25 February 1944 the corps ordered that for the duration of the deployment of the III. (Armenierbataillon 809)/GR128 and the I. (Ostbataillon 628)/GR745 in the KVA A1 these units were subordinated to the 165 Reservedivision in all respects.
On 29 February 1944 the corps issued proposals to the Admiral Niederlande concerning the deployment of ship crews and static naval units as Alarmeinheiten. If the former for some reason remained in port in the event of combat or Alarmstufe II they would be subordinated to the land commander, who would decide on their further deployment as Alarmeinheiten. Static navy units would also become subordinated to the land commander in case of combat or with Alarmstufe II. Also discussed was the relation of the Seekommandant Süd-Holland in relation to the VB Vlissingen. As long as the VB Vlissingen  was not encircled, the Seekommandant would fulfil his normal function, i.e. deploy all means available to combat an enemy attack with an emphasis on the VB Vlissingen. However, as soon as the latter had been encircled or contact with the commander of the KVA A1 had been lost, the Seekommandant would become fully subordinated to the commander of the VB. The same principle would be followed for artillery support. Apparently, the navy had planned for the Seekommandant to leave Vlissingen in case of an attack. The corps commander now requested that these plans would be shelved; If the VB Vlissingen was surrounded, no single man could be allowed to leave it, not even the Seekommandant.
Finally on this day, the LXXXIX Armeekorps reported to the AOK15 on the completion of the items ordered by the AOK15 on 20 January concerning the location and headquarters, the fortification of positions and communication networks in the various KVAs. All act:ivities had been completed, with the following exceptions:
  • Generalkommando: the telephone connections with the new Ausweichgefechtsstand Gent would be completed after the end of construction work
  • 165 Reservedivision:  2 Ausweichgefechtsstände of the artillery had not yet been completed; the firing positions of 3/1140 and 2 LAG had not been completed. Cablle-laying work had not been complted.
  • 712 Infanteriedivision: the Gefechtsstand I/GR732 (move from Lissewege ordered) and that of the II/AR1712 had not been completed; completion of part of the Zwischenwiderstandnester possible only towards the end of March
  • 48 Infanteriedivision: the completion of the Gefechtsstand II/GR127 was planned only in the second half of March
  • Abschnitt Antwerpen: fortification work was still ongoing in the Unterabschnitte Hafen and Stadt; field fortifications had been completed for 80%; the following positions were in the process of being constructed: 2 Flakstellungen, 5 Rundumstellungen, 2 MG-Stellungen and 2 Pak-Stände. Completion of the positions for the Alarmflakzüge possible only towards the end of March. The construction of the AT-ditch had not yet been completed.
On 4 March 1944 the corps issued an order concerning the deployment of the Festungspionier- and Baueinheiten subordinated to the Festungspionierstab 12 in the event of combat action. More specifically, the Festungspionierstab 12 was to prepare for the folllowing activities: clearing up of destructions to important infrastructure in the rear areas of the combat area as well as the costructioon of new bridges or other crossing facilities; undoing damage to permanent and field fortication bunkers; building additional field constructions, as well as Riegelstellungen  and rear positions and guaranteeing the supply of material and equipment for construction work. As a conseqence the divisions could not rely on the engineer and construction units and the Festungspionierstab 12 would be in command of all engineer and construction units in the KVA. The only exception was when units were under attack, in which case the units could be used for defensive purpose, but only with the explicit permisison of the corps. In case communication with the corps was lost, the commander of the division was to decide. In case the Abschnittsgrippe I/12 and II/12 were to depart, static 8-man groups would remain in Brugge (for the I/12) and Eernegem (for the II/12). The deployment of the Marinefestungspioniergruppe in the KVA A was the responsibility of the Seekommandant Südholland.
On 12 March 1944 the corps issued an order to the divisions about the concepts of Stützpunkt and Widerstandsnest. In essence, the decision whether to regard a position as one or the other was that the divisional commander. This had been decided by the AOK15 on 7 March.
On 14 March 1944  the corps commander inspected the area of the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision. The report drafted afterwards contain some interesting information. Thus, the Panzerjägerabteilung was still equipped with only 5 Sturmgeschütze. Also, the division had too few Hilfswilligen. Further, the division was short of 90 MG and 23 mortars.It was also proposed to establish a Strafvollstreckungszug with the division. In addition, the division requested 1 FK 39 and 1 sFH 12.2 (r) for the Feldersatzbataillon and a larger car for the division commander. Finally, instead of just 1 batallion, 1 regiment was to spend time training at the Truppenübungsplatz.
Also on this day, the corps issued an order on the naming of the Ostbataillonen. More specifically, the I (Ostbataillon 628)/GR 745 was renamed into the I (Ost)/GR 745 and the III (Armenierinfanteriebataillon 809)/GR 128 into III (Armenier)/GR 128.
On 16 March 1944 the corps submitted Kriegsgliederungen to the AOK15 for the emergency cases Oostburg and Dixmuiden. For the former the Vorausabteilung was the reinforced III/GR 745; for the latter the reinforced Füselierbataillon 148.

On 22 March 1944 the corps issued a copy of an army order to its divisions concerning the construction of numerous decoy installations. The corps ordered the establishing of shops where decoy canons could be produced (with the help of the civilian population).
On 27 March 1944 Generalfeldmarschall Rommel visited the Generalkommando, as well as some Atlantikbefestigungen in the corps area.
On 28 March 1944 the LXXXIX Armeekorps wrote to the Militärbefehlshaber Belgien-Nordfrankreicht with respect to the KVA Antwerpen. The corps essentially approved the separation of the positions of Kommandeur KVA Antwerpen and Feldkommandant. However, the following was to be implemented in order to safeguard  the defensive interests of the KVA:
  • The headquarters of the Kommandeur KVA Antwerpen (including a communications platoon) was to be fully established with all positions filled.
  • The Kommandeur KVA Antwerpen was to have seniority over both the Feldkommandant and the Kommandant Trüppenübungsplatz Maria-ter-Heide.
  • In the event of combat or Alarmstufe II several units of the Feldkommandant were to be subordinated to the Kommander KVA Antwerpen, including the entire Gericht, Militârverwaltungsstab, Feldgendarmerietrupps 895 und 821, GFP, SD. Since this measure involved the major part of the units of the Feldkommandant it was also decided that, in the event of combat or Alarmstufe II, the Feldkommandant  would simply be subordinated to the sector commander.
  • It was also decided that the KVA Kommandeur would also be the Stadtkommandant. Thus, the Ortskammandantur 720 Antwerpen (including the Feldgendarmerietrupp 830) would becaome subordinated to the KVA-Kommandeur and not the Feldkommandantur 520.
  • All units located within the boundaries of the KVA and subordinated to the MilBH or the OFK 762 Brüssel were subordinated to the KVA Kommandeur for purposes of preparing and executing the defence of the KVA.
  • Finally, if sabotage, unrest and the like (normally the responsibilities of the Feldkommandant) were to require the large-scale use of troops, the KVA Kommandeur would assume overall command.

We also learn from this document that the headquarters of the KVA Antwerpen consisted of 15 officers, 1 Beamte, 19 NCOs, 64 other ranks and 2 Angestellter. The Nachrichtenzug for the KVA Antwerpen was made up of 1 officer, 16 NCOs, and 78 other ranks.

Also on 28 March a Kommandeursbesprechung was held on the visit of Feldmarschall Rommel on 27 March. Here, the following items were decided:

  • Rommel ordered the further strengthening of the KVAs to fortresses, as well as the Befestigung of a Landfront to be established some 3-5km behind the coastline. The purpose of the Landfront was to prevent a breaking-out of the coastal front, as well as to prevent airborne or glider troops to establish contact with seaborne troops. Most important was the strengthening of defensive capabilities at the coast., including large minefields and beach obstacles. All possibilities for an increase of labour and supply capabilities were to be used. Training was less important that the above mission. Also Rommel refused the creation of larger reserves. Preference was to be given to platoon- and company-sized reserves.

  • During the meeting the following points were made. Firstly, the exact position of the Landfront could not be determined. Further, presentations were given by Oberst Radecke of the Festungspionierstab, Oberst Babinger on artillery issues and Major iG Zetsche on logistical issues. Finally, the new NS-Führungsoffizier of the corps, Oberleutnant Dr Kirsch also gave a presentation.

On 30 March 1944 the corps again ordered the checking of full defensive readiness and the execution of the alarm exercises.

On 1 April 1944 the corps was organized as follows:

Also on 1 April Oberst iG Ulrich telephoned with Oberst iG Metzke of the AOK15 concerning the deployment of the schwere Heerespanzerjägerabteilung 668. It was proposed that the deployment in the corps area was to be carried out following the Dinglichkeitsstufen: 1) sector Zeebrugge-de Haan; 2) Nieuwpoort and 3) sector Breskens-Zeebrugge.
On 3 April 1944 Generalleutnant von Tettau, who was at the time Leiter des Führungs- und Ausbildungsstab in die Niederlanden, visited the corps headquarters for talks about operational and support possibilities in case of enemy attacks on Antwerp. Also on this day, the Generalkommando wrote to the Militärbefehlshaber Belgien-Nordfrankreich concerning the KVA Antwerpen. Attached to the document ( was the Stärkenachweisung for the KVA. The corps emphasized that this constituted the minimum requirement, the complete realisation of which was the precondition for the separation of the functions of KVA Kommandeur and Feldkommandant. Further, the Generalkommando would request the Etatisierung for a Nachrichtenzug for the KVA Antwerpen. There were no objections against the plan to send a small Arbeitsstab from the Feldkommandantur 520 to Torhout in case of Fall A II. Further, the earlier corps requirment for the Ortskommandanur 720 to be subordinated to the KVA-Kommandeur was dropped. In case of Falle IIa and case om combat the Feldkommandantur 520 was to remain geschlosseni in Antwerpen (with the exception of the above-mentioned Arbeitsstab).
Finally, on this day a meeting took place with the commander of the AOK15. During this meeting the following items were discussed: the Landfronten of the KVAs (no info available), the deadline of 15/4 for the erection of anti-air assault obstacles on flat terrains as well as the beach obstacles. It was again further emphasized by the Chef AOK15 that the construction activities were more important than training. The last point of discussion was constituted by the Hilfswilligen. There were 1604 with the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision; however some 900 Hiwis were short; Since OBWest had communicated to no further Hiwi could be provided, the corps forwarded a new request to the AOK15.

On 5 April 1944  the LXXXIX Armeekorps issued orders to its divisions and the KVA Antwerpen to turn the Küstenverteidigungsabschnitte into Festungsbereichen or fortress areas. Interestingly, detailed information was provided for each of the sectors:
  • 165 Reservedivision
    • Festungsbereiche: the island of Walcheren, including the South-Beveland sector from Stp Scharnhorst to and including Stp Grosser Kurfürst The entire Walcherent coastline was Seefront, while in the sector from Stp Scharnhorst to and including Stp Grosser Kurfürst a line some 3-4 km inland would function as Landfront.
    • Feste Plätze: these were area to of importance (communication, traffic) to be defended at all cost even when encirclement threatened.:
      1. On North-Beveland the StpGr Hildebrand-Alarich-Theoderich-Bölcke
      2. On South-Beveland the StpGr Goes (with the line Wemeldinge-Goes-Hansweert as boundary)
      3. The Bath Straits were to be left open and all troops not allocated above were to reinforce it.
  • 712 Infanteriedivision
    • Landfront: Braakman-Schoondijke-Oostburg-Sluis-Brugge-Brugge-Oostende Canal (llink with 48ID). The land front between the Braakman and Schoondijke was preferably to run as close behind the sea front as possible. A connection between the land front and the KVA Antwerpen was non-existent.
    • The city of Brugge (with a Kampfkommandant) was to be fully integrated in the defences of the land front
    • In the event of an attack, help was NOT to be expected from the Luftwaffenjägerregiment 38 to occupy positions in the land front
  • 48 Infanteriedivision
    • Landfront: Brugge-Oostende Canal  - Plassendaele - Sllijpe  -Veurne - Veurne-Bergues Canal (corps boundary)
    • In the event of an attack, help is  NOT to be expected from the units of the 19 LwFd located behind the division to occupy land front positions
    • The units of the 19 LwFd located inside the Festungsbereich of the 148ID can only be called upon to construct obstacles or minefields INSIDE the billeting areas of the 19 LwFd.
  • 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision
    • The division was not to be used to occupy positions in the land front, bur rather to counterattack a landed enemy.
    • However, the division was to lend physical support to the units of the 48/712 ID located in the Festungsbereiche, withoit endangering its own field fortification work and training
    • The division is to continue its current field fortification work and close defence preparation. In addition, it was to erect obstacles against air landings in its entire area. These obstacles were at the same time to be constructed as mock mine fields.The division was to start imediately with the training of mine-laying platoons. For this purpose an engineer company of the division was to be reattached to the division.
    • Wether the order for the Luftwaffenjägerregiment 45 to assume blocking positions in the Brugge-Veurne sector would be changed or not was to be decided later.
  • KVA Antwerpen
    • The above order can only theoretically be applied to the sector. The main effort is the defense of the city and port of Antwerp.
    • An 800-1000m deep mine field is to be laid following the line of the Forts 8-1 and further following the AT-ditch over Merksem and along the Schijn river.In this minefield defensive positions are to be integrated to control the minefields an to prevent the enemy from clearing the minefields.In the same way the Stp Scheldetunnel is also to be defended. The main defensive line at the inner city boundary is also to be protected by a similar miine field.
    • For the Unterabschnitt Hulst the following measures were to be taken:
      • Hulst itself is to be turned into a strongpoint with all-round defences
      • The resistance nests along the Schelde between Walsoorden and Terneuzen were, if possible, to be grouped together and protected towards the hinterland with a minefield
      • The planned creation of a mobile reserve and its located were to be reported to the corps
    • For the UA Ost no changes were made
    • The placing of obstacles againt air landings was to be executed in such a way that, first, the areas closest to the city and port were to be secured. The measures ordered for the UA Hulst above were to be given the same priority.Later the obstacles could then be constructed in areas further away, with the help of civilians..
Also on 5 April the corps issued orders about the subordination and the deployment of the schwere Heerespanzerjägerabteilung 668.On the orders of the AOK15 the unit was to be deployed in the sector Zeebrugge-De Haan and defend this sector against armoured assaults, in such a way that it could fire towards the sea with single guns but could also from further back fire as a unit right up until the dunes. Even though the unit was directly subordinated to the corps, it was to work closely together with the 712 and 48 Infanteriedvisionen. Also, since the unit could be pulled out at any time, the Pak guns already present in the sector were to remain in place. Until the unit hade been given its final locations, it was to put up in an area south of Bruges
Also on this day a meeting took place between the Ias of the divisions. The first point discussed was that Rommel had ordered that each and every soldier was to start immediately with the construction activities, whatever the difficulties. Further, the first requirement for minefields in the Landfront was a depth of 400metres (with deeper minefields later). The Minenband at the coast was to be completed. At unit boundaries minefields were to be established at right angles with the coastline. Important also were large minefields (Grossminenfelder) which were to have sufficient depth. Even though obstacles against air landings were only priority level 4, this did not mean that this work could not be started at appropriate locations. Not to be forgotten was the 2. Stellung the construction of which was to be continued. Available supplies of mines were to be used first as beach obstacles, then at the coast and then in the rear areas. The labour effort for the beach obstacles was to be maximum. Troops of the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision were to be used for construction work if the own duties of the division so allowed, and only within Festungsbereichen; The 165 Reservedivision was to begin with construction activities on Walcheren, North-Beveland and the southwestern part of South-Beveland. Within large minefields, strongpoints, observation posts and weapons were to be integrated. Finally, mock minefields were immediately to be made to look like real ones.
On 6 April 1944 the Artilleriekommandeur 189 reported to the corps on the deployment of Torpedobatterien and the possible locations for these. For the entire OBWest area the initial allocation was 200 torpedoes, with a monthly follow-up delivery of 200-300 units. The AOK15 was to get absolute priority in deliveries with 45 batteries of 3 torpedoes each planned (15 batteries of which would be delivered shortly). The LXXXIX Armeekorps was planned to receive 8 of these. The torpedoes had a range of 5km. and a speed of 60km per hour.
  • Vlissingen (1 battery): 6th priority
  • Both sides of Westkapelle (2 batteries): 3rd an 4th priority
  • North of Vrouwenpolder (1 battery): 7th priority
  • Blankenberge (1 battery): 1st priority
  • Zeebrugge (1 battery): 8th priority
  • Cadzand Kurhaus (1 battery): 2nd priority
  • Nieuwe Sluis (1 battery): 5th priority
On 7 April 1944 the corps issued an order to the 19 Luftwaffenfeldivision on the deployment of the artillery and the return of units from the Truppenübungsplatz Maria-ter-Heide.
Specifically, the division was to ensure that the I und II/LwAR 19 were not pulled out before the III/LwAR 19 was operational and ready to fire and, secondly, that the troop from could be pulled back from Maria-ter-Heide within the shortest possible time. On the same day an order was also issued to the division concerning the use of the civilian population for construction purposes.
On 8 April 1944 an air attack on the airfield at Koksijde killed approximately 40 civilian labourers. In addition the runway and several hangars were damaged. Also on this day, the corps passed on an order from the Admiral Niederlanden concerning the mobile Flak reserves of the Kriegsmarine.
The Admital Niederlanden had ordered that every Marineflakabteiling was to establish 1 light and 1 medium mobile Flakzug (each consisting of 3 canons and 1 searchlight). The transport was to be provided by the 10. Marinekraftfahrabteilung. The army corps were requested to instruct the commanders of Verteidigungsbereiche or fortresses that the mobile flak units could be pulled out and, thus, were only temporarily available to them  In the actual. In order not to weaken the defensive strength of the VB Vlissingen, 2x 4cm Bofors would be made available to replace the 3.7cm Flak in that case. Further on this day, the corps ordered (on the basis of an Heeresgruppe B order) the immediate submission of a Gesamtausbauplanung. This action was required since the Heeresgruppe B had ordered that proposals for such an Ausbauplanung were to be submitted to the AOK15 as early as 12 April.  The planning was to be drafted by the divisions, in cooperation with the Festungspionierabschnittsgruppen and the relevant headquarters of navy and air force. The planning was to be submitted in 3 Dringlichkeitsstufen (levels of priority) and broken down into numbers for the 3 services. In the 1. Dringlichkeitsstufe the following was to be included:
  • the gesamte Sommerausbauprogramm (from 1 May to 30 September 1944). This programme had been drafted by the Festungspionierstab 12.
  • all AT-tanks (of caliber 75mm and higher), LAG and KwK positioned at the coast following the numbers available at the time (156RD: 10 schwere Pak; 712ID new allocation of 7 schwere Pak; 48ID loss of 5 schwere Pak). The 88mm LAG requested by the divisions with the corps through the Artilleriekommandeur 189 were also to be taken into account.
  • Schusssichere protection of railway artillery in the curent positions. To be included were the firing positions more to the rear (for the K5 canons). For each railway canon a tunnel was to be constructed which could shelter npot only the canon, but also a locomative and 1-2 ammo carriages. The tunnels were to be constructed in building strength A.
  • AT-positions for 88mm in the rear zone (Tiefenzone). in as far as the guns were divisional 88mm canons deployed in the rear.
  • Concrete for beach and coastal obstacles
  • Constructions of various types for the Landfront. Small bunkers for troops were only to be constructed if tactically very important, otherwise not.
  • Divisional artillery in turnable armoured turrets (drehbahren Panzertürmen).In these constructions divisional batteries were to be deployed in important locations and when required to also be able to fire inland.
  • All army and naval batteries not included in the Sommerbauprogramm

All other constructions were to be included in the second and third levels of priority, as decided by the divisional commanders. In addition, the document also dealth with some specific issues:

  • available Lichtsprechgräte, available as well as still to be allocated measuring equipment of Heeresküstenartillerie and so on were to be planned for permanent fortification (priority level 1)
  • construction of the battery Schelde had been approved and was to be carried at in priority level 1.
  • B-Stellen for infantry and artillery were to be taken into account
  • The Nachrichtenführer were to be involved in the planing of communication bunkers of all types
  • In general no personnel bunkers were to be constructed. The construction of small personnel bunkers was only allowed at the coast and in those sectors and locations where the recently carried out Verdichtung of the troops present had not yet been carried out.
  • In the planning the constructions which had been planned until 30 April, but which had not been completed due to labour or material shortages, were to be included.

The divisions were to submit their plannings to the corps on 11 April at the latest.

Finally on 8 April, the corps issued an order on the Abwehrbereitschaft. It wasfirst pointed out that the jamming of radars, intel on the enemy as well as good tidal conditions could make enely landings possible. The divisions were, therefore, ordered to 1) order increased attention for guards, sentries and patrols, 2) feuerbereitschaft of the heavy weapons in case of darkness and mist.and readiness of the Seezielbatterien for firing at Vernichtungs- und Sperrfeuerräume. If no targets could be located at sea fire was to be directed towards Anlandungsstellen.
On 9 April 1944 the corps (on the basis of instruction from Generalfeldmarschall Rommel) ordered changes to the order concerning the accommodation of reserves.
Indeed, Rommel had ordered units to move forward to the coast. However, reserve and logistics troops south of the newly established Landfront were to remain in their accommodation, albeit protected against air attacks.
On 12 April 1944  Major Baumann of the Kommandostab of the Militärbefehlshaber came to the corps to discuss the mobilisation of the Flemish for guard and security duties.
After the meeting the corps commander decided that Major Baumann would be requested to begin talks with the following goals: 1) measures to provide volunteer Flemish civilians to guard factories, bridges, port infrastructure, buildings in cities and militarily important constructions; 2) immediate start of the recruiting campaign.
On 13 April 1944  the corps wrote to the Militärbefehlshaber concerning the allocation of personnel from the Feldkommandantur 520 for the KVA Antwerpen.
In this document the corps commander communicated firstly that after the approval of the new official strength the personnel requests to the FK520 by the KVA Antwerpen were so restricted that the operations of the FK would not be jeopardized. Secondly, a secondment or detachment of personnel from the FK  to the KVA had so far not been ordered directly to the headquarters. Rather one officer and 1 Stabshelferin had been detached to the Unterabschnitt Stadt, which was attached to the Ortskommandantur. In addition, a few officers of the FK  had so far been called upon to act as OvD. However, after the approval of the new strength of the KVA Antwerpen, this would no longer be necessary.  
In the period 13-
15 April 1944 Generalleutnant Diehm (General zbV bei HrGr B) visited the coastal divisions and inspected the beach defences
(Vorstrandhindernisse). On 15 April Diehm also visited the corps headquarters in Antwerp.
Also on 15 April 1944 the LXXXIX Armeekorps submitted the plans of the divisions for the Landfront and also added its own opinions for each of the sectors, this in the context of the planned ortganisation of the coastal defence sectors as Festungsbereiche:

  • 165 Reservedivision: firstly, the corps mentioned that Rommel had insisted on the occupying forces on South -Beveland being moved forward to bolster defences on Walcheren, with only the narrow passage at Arnemuiden and the strongpoints to the south until Borssele remaining occupied. The corps fundamentally disagreed, arguing that a defence of the South-Beveland canal and the important town of Goes was necessary. Taking into account the army order for the Reservebataillon III/205 to be moved from the Middelburg area to the coast, the corps proposed the following solution:
    • At the Straits of Bath only the railway bridge was to be defended by 3x 2cm Flak and an infantry platoon
    • II/Reserveregiment 260 (Ausbildungsbataillon) would be moved to Goes to defend the South-Beveland canal and Goes
    • The Arnemuiden-Schoondijke szctor (Wn Schill) would be occupied by Stab III (Arm)/GR 128 with the Stabskompanie, 2 /Arm)/GR 128 and a subordinated company of I/RGR 260.
    • In the area of the east of Middelburg I/RGR 260 (less one company) would be positions as Divisionsreserve
    • III/RGR 205 would be transferred to an area West of Middelburg with the headquarters and 1 companuy and to an area southeast of Westkapelle with one company as Divisionsreserve
    • The strongpoints between Hoedekenskerke and Ellewoutsdijk could, according to the corps, not be given up since otherwise the inner Schelde would be totally defenceless.
  • 712 Infanteriedivisio: Even though it would be tactically desirable to connect the land front to the Braakman rather than south of Breskens, the corps was forced to accept the division's proposals, since the land front could only be as large as the trrops available for it. In the sector Breskens-Westkapelle the terrain could not be flooded, The corps also emphasized the weakness in case of an allied attack on the Westerschelde, since vast stretches of terrain on the southern river bank between Breskens and Antwerp were devoid of troops.
  • 48 Infanteriedivision: The corps agreed to the proposals of the division. It saw weak spots on eitherc side of Oudenburg and Veurne., where floddings were impossible. The corps then asked for permission to flood areas east of Oudenburg and south of Nieuwpoort with salt water.Finally, the corps stated that the artillery batallion in the Zandvoorde area would probably have to be moved out of the Festungsbereicht to the south as the location was required for newly-transferred units of the division.
  • KVA Antwerpen: in this sector the word land front could not really be used. The spaciois Unterabschnitte Ost and Hulst were virtually undefended. It was planned to protect the city and the port with an outer and an inner mine belt, with the latter having priority. In the UA Hulst the resistance nests near and north of Walsoorden would be grouped together and defended inland by a minebelt. Hulst itself would be tirned into a strongpoint with all-round defences.However, due to the absence of sufficient labour, construction work was predicted to be very slow.
In the Anlagen to this document the organisation of and information on the mobility of (parts of) the division in the corps sector were added.
Further on 15 April 1944 the LXXXIX Armeekorps again addressed the AOK15 with a fairly urgent matter. Indeed, the transition of the KVAs to Festungsbereiche had given rise to a number of questions, the solution of which was becoming urgent:
  • After completion of the large-scale laying of minefields within the Festungsbereiche large-scale counterattacks would no longer be possible (the minefields being in the way). As a result the training of the trrops could be scaled down, freeing up time for construction activities. However, the current situation of trying to do everything (inclusing preparing for a large-scale counterattack) would nowhere lead to satisfactory results.
  • The extraction of a coastal division for deployment to another sector within 36 hours would no longer be possible due to the minefields blocking the exit of the division.
  • On the orders of OBWest the 165 Reservedivision was to continue fulfilling its mission as a training division for a full 100%. If this requirment was not dropped, it would be impossible for this sector is to become as fortified as the other sectors. Considering the strategic importance of Walcheren and the VB Vlissingen this was felt to be unacceptable.
  • The rear boundaries of the current Kampfzone would have to be altered to coincide with the Landfront of the Festungsbereiche, since no more troops would be locatéd behind these boundaries.
  • The cities of Bruges and Diksmuide were no longer occupied by units of the coastal defence divisions. However, both places were feste Plätze with Kampfkommandanten.  Diksmuide would then be without any occupying troops at all, while the defence of Bruges would be severely weakened.. In addition, many bunkers had been constructed in Diksmuide and the town  was an impiortant communications hub.
  • The creation of Festungsberiche would require further substantial evacuations of the civilian population. Along the coast the entire 1000m-deep minefield belt would have to be evacuated. Also, the large minfields meant that cattele could no longer be kept and the erection of obstacles inland that agricultural activities would become severely restricted.
  • The German military administration in the occupied territories shoulbe be clearly informed, by OBWest himself, that agricultural and economic activities within the fortress area would no longee be possible.
  • The German military administration should also be urged by OBWest to make available many more civilian labourers. The situation in which troop commanders were responsible for construction activies, but had no say in the allocating of labourers was no longer practicable. As a solution the sector commanders were to be given full powers within their fortress sectors to requisition labour.
These issues were discussed with the Armeechef on the same day.
Also on 15 April the Chef des Generalstabes of the corps had a meeting with the Chef des Generalstabes of the AOK15. No fewer than 16 different items were discussed. In the first few points issues in the various coastal sectors were discussed.
  • 165 Reservedivision: this division was to receive 2500 recruits. Allocating these to the coastal regiments was not seen as possible. Hence, the formation of a Rekrutenbataillon was necessary. The question remained, though, how to deploy such a unit. The idea of transferring the unit to Maria-ter-Heide, excluding the Ausbildungsbataillon, was discussed. Also discussed was the issue of the Landfront, especially following Rommel's order to mover reserve (in this case the III/205) closer to the coast. The move left an insufficient number of troops on the Beveland islands. The solution proposed by the corps was to, one the hand hand move the III/250 to the west of Middelburg with one company SE of Westkapelle and the I/260 (less 1 company) east of Middelburg. On the other hand, the Gruppe Borssele would consist of the III/(Arm)/128 with one company and the 1/260. The feste Platz Goes was ti be occupied by the II/260, while Bath was to have a bridge guard only.
  • 712 Infanteriedivision: here the connection with the Landfront was to be at Breskens and not at the Braakman.
  • 48 Infanteriedivision: Oudenburg and Veurne were regarded as weak spots
  • KVA Antwerpen: here a Landfront was non-existent. Weak sectors were Ost and Hulst.

Other items were also discussed. Logistics units had to stay outside the festungsbereiche. The transfer was dependent on available static infrastructure. The evacuation of Bruges and Diksmuide was necessary, with the later posing an especially serious problem. The question was asked whether the AOK could position something there. Further, the construction work on the 2. Stellung was to be stopped. Also discussed was the problem that the 712ID had placed an insufficient number of obstacles due to material shortages. The use of the 19 LwFd for construction duties in the Landfront was also discussed. In view of the 'nonchalance' of the military government in providing civilian labour, it was proposed that the KVA commanders would have full power in the KVA in this respect. Further, traffic control units were not available in the combat area; could these by provided by the Militärbefehlshaber. The reduction of the Korpsnachrichtenabteilung with one company was seen as a big problem. Also communications equipment for a deployment of the Arko 189 was not available. Finally, decisions had to be made regarding the Landfront, so that construction work could start immediately.

On 16 April 1944 a report was released following the above visit by General Diehm. Generally speaking, Diehm did not have any essential criticism. He found that hard work was being put in everywhere. However, Diehm did have the impression that the cooperation between the Festungspioniere and the army could be better. Diehm also made more specific comments. As for the provision of building materials he noticed that the corps had much less materials than eg. the LXXXII AK. He would request more material with the AOK15. Secondly, for the 165 Reservedivision, Diehm advised the mining of sandbanks in front of the beach obstacles. The beach situation in the sector Westkapelle was seen as especially difficult. The use of more civilian labour was also demmed necessary. Thirdly, for the 712ID the general praised the work done as well as the good us of civilian labour. Finally, for the 48 Infanteriedivision, it was found that the beach obstacles had too much depth and not enough width. Diehm also felt that in locatie where the navy had laid Waserbombe, the use of beach obstacles was useless.
On 17 April 1944 the LXXXIX Armeekorps informed the 165 Reservedivision that the AOK 15 had essentially agreed the proposals of the division (see above). In more detail:
  • The Festungsbereich Walcheren consisted of:
    • the island of Walcheren
    • the western part of the islands North and South Beveland
  • The fester Platz Goes consisted of the middle part of the South-Beveland island
  • The following troop movements were ordered:
    • At the Straits of Bath only the railway bridge was to be defended by 3x 2cm Flak and an infantry platoon
    • II/Reserveregiment 260 (Ausbildungsbataillon) would be moved to Goes to defend the South-Beveland canal and Goes
    • The Arnemuiden-Schoondijke szctor (Wn Schill) would be occupied by Stab III (Arm)/GR 128 with the Stabskompanie, 2 /Arm)/GR 128 and a subordinated company of I/RGR 260.
    • 2x schwere Feldhabutize 18 (mot) of the 1./RAA 61 were to join the Stp Friedrich Barbarossa (2 und /RAA 61) as mobile reserve for a possible counterattck
    • For 7. /RAA 5 a firing position was to be constructed in the Serooskerke area. In case this battery was pulled out from South-Beveland to Walcheren a position switch of the 1./RAA 61 with 4x sFH 414 (f) was planned in the currently occupied position of the 4./RAA 5 in the southwest corner of South-Beveland.
    • In the area of the east of Middelburg I/RGR 260 (less one company) would be positions as Divisionsreserve
    • III/RGR 205 would be transferred to an area West of Middelburg with the headquarters and 1 companuy and to an area southeast of Westkapelle with one company as Divisionsreserve
    • The deployment of the Veterinärkompanie 137 within the Festungsbereich was to be investigated. All other logistical units and facilities were to remain where they were
  • The straits of Bath, the passages across the South-Beveland canal and Arnemuiden were to be equipped with obstacles against air assault, and this with the highest priority.
  • The transfer of the above units and the construction of the KVA into a Festungsberich were to start immediately.

Also on 17 April the corps wrote to the 712 and 48 Infanteriedivisionen concerning the execution of the process of turning the KVA into Festungsbereichen. The AOK15 was agreed with the proposals of the divisionen. The only limitation was that no combat troops of the infantry or engineers were to be deployed at the Landfront. The AOK15 was also agreed with the plans of the 48 ID to carry out some sweet water floodings, even though the approval of the OBWest was still expected. The corps also permitted that lon-local forces currently deployed on the 2. Stellung were transferred to working on the Landfront. A special problem was the result of the creation of Festungsbereiche on the location of logistical units. In principle, all logistical units and infrastructure were to be integrated into the Festungsbereiche. Where this was impossible, the logistical units and infrastructure were to be positioned as close as possible to the Festungsbereiche so that they could continue supplying the divisions and, when attacked from the rear, withdraw into the Festungsbereiche. For the 712 Infanteriedivision the Bäckerei- und Schlächtereihalbkompanie and the Feldhalblazarett could remain outside the Festungsbereich for the time being. However, all other units and infrastructure were to be moved inside in as far as possible. For the 48 Infanteriedivision the Verwaltungstruppen were to bge concentrated in Diksmuide. Further, the Hauptverbandplätze in Wilveringem and Gistel could remain. All other units and infrastructure was also to be moved inside the Festungsbereiche, again in as far as possible. Finally, for ammunition supply, 2-3 Ausgabestellen were to be planned.

On 18 April 1944 the corps issued orders to the 712 and 48 Infanteriedivisionen concerning changes in the preparation for the readiness of the divisions to be pulled out for other uses. More specifically, in the cases of the 712ID and the 48ID it was envisaged to pull out the complete division. Since the former division was seen as the first candidate for pulling out, this division was first to be made mobile. Only in exceptional cases would the 48ID be pulled out to be deployed elsewhere. Vorausabteilungen of the division were to be Abmarschbereit within 6 hours, the complete divisions within 36 hours.

On the same day, a similar document was produced but this time with reference to the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision and the schwere Panzerjägerabteilung 668.

On 18-19 April 1944 Generalfeldmarschall Rommel visited the KVA A2 and A1, respectively. On 19 April a meeting took place between Rommel and the corps commander. Four issues were discussed. The first problem was the occupation of the Landfront and the order by the AOK15 commander that no fighting troops could be used. This was impossible for the divisions, which would have to allocate at least some fighting troops. Secondly, the construction work could not fully be carried out due to indufficient supplies of building materials. Thirdly, courses within the division were to be suspended for 3-4 weeks, so that an extra construction effort could be made. Finally, and specifically for the 165RD the latter was to prioritise its coastal defence and fortification mission, rather than its training mission.
On 19 April 1944 the corps gave its permission for the transfer of the Personaleinheit Sturmgeschützabtailung 1019 to the Truppenübungsplatz Maria-ter-Heide until 9 May. Also, in response to a question from the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision, communicated that for the deployment of a regimental group in the Oostburg area the regiment to return last from Maria-ter-Heide was planned.
On 20 April 1944 the Generalkommando informed the AOK15 that a manning of land defences the land defences (Landfront) by support troops only was not possible. and therefore requested permission to deploy small numbers of fighting troops. In addition, the corps also requested the AOK15 to suspend courses for four weeks, so that extra efforts could be made in fortification. On the same day the corps also urged the coastal divisions and the Abschnitt Antwerpen to speed up and complete the construction of defences, saying that all days remaining before the invasion were to be fully used.
On 21 April 1944 the Generalkommando issued an order to the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision and the Armeekraftwagenkolonne Nachtigall concerning the transport of units of the division residing there to their operatioonal areas at the coast in the event of combat actions.Thus, all parts of the division were to be transported from Maria-ter-Heide as soon as possible. The Armeekraftwagenkolonne Nachtigall was at the disposal of the division for the transport of the combat elements.According to the document the headquarters of the unit were in Gent and the commander was Hauptmann Brunner. The unit had smaller units (Staffeln) in Wetteren, Gent, Deinze, Kalken and Lokeren.
On 22 April 1944 the corps issued comments to the AOK15 order of 20 April  concerning bunker construction and the construction of Nusskrackerminen. Firstly, the corps stipulated that, even though, training courses had been suspended, divisional courses were exempt and could still be continued, unless the AOK15 was still to decide otherwise. Second, the deployment of the civilian population to work on Luftlandehindernisse in the area of the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision was to be organized by the 712 and 48 Infanteriedivisionen, in cooperation with the relevant headquarters of the Militärbefehlshaber. Thirdly, with respect to the deployment of units of the 19 LwFd in the Festungsbereiche of the coastal defence division, it was decided that the Pionierbataillon 19 (less 1 company) would remain at the disposal of the 48 Infanteriedivision for mine-laying duties. One company would be at the disposal of the 712ID for the construction and mining of the Landfront. Fourthly, the 2. Stellung was to be continued only north of Bruges, where it was located in the area of the Luftwaffenjägerregiment 45. In other areas construction was to be halted and labour and material used for the new duties. Fifthly, the divisions had full authority of the available Rollbocke in their areas. The KVA Antwerpen  was to install the Rollbocke available and report the numbers to the corps. The allocation of Rollbocke was to be made by the corps. Any resulting gaps in defensive lines were to be filled with mines or other defensive obstacles. Sixthly, it was currently being determined whethet the Festungspionierstab 12 and the OT could help the divisions with the creation of the factories for the nutcracker mines. The divisions themselves, however, were to to create such factories, whatever the possibilities of the above. Finally, the corps noted that it was being faced with divisional requests for massive amounts of material whould could not be delivered in sufficient amounts through the fortress egnineer or OT channels. The corps would try to get extra materials through the Militärbefehlshaber. If necessary, the divisions were to help themselves out in confiscating all available materials in their areas.
Also on this day and in follop-up of the above, the LXXXIX Armeekorps wrote to the Militärbefehlshaber concerning the use of the entire population for the construction of obstacles against paratroop and glider landings and other obstacles and the materiald required.
The military commander was informed that the field units would direct their requests for labour and material to him and, consequently, request to order subordinate commands of the latter to meet requests from the troop commanders. Secondly, the Militärbefehlshaber was also asked in the areas of the OFK Gent and Brüssel to constructed ddefences against air attacks, to construct air landing obstacles around Gent and to confiscate all available construction materials.
On 24 April 1944 the corps issued an order to the 712 Infanteriedivision that the division was to be ready to march in 6 hours in the event it was being pulled out for deployment elsewhere.

On 27 April 1944 the Generalkommando issued an order concerning the transfer of the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision. For this purpose the Luftwaffengrenadierregiment 38 was transferred from Maria-ter-Heide to the Bruges area on 30 April. The new Bereitschaftsräume for the division were mentuioned as follows:
All transports were to be carried out at night. The Luftwaffenpionierbataillon 19 was tio be shared by a number of units (1 company to the 19 LwFd, 712ID  and 48ID each, with the latter two to be used for the constructions of the Divisionsfestungsbereiche) The Luftwaffenfüselierbataillon 19 was to be temporarily subordinated to the 48ID for the fortification of the Landfront. The units of the division were also given provisional directions for deployment. Thus, the division was to prepare a deployment in counterattack. The Luftwaffenjägerregiment 38 and the Luftwaffenfüselierbataillon 19 were to specifically prepare for a deployment on the boundary of the 712ID and 48ID. The division was also to take over defence of the strongpoints between Terneuzen and Nummer Een from the 712ID and to set up Fallschirmjagdkommandos. Finally, however, the 712ID would remain solely in charge in the KVA A2.
On 29 April 1944 the Flakkompanie 148  was transferred from Oostende to Dunkirk.
On 30 April 1944 the Generalkommando LXXXIX Armeekorps issued the deployment order for the 19 LwFd. Following this order the division (Heeresgruppenreserve) would either be pulled out for deployment to other fronts or subordinated to the army or corps. The combat mission of the division was two-fold. On the one hand, the division was to prepare for countering enemy air landings in the area Terneuzen-Brugge-Maldegem-Eeklo. On the other hand the division was to prepare a closed formation counterattack against an enemy invader in close cooperation with the two coastal defence divisions along the Belgian coast. The individual regiments were tasked with individual missions, in the event of regimental counterattcks, though this situation was deemed improbable. Also on this day, the Jägerregiment 38 was transferred from Maria-ter-Heide to the Bruges area. Further on this day, the corps issued an order to the divisions concerning the construction of Vorstrandhindernisse and Luftlandehindernisse. With respect to the former width was to be preferred to depth. If depth was the aim then the obstacles were to begin as close as possible towards the sea to stop the enemy as early as possible. The construction of concrete factories was said to be very good, so that large numbers of nutcracker mines could be built in the very near future. With respect to the latter, work was said to be going well, but the number of German guards was still to be reduced. Also, full training days were forbidden for as long as obstacles were to be built. Neverthless, the commanders had to ensure that the troops got enough rest and sleep.

On 2 May 1944 Oberst Gajer, the Kommandeur der Festungsstammtruppen LXXXIX, was appointed Stabsoffizier für Marschüberwachung with the corps headquarters. All the Strassenkommandanten would be subordinated to him. Also on this day, there was a message from Oberstleutnant iG Behr, Chef des Generalstabes LXIV Reservekorps. He said that Oberstleutnant Bernhardy of the AHA Berlin had told him that the reserve division deployed at the coast were to be transformed into static infantry divisions and that an order for the 165 Reservedivision was to be expected in May.
On 2-3 May 1944 the corps commander inspected the sectors of the 712 and 48 Infanteriedivisionen.
On 3 May 1944 the corps passed on an AOK15 order to the divisions concerning the building of the Landfront and the occupation of it, adding its own comments.
Extra attention was still to be paid to the connections with the divisionals and corps boundaries. Also, the Vorfeld of the Landfront was to be kept under observation, so that enemy airborne troops could be spotted immediately. Every artillery batallion deployed in the divisional sector was also to establish a Landfrontbeobachtungsstelle so that fire could be opened immediately.
Also on this day an order was issued concerning the defence against air attack. No single man was to be unprotected in case of air attack. The room in (semi-) permanent bunkers was to be fullu used for sheltering. Other troops were to have Panzerdeckungslöcher. Orders were also released for the Stellungsbau. Trenches were to be constructed in large numbers, but covered only with light material. In future, field bunkers were to be kept as small as possible and as low as possible above the surface with protection by earth. It was especially advise to reinforce cellars and then to blow up the house above it for extra protection. Further, the construction of a Landfront was NOT to be at the expense of the defences at the coast. Also, each division was to prepare a combat plan for the Landfront. Like the coastal front, the latter was to be subdivided into sectors with sector commanders. Mock minefields and air assault obstacles were to continue being placed. The construction of large bunkers and long trenches at the Landfront was forbidden.
On 4 May 1944 the corps commander's notes on the inspection visits of 2-3 May above were released. In general the corps commander was pleased with the progress in the construction of beach obstacles. However, the construction of Luftlandesperren was still seen as insufficient. As the poles were too thin, it was suggested to tie together pairs of poles. Other problems were encountered, notably in the sector of the GR 745:
  • 7/GR 745:
    • Stp Blücher-West: the 3-man crew and generator of the Marinescheinwerfer 9 were still accommodated in a wooden barracks, despite multiple requests from the GR 745 to the navy to change this
    • Wn von der Tann: the strongpoint commander and troops were still accommodated in houses; also the VF-bunkers had been built too close to one another. Also this strongpoint had not water supply since all bottles had been exchanged for new ones simultaneously.
  • 11/GR 745: in the Zwischenwiderstandsnest 4 10 men were still accommodated in a house. Also, the batallion commander was unaxware of division and corps orders
  • 2/GR 745:.
    • Stp Blücher: the company commander did not know the details of the deployment of his unit. Also, with 8 men found near 11 horses, the strength deployment was badly organized. Finally, for 21 men working on construction, no fewer than 31 men were in the rear services.
    • Stp Knocke: this strongpoint needed extra labour forces. An attempt to free labourers for the construction of beach obstacles from the nearby camouflage net factory (126 workers) and barracks construction firm (300 workers) had failed.

It was further noted that the Strafvollstreckungszug 712 had to march hours each day from Sluis to their work place (i.e. constructing beach obstacles at the ZWn 4). The bunker of the Regimentsgefechtsstand 745 had been built too close to one another and were badly camouflaged.With the exception of 2, all bunkers were of VF-strength.

On 5 May 1944 the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision was transferred to the area Brugge-Sluis-Ijzendijke-Eeklo. The division headquarters were transferred to Eeklo.On the same day the Divisionsgefechtsstand of the 48. Infanteriedivision was located 1km to the south of Oostende.

Also on this day, the corps issued an order to the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision concerning the defence against enemy air landings. In their new billeting area the division was no longer to construct all-round defences. Rather, it was to secure the area against air landing by the construction of obstacles and by establishing observation posts which were to be constantly manned. In the event of enemy air landings within the billeting area, all available forces were to immediately counterattack. The divisional artillery of the division operating in the area of the 712 Infanteriedivision was to be used in this respect, for as far as it was able to fire and preparations for such use were to be made. Finally, both divisions were to closely cooperate and train together.
On 8 May 1944 the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision was ordered to carry out Aktion Landgraf. This involved the simulation of a newly-arrived attack division by the division. The Belgian resistance and the enemy were to be led to believe that the 86 ID had arrived in the area Tielt-Roeselare-Ieper-Izegem. For this purpose the same preparations and actions were to be carried out in this area in the same way as those that had been ordered in the area between Brugge and Veurne. The units used for this deception were to be ready to return to its parent division with 2 (night) and 6 (day) hours. In the area a communications network was also to be set up which was to to look like that of a division. Total secrecy was to be maintained, even towards divisional units which were not involved. In the Anlage the participating units (centered around the Luftwaffenjägerregiment 45), detailed map, Einzelanweisung and special orders for the logistical element were provided. The deception was to be take thus far that even documents were to be lost and radio messags carelessly made on purpose.

On 10 May 1944 the corps reported that the Admiral Kanalküste had reported enemy landing exercises. On the basis of these the corps passed on 2 conclusions; Firstly, the Vorstrandhindernisse had so far been constructed in the right place, since the enemy would have to try and land further away from the coast. Secondly, after the obstacles had been given sufficient width, they were to be given sufficient depth towards the water; thus nutcracker mines were to be placed along the low-tide line and KMA mines further into the water.
On 11 May 1944 the corps passed on to the divisions a message from the Admiral Kanalküste about landing exercises having been carried out by the British.

On 15 May 1944 the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision was ordered to take over the Schelde defences between Terneuzen and Nummer Eén, more specifically the defence of the strongpoints Terneuzen, Scheldearm-Ost and the Wn Hoofdplaat, with Nummer Een held by the 712ID. The combat mission for the division in this sector was the defences of the positions on the southern Schelde bank, which were to be held until the last man! Still, the 712ID would remain responsible overall, except for the destruction of the port of Terneuzen and the fortification work in the sector Terneuzen-Nummer Een, which would become the responsibility of the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision. The latter division would officially assume its new duties on 18 May.

Also on this day, the corps ordered that the cooperation at the corps boundaries was to be prepared now. Specifically, on the French-Belgian border, the Nahtregimenter of the 48ID and the 18lwFD were to hold a joint terrain meeting, led by the latter division. In addition the 48ID was to provide a Nahtkommando. This consisted of the 2 und 4 Kompanie of the Füselierbataillon 148.
On 16 May 1944 the AOK15 ordered the reorganisation of the 165 Reservedivision into the 70 Infanteriedivision (bodenständig). The Generalkommando issued its order on 23 May.
On 18 May 1944 the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision officially assumed command of the defence of the southern Schelde bank between Terneuzen and Nummer Een.Also, the corps commander inspected strongpoints in the KVA A1.
On 23 May 1944 the Generalkommdo LXXXIX issued its order for the reorganisation of the 165 Reservedivision into the 70 Infanteriedivision (bodenständig), on the basis of an AOK15 order of 16 May. The extracted units of the 165 Reservedivision were to be transported to the Woensdrecht area. On the onders of the army relieving and relieved units were to be kept ready as local Alarmeinheiten. The document is accompanied by 2 annexes: the first detailing the reorganisation of the division, and the second detailing that of the Reserveartillerieregiment 5.. Both these documents have been processed in one document below:

 


On 31 May 1944 the Generalkommando LXXXIX issued an order for the deployment and billeting of the 70 Infanteriedivision.This was actually a change to the original plans. On the orders of the AOK15 the Personaleinheiten designated to move to the KVA A1 for the reorganisation of the 165 Reservedivision were NOT to immediately move to the KVA A1, but rather were to be deployed as Korpsreserve in the area Antwerpen-Zuid-Beveland-Bergen-op-Zoom, this to fake a newly-arrived Eingreifdivision. The operation even had a a code name Aktion Geiger and the faking unit was to be called Ausbildungsstab Geiger.The actual move into the KVA A1 was now planned for mid-June. The units already (or soon to arrive) in the KVA A1 were the I/GR118, the Pionierbataillon 170 and support units. This complex action led to an equallly complex subordination of units. Thus, the Personaleinheiten of the 70ID deployed to the east of the Beveland Canal were grouped as the 70ID  and commanded by Oberst Geiger. This force consisted of the Regimentsgruppen 1019 and 1020, the AR 170 and relieved units of the 165RD. However, the 70ID itself was subordinated to the 165 RD in all ways but tactically (tactically it was directly subordinated to the Generalkommando). The missions assigned were to be completed in the closest possible co-operation with the 165RD and the KVA Antwerpen. Relieved units of the 165RD accomodated in the area of the 70ID remained subordinated administratively and for training prposes to the 165RD, but logistically to the 70ID.
The document also ordered the tactical mission of the 70ID. Thus, the 70ID was todefend its area (Antwerpen-Woensdrecht) against enemy air landings and sabotage and was to also defend militarily important objects. The Regimentsgruppe 1020  and parts of the 165RD in the Kalmthout area were to cooperate closely with the Abschnitt Antwerpen for the defence for the city and port of Antwerp as well as a deployment in the Unterabschnitt Ost. The Regimentsgruppe 1019 was to explore a deployment in the eastern part of the KVA A1 in close cooperation with the 165RD.
The divisional headquarters were to be operatonal on 6 June with a sufficiently large Vorkommando in the Divisionsgefechtsstand De Donk with the follwoing composition (Oberst Geiger als commander, Hauptmann Ihlenburg as Ia, Hauptmann Meyeras Ib, Oberleutnant Böhm as Ib-Hilfsoffizier, Major Schaudich as IIa/b, Leutnant Lorenz as O1, Stabszahlmeister Ernst as IVa and Leutnant Reichel as WuG.
An annex to the document is a Planpause with the position of the units:
  • :I/1018 in Aagtekerke, Pionierbataillon 170 Sint-Laurens, Nachschub Middelburg, Füselierbataillon Lewedorp-Nieuwdorp GR1018 Goes, II/1018Goes PzJKgAbt Goes
  • GR1019 Woensdrecht, II/1019 Woensdrecht, III/AR 170 (ohne 9.) Woensdrecht
  • 70ID De Donk, AR170 De Donk,I/170 (1-4) De Donk,I /1020 Kapellen, GR1020 (ohne I/1020 ) Brasschaat
  • I/205 + II/260 in Kalmthout
  • I/1019 In Krabbendijke
Further on this day, the LXXXIX Armeekorps addressed the AOK15 on the subject of cover against air attack. In this document some complaints were formulated. Thus, the troops had been overwhelmed by a multitude of orders for the defence against air attacks, many of which contradicted each other (the document nicely proves this!). Also criticized was the fact that Fliegeralarm had to be called each time an aircraft was spotted, resulting in units being contactly under Fliegeralarm. Particularly problematic was that earlier troops were supposed to be take cover also in VF-construction, but that a recent order forbade this and sent the troops ti Panzerdeckungslöcher for cover, which did not always provide this cover. The corps requested the AOK15 to insist that the Heeresgruppe would only give general guidelines, leaving the commanders in the field to decide what to do in the event of air attacks.

On 1 June 1944 we find an Unterkunftsübersicht of the 19. Luftwaffenfelddivision. This overview has been processed in the Google Earth animation below.

Also on this day, the corps commander visited beach obstacles and the Hauptkampflinie in the KVA A1. He also had a meeting with general Daser. It was ordered that no complicated and time-consuming obstacles were to be constructed. Rather, the focus was to be placed on closing remain gaps. In the Westkapelle sector it was ordered that flamethrowers were to be installed where obstacles and wire defences were insufficiently present. Also, the socles for 7.5cm Pak were found not yet to have been installed in 2 bunkers. It was deemed important to place canons in bunkers even if the bunkers were only partially completed. Further, the issue of a relaxation centre (Erholungsheim) for the III/Armenierbataillon 128 would be addressed again after the relief operation. Finally on this day, the LXXXIX Armeekorps issued orders for the Stabsoffiziere für Marschüberwachung. This command was a corps command, to which all the Strassenkommandanten in the corps area were subordinated. The commander was Oberst Gajer. The Stomü had far-reaching powers, including the disciplinary power of a division general. He had 21 men in his HQ. The latter were located in the corps headquarters in Antwerp.
On 3 June 1944 the corps ordered the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision to be ready to be moved out of the area. The units still taking part in the Aktion Landgraf around Roeselare were to be transported from there. The strongpoints on the southern bank of the Westerschelde were to return to the contraol of the 712 ID.
On 4 June 1944 the corps wrote to the SS-Panzerdivision Adolf Hitler concerning the necessary recce missions to be carried out for possible deployment. More specifically, recce missions were to be carried out for a counterattack against an airlanded enemy in the area Ijzendijke-Eeklo-Brugge-Aardenburg. Of second importance was a deployment in the area Hulst-Antwerpen-Bergen-op-Zoom.Of special importance for this heavy armoured division was that its tanks could only cross the Schelde river at Antwerp (Schelde tunnel) and Dendermonde. The process of finding other bridges and reinforcing those was in progress.
Also on this day, the corps issued an order for the reorganisation of the Panzerjägereinheiten. Specifically, the Panzerschreck AT-weapons currently with the grenadier companies were to be surrendered to the 14. Kompanien. The 88mm R - Werfer 34 (Puppchen) also allocated to the 14. Kompanien were to be deployed with the grenadier regiments as platoons (each with 4 guns).
On 5 June 1944 the corps passed on to the divisions, as well as the OFK570, HKAR 940 and the schwere Heerespanzerjäherabteilung 668 the message from the AOK15 that a radio message had been received making the invasion possible within 48 hours. At 10.30pm on 5 June 1944 the AOK15 ordered Vorwarnung for the entire army area. The reason for this was the interception of a radio message signalling the invasion to begin within 48 hours.
On 6 June 1944 the corps sent an order to the 70 Infanteriedivision. Let us us remember that this division was still in the process of relieving the 165 Reservedivision. The corps wrote that the enemy attack in Normandy made it necessary that units of the division would become einsatzbereit as soon as possible. In terms of tactical subordinations the following decisions were taken:
  • Tactically subordinated to the corps: Stab 70 ID with the I/RGR 205, II/RGR 260, I/AR170, Panzerjägerkompanie 170 and still to arrive parts of the GR 1020.
  • Subordinated to the 165RD were: GR 1018, GR 1019, III/AR 170, Nachrichtenabteilung 170, Pionierbataillon 170, Versorgungstruppen
A number of missions were also given to the 70 Infanteriedivision:
  • The subordinated parts of the 70ID were at the disposal of the 165RD in the KVA A1. The Enge von Bath was to be secured and defended against enemy air landings.
  • The 70ID with its subordinated units was to secure and defend its accommodation areas against an airlanded enemy
  • In case of air landings near (rather than in) the accommodation areas the corps would decide if and in which form counterattacks with limited purpose were to be conducted.
  • In case of an enemy attack on Antwerp the corps would order the tactical subordination of the 70ID to the KVA Antwerpen, in which case the division was to move on Antwerp.
  • The 70ID was to constantly check the divisional area for air landings. It was to take and keep contact with the Flakschule Hoogboom and the Truppenübungsplatz Maria-ter-Heide.
At 2 am on the morning of 6 June 1944 AOK15 ordered Alarmstufe II. At 2.30am there was a report of enemy landing attempts and the use of airborne troops in an area between Cherbourg and Le Havre. The corps war diary clearly states: Beginn der anglo-amerikanischen Invasion. Following these reports the attention of the LXXXIX Armeekorps shifted to the hinterland as well as Antwerp. Thus, the 712 and 48 Infanteriedivisionen were ordered to especially defend the rear divisional areas against landings from the air. At 6.30 pm the corps, on the basis of reports of the Sicherheitsdienst, warned that resistance forces would infiltrate into Antwerp that night, which move would combine with air landings by enemy soldiers. Acting on this information the LXXXIX Armeekorps contacted the Luftgaukommando Belgien-Nordfrankreich (Ia, Major iG Krüger) at 7 pm requesting the immediate deployment of the Flakschule Antwerpen-Hoogboom. The Luftgaukommando, however, said that the Luftflotte 3 was to be contacted.
As a result of the latter action 7 June 1944 saw the appearance of two searchlight and 3 light Flak batteries in the Antwerp area. On the same day it was decided that the following alarm procedures would apply: Vorwarnung from 8 am to 7 pm and Alarmstufe II from 7 pm to 8 am. Also on this day, the corps issued an order to all divisions ordereing an immediate concentric attack with all available forces in the event of enemy air landings between the Seefront and the Landfront. In case air landings occurred behind the Landfront, the latter was to be defended.
On 8 June 1944 the II/RGR 260 was transferred from Capelle to Zwartenheuvel. Also on this day, recces were made for the deployment of the SS-Panzerdivision Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler in the areas Antwerpen, Bruges, Gent, Terneuzen. Further, the corps established contact with the 19 Panzerdivision. Also, the Pionierbataillon of the Leibstandarte would be moved to the Lier area. Finally, the AOK15 ordered that the supplies of the strongpoints were immediately to be safeguarded.
Also on 8 June the corps issued an order concerning the locations of the headquarters sections of the Stp Generalkommando in Antwerpen, as well as guidelines for its defence. This document will be analyzed in more detail. The order was a Sonderstabsbefehl. A number of headquarters units had their accommodation changed:
  • Abteilung IIa/b from verst. Bunker VI to Arbeitsbunker A1
  • NFSO from Arbeitsbunker A4 to verst. feldm. Bunker VI
  • IVz from Mannschaftbunker M1 to verst. feldm. Bunker VI
  • IVb from verst. Bunker VI to Arbeitsbunker A1
  • HQu from Arbeitsbunker VI und Arbeitsbunker A1 to Mannschaftsbunker M1
  • Verbindungsoffiziere from verst. Bunker VI to the cellars of the Hagedoornlaan 12
The document also had 2 Anlagen. The first contained new orders for the defence of the corps headquarters strongpoint, replacing those of 12 February. The strongpoint commander was names as Hauptmann Dieter, with Oberleutnant Heeman as his second-in-command. Available troops for the defence were the Sicherungskompanie LXXXIX and all available men of the Sicherungsbereich (see next Anlage below). Both the strongpoint commander and the commander of the Sicherungskompanie were given several responsibilities. Special orders were also given to the verst. Sicherungskompanie. It was to take over the defence of the entire strongpoint. Subordinated to the company were also 1 Gruppe (strength 10 man) to be used for sentry duty and patrols within the Sicherungsbereich, and (on the code word Verteidigung) all the available extra soldiers (see next Anlage below). The second Anlage details the names of the extra soldiers mentioned above. The total number was 117 NCOs and other ranks from various headquarters units.
At 1.30pm on 9 June 1944 the SS-PzD Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, at that moment billeted in Beverloo, was immediately subordinated to the LXXXIX Armeekorps and transferred to the former operational area of the 19 Luftwaffenfelddivision in KVA A2 (area Ijzendijke-Aardenburg-Eeklo)  Elements of the division were to be transported to the following Bereitstellungsräume:
  • a reinforced SS-Panzergrenadierregiment in the area Biervliet-Schoondijke-Waterlandkerkje-Watervliet
  • a reinforced SS-Panzergrenadierregiment in the area Sint-Margarete-Sluis-Lapscheure-Middelburg
  • an SS-Panzeregiment in the area Maldegem-Eeklo
  • an SS-Panzeregiment in the area Linde-Bentille
  • the remainder of the division south of the canal Terneuzen-Brugge in the area Bassevelde-Eeklo-Maldegem
Since an attack was thought to be imminent the units had to move to their positions immediately, i.e. in the night of 9/10 June. The headquarters of the division were to be located in Kaprijke. The Stabsoffizier für Marschüberwachung for the division was Oberst Gaier. Besides having to take up contact with the coastal defence divisions, contact was also to be made with the parts of the Ostbataillon 600 in Hulst.
At 3 pm Alarmstufe II was ordered (from 6 pm onwards) on the basis of an intercepted radio message making enemy landings possible in the early hours of 10 June. At 4pm the Ia of the 19 Panzerdivision was with the Chef des Generalstabes to discuss the possible deployment of a Kampfgruppe.

At 8 pm the 712 Infanteriedivision reported the operational readiness of the Kampfkommandant Brügge and the OFK Gent that of the Kampfkommandant Gent. At 8.45 pm the corps war diary mentions that the Flakabteilungen 291 and 294 had arrived in the area Gent and Maldegem, respectively. The latter unit is later identified as the schwere Heeresflakabteilung 294, prompting us to believe the former unit to be the schwere Heeresflakabteilung 291. The appearance of these units here, though logical (air defence for the SS-PzD Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler) is surprising, since these units were based in the Pas-de-Calais providing Flak defenses for the V2 and V3 weapons site in that area. It is difficult to believe that these 2 crucial units were withdrawn from those sites.We, therefore, believe only some parts of these units to have moved north.

Finally, at 9 pm the Generalkommando issued orders for the airfield at Koksijde to be rendered unusable and for civilian labourers to do this.

Also on 9 June (actually in the night of 9/10 June) the following Luftwaffe units entered the corps area,
  • Luftgaufeldregiment Nr 22 (to cooperate with the 48 Infanteriedivision)(area Izegem-Roeselare)
  • Luftgaufeldregiment Nr 52 (to cooperate with the KVA Antwerpen)(area Poppel-Turnhout)
  • Luftgaufeldregiment Nr 53 (to cooperate with the Generalkommando)(commanded by Oberst Linden)(Sint-Niklaas-Lokeren)

A corps order of 10 June gave these units the mission of combatting airborne threats. These units were no other than the former Fliegerregimenter 22 (Gent), 52 (Soissons), and 53 (Tongeren). The mission of these regiments was to defend their area against enemy air landings and to block enemy incursions. However, the regiments would only become subordinated to the Generalkommando in case of an enemy attack an on the orders of the AOK15.

An earlier corps order of 9 June gives different names to these regiments (these were actually the old names). Thus, the Luftgaufeldregiment 1 for 22 (located in the area Izegem-Roeselare), the Luftgaufeldregiment 2 for 53 (located in the area Sint-Niklaas-Lokeren) and the Luftgaufeldregiment 3 for 52 (located in the area Poppel-Turnhout). This order was later cancelled and replaced by that of 10 June above.

On 10 June 1944 the SS-PzD Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler arrived in its designated areas with its divisional headquarters in Kaprijke. On the same day the (schwere Heeres)Flakbateilung 291 and the Luftwaffe gemischte Flakabteilung 242 were reported to have arrived in the Antwerp area. The latter unit had also arrived from Northern France (the Watten area). Also, the Luftgaufeldregiment Nr 51 in Antwerp reported its operational readiness. Finally, Oberst Linden of the Luftgaufeldregiment Nr 53 established contact with the Ia of the corps.

On 11 June 1944 it was ordered that, as of 12 June, the Grenadierregiment 1019 would be subordinated to the 70 Infanteriedivision with the mission of countering enemy airborne troops and defending the strategically important Bath isthmus on the river Schelde. Further on this day, the corps released some lessons drawn from the invasion so far. Finally on this day, the corps wrote that, in spite of several requests, the Alarmstufe II was to be continued for the foreseeable future. As this put heavy pressure on the troops, the divisions were allowed to introduce some measures to relax that pressure.

On 12 June 1944 the Grenadierregiment 1020 joined the 70 Infanteriedivision. At the same time the I/Reservegrenadierregiment 205 and II/ Reservegrenadierregiment 260 battalions of the 165 Reservedivision were subordinated to the KVA-Antwerpen for the defence of the city. This combat group was known as the Regimentsgruppe Holdschuher. The combat mission of this was specifically the defence of Antwerp to the east and south of the city. Also on this day the LXXXIX Armeekorps established an advance communications post in Gent, the so-called Meldekopf Gent.

At 0.58am on 13 June 1944 the Germans blew up the port of Nieuwpoort. Also on this day, it was announced that the 363 Infanteriedivision would arrive from Denmark and would be subordinated to the Generalkommando. The resident 48 Infanteriedivision was ordered to propose billeting for this division. The combat mission of the 363 Infanteriedivision was the defence against air landings and the counterattack in case of an enemy landing near Oostende, as well as the blocking of the narrow area to the southeast of Veurne. An Anlage makes clear that the units of the division were to be offloaded at the railway stations of Torhout, Jabbeke, Veurne, Diksmuide, Brugge, Kortemark and Lichtervelde.

At 6 pm AOK15 informed the corps that a departure of the 1. SS-PzD Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler was likely, as soon as the 363 Infanteriedivision had arrived. Finally, at midnight the corps was informed that the operational area for the latter division would be the Bruges area. Finally, the Ia of the AOK15 informed the corps that the 715 Infanteriedivision would not be subordinated to the corps.

On 14 June 1944 the operational area of the 363 Infanteriedivision was specified as being between Bruges and the river Schelde. On the same day it was decided that the following alarm new procedures would apply: Vorwarnung from 8 am to 9 pm and Alarmstufe II from 9 pm to 8 am. Lastly, it was decided that the newly-established Artilleriepakabteilung 1037 was to be subordinated to the Generalkommando and deployed in the Bruges-Maldegem area. It was equipped with 27x 88mm Pak and 14 transporters. The unit was actually a replacement for the Heerespanzerjägerabteilung 668, which was now to return to its old billeting area south of Bruges and prepare to be Armeereserve.

On 15 June 1944 parts of the 363 Infanteriedivision had arrived. Air defences for the unloading of the division were taken over by the schwere Heeresflakabteilung 294 and the gemischte Flakabteilung 242. Finally, at 10pm the 1. SS-PzD Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler commenced its departure to the 7 Armee..Also on this day, we find an Offizierstellenbesetzung or overview of staff officers, which can be found in the document below:

 

 

On 16 June 1944 various transfers took place. Firstly, more parts of the 363 Infanteriedivision arrived. Secondly, it was decided in a corps order that the division was to move into the area vacated by the departing 1. SS-PzD Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler. A first area to be vacated for a reinforced regiment of the 363 Infanteriedivision was the area Aardenburg-Lapscheure-Vivenkapelle (night of 17-18 June), followed by the area Maldegem (18-19 June) and Ijzendijke (19-20 June) These were the so-called Marschbewegungen  for the division. In case of an enemy attack during these transport movements the division (together with remaining parts of the Leibstandarte) was to attack towards Zeebrugge and, secondarily, towards Oostende Thirdly, the schwere Heeresflakabteilung 291 was now located in Maldegem to protect the loading of the latter division. Fourthly, the Luftgaufeldregiment Nr 53 was transferred to the Laon area. Finally, Luftgaufeldregiment Nr 22 had moved to the Beauvais area.

On 17 June 1944 further parts of the 363 Infanteriedivision arrived. Also, the first units of the 1. SS-PzD Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler departed. It was also announced that the gemischte Flakabteilung 242 was to remain tactically subordinated to the LXXXIX Armeekorps for the time being. On this day we also find an updated Bewegungsübersicht for the 363 Infanteriedivision, which can be found in the document below:

 

 

On 18 June 1944 the corps issued a correction to the Dienstanweisung for the Stabsoffiziere für Marschüberwachung.

On 19 June 1944 further units of the  1. SS-PzD Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler departed. Also on this day the LXXXIX Armeekorps issued an order to the 89 Infanteriedivision. This unit was to be subordinated to the corps and deployed in the area Brugge-Veurne-Diksmuide as Eingreifdivision and Armeereserve. However, since on 20 June, it was decided that this division would not be sent to the LXXXIX but rather to the LXXXI Armeekorps it will not be dealt with further here. Interestingly, the latter document was also addressed to the Kampfkommandant Brügge and the Kampfkommandant Dixmuiden.

On 21 June 1944 the move of the 363 Infanteriedivision within the corps area was concluded.

On 22 June 1944 the corps issued an order on the Führereinsatz of the Festungsstammtruppen in case of Alarmstufe II. It was first stated that the Kommandeur Festungsstammtruppen LXXXIX was continuously at the disposal of the corps as the Stabsoffizier für Marschüberxwachung. At on the onset of combat Oberst Gajer would be deployed as Stomü with his headquarters staff. A second point made was that batallion commanders, company commanders and other officers acting as instructors and at that time not being used in strongpoints would only fully come at the disposal of the divisions in thearea at the onset of combat. If possible, there we to be used, in the context of the Festungsstammtruppen, as second-in-commands of strongpoints and sub-sectors which were somehow involved in the deployment of Festungsstammtruppen. If this were not possible they could be used as Ordonnanzoffiziere, liaison officers or commders of Alarmeinheiten. In principle these officers could only be used for static defence and deployment missions.

Also on 22 June the 165 Reservedivision issued an order concerning its relief by the 70 Infanteriedivision. The Ablösungstermin was mentioned as around 5 July. The duration of the relief operation was put at some 3 weeks. In the document the 165 Reservedivision proposed, and requested permission, to conduct the relief operation in the manner formulated (see document). The document also proposed to transfer 831 NCOs and 2437 other ranks from the 165 Reservedivision to the 70 Infanteriedivision.

On 23 June 1944 an order was issued for the transfer of II/Grenadierregiment 1020 to Middelburg with subordination to the 165 Reservedivision upon arrival. The unit was to relieve the II/Reservegrenadierregiment 205, which was deployed as Divisionsreserve in the Grijpskerke area. The latter unit was to be billeted in Middelburg for other purposes. The Abmarschbereitschaft was 4 hours; the Verladebereitschaft 8 hours. The code word was Dänemark.

Also, the corps issued an order to the 363 Infanteriedivision concerning readiness for departure or loading in the event of it being deployed elsewhere.

Finally on this day, the LXXXIX Armeekorps issued an order concerning the relief of the 165 Reservedivision. An Anlage to this order was the order by the 165 Reservedivision of 22 June above. The corps was especially worried about the weakened combat strength of the division after the relief operation. Experience with the I/GR 1018, which had been deployed at the coast for some time now, had shown that the eventual combat strength would be decreased, mainly due to the new troops being Magenkranken. Secondly, the corps warned that if the transfer of the above-mentioned NCOs and other ranks from the 165RD to the 70ID was not sanctioned, then the division would no longer be able to varry out its defensive duties. Delaying the relief operation and/or providing longer training was said not to change anything., since many new troops were simply unfit for coastal defence.

On 24 June 1944 an order was given to the KVA Antwerpen to form 1 company (81 troops) from the I/Reservegrenadierregiment 205 and II/ Reservegrenadierregiment 260 to be located at the bridge in Dendermonde to provide infantry defence for the Flak units present there and to defend the bridge against sabotage from 27 June onwards. The bridge was defended by 2x 2cm Flakzügen. The infantry company would remain subordinated to the KVA Antwerpen.

Also on this day the corps informed the 48 Infanteriedivision in the KVA A3 that it was to be  reinforced with extra units:in the night of 25/26 June (see below) These extra units would be supplied by both the LXXXIX Armeekorps (363ID) and the LXXXII Armeekorps (182 Reservedivision, 326 Infanteriedivision, 331 Infanteriedivision).

On 25 June 1944 the headquarters of the 363 Infanteriedivision were located in Kaprijke, while those of the Artillerieregiment 363 were are the eastern outskirts of Sint-Kruis (Bruges). On this day, the gemischte Flakabteilung 242 was also withdrawn from Nieuwpoort.

On 26 June 1944 the following units arrived in KVA A3: Stab Reservegrenadierregiment 79 (182 Reservedivision), Reservegrenadierbataillon 437 (182 Reservedivision), Füselierbataillon 363, II/Artillerieregiment 363 as well as one searchlight and one medium AT-platoon. More specifically, these units were deployed and tasked with missions as follows:

  • Raum Ostende: Füselierbataillon 363 (durch 89AK), RGB 437 (182RD) (durch 82AK), II/AR363 (durch 89AK), ein schw. und ein mittl Zug Panzerjäger zu je 3 Geschützen (durch 82AK). Mission: counterattacking and destroying a seaborne assault near and on both sides of Ostend. In addition the Füselierbataillon 363 had the mission to prepare a counterattack towards the boundary with the 712 ID. For this mission the batallions were to be located in such a way that the rear units would be located in the Landfront and the mass of the division lovated north of the Landfront.

  • Raum Veurne as Regimentsgruppe Furnes: Stab RGR 79 (182RD) (durch 82AK), I/GR752 (von 82AK), II/GR558 (von 82AK), III/RGR 205 (165RD) (durch 89AK), leichte RAA 179 (durch 82AK). Mission: counterattacking and destroying a seaborne assault in the area Nieuwpoort-Veurne or on the boundary with the 18 Luftwaffenfelddivision. For this purpose 2 batallions were to be located on both sides and north of Veurne, while one batallion was to be positioned south of Veurne to protect towards the north and south;

  • As a result of this operation the following units of the 48 Infanteriedivision would become available for other uses: Füselierbataillon 148, Pionierbataillon 148 und Feldersatzbataillon 148. The division was to report how it wanted to use these units. The document below contains all the details with respect to the advance parties and the arrival of the units (Vorkommandos und Eintreffen der einzelnen Bataillonen):

 

On 27 June 1944 further units arrived in KVA A3. I/Grenadierregiment 752 (326 Infanteriedivision), II/Grenadierregiment 558 (331 Infanteriedivision), I/ Artillerieregiment 179 and III/Reservegrenadierregiment 205 (165 Reservedivision). Also on this day the departure of the 1. SS-PzD Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler was concluded. Further, the headquarters of the corps' Quartiermeisterabteilung were transferred to Schoten, while that of the Artillerieregiment 363  was moved from Sint-Kruis to Aardenburg. Finally, Grenadierregiment 958 (363 Infanteriedivision) was transferred from Ijzendijke to Plakkebord.

Also on 27 June the LXXXIX Armeekorps issued another order. It first pointed out that the second large-scale allied landing was still to be expected, which would be the start of the deciding battle in the West. In the case the sector of the corps did not come under attack, it would be certain that all available forces would be pulled out to be deployed elsewhere. In such a case it would be extremely important that all the prepared measures for the extraction and transfer of units would be executed smoothly. In the first instance, candidates for extraction would be the 363 Infanteriedivision (Armeereserve), schwere Heerespanzerjägerabteilung 668 and the units transferred to the 48 Infanteriedivision from the area of the LXXXII Armeekorps. In a second stage the 712 and 48 Infanteriedivisionen could be pulled out. Code words were Oostburg, Dixmuden and Feierabend (the latter presumably for the 363 ID). All commanders concerned were ordered to recheck the measures taken.

On 28 June 1944 the LXXXIX Armeekorps issued a document with an overview of the emergency headquarters (Ausweichgefeechtsstände) and forward communication centres (Meldeköpfe).

  • Emergency headquarters (Ausweichgefechtsstände):

    • Führungsabteilung:

      • Gent (Ausweichgefechtsstand): field fortification

      • Diksmuide (vorgeschobener Gefechtsstand): permanent fortification

      • Brugge - Sint-Kruis (vorgeschiobener Gefechtsstand): permanent fortification (only for essential part of the Führungsabteilung

    • Quartierabteilung:

      • Antwerpen-Nachtegalenpark: permanent fortification

      • Antwerpen - Fort 5: field fortification

      • Gent - Justitiepaleis

  • Forward communication centres (Meldeköpfe):

    • vorgeschobener Gefechtsstand Gent, Gefechtsstand Nachtegalenpark, Meldeköpfe Boom und Kontich. The location of the centres is indicated by road signs with mention Paula.

On 29 June 1944 the divisional headquarters (Führungsabteilung) were located in Gistel, while the Quartiermeisterabteilung was in Oudenburg.

Also on this day the 165 Reservedivision was ordered to prepare a long-term defence of the Verteidigungsbereich Vlissingen. The order stipulated that if, in the event of combat action on Walcheren, the Verteidigungsbereich Vlissingen was threatened, the following units below would additionally have to be withdrawn into the VB: Divisionsstab 165RD and the troops occupying Middelburg, I/RGR260 (less 1 company), II/GR1020, Reserveartillerieabteilung 5 mit 2-3. Batterie, und 2. und 5./RAR61, Stab un 3. Kompanie/Reservepionierbataillon 9. The units inside the VB Vlissingen were also supposed to stay inside the VB and would only be allowed to operate outside it on the explicit orders of the AOK15. The document also states that the Generalkommando would already request that the I/RGR 260 would already be moved intio the VB.and deployed along the Landfront.

Further on this day, the LXXXIX Armeekorps wrote to the AOK15 with respect to the defence of the VB Vlissingen. In order to defend it with success in the long term, it was deemed necessary to have following troops: 2 complete infantry regiments, 2 further artillery batallions for the Landfront (in addition to the Heeres- und Marineartillerie present), 1 schwere Panzerjägerabteilung, 1 Pionierbataillon, a mixed Nachrichtenkompanie, a further schwere Flakabteilung, a Sanitätskompanie or a Feldhalblazarett. Also further permanent bunkers were requested. The following units had the mission to conduct a fighting retreat into the VB Vlissingen: Divisionsstab 165RD and the troops occupying Middelburg, I/RGR260 (less 1 company), II/GR1020, Reserveartillerieabteilung 5 mit 2-3. Batterie, und 2. und 5./RAR61, Stab un 3. Kompanie/Reservepionierbataillon 9. Heavy AT-weapons were not available, since all of these had been deployed at the coast. The Sicherheitsbesatzung of the VB Vlissingen was mase up of: Reservegrenadierregiment 215 with the I. und III. Bataillonen, 8. Kompanie/GR1020, 3. und 4. Kompanie/Festungsstammabteilung I/LXXXIX, Heeresartillerieabteilung 1140, Seekommandant Südholland mit Hafenkapitän, Marineflakabteilung 810 mit 2, 3, 4 Batterien and the 8-9/MAA 202. The corps also requested permission to already move the I/RGR 260 (less 1 company) into the VB to occupy the Landfront, which was at present undermanned. Finally, for a fighting retreat into the feste Platz Antwerpen all units of the 70ID, with the exception of the I/GR 1019 had been given orders. The latter batallion was lokacted on South-Beveland between Goes and the Bath isthmus.

Finally on 29 June, the LXXXIX Armeekorps issued an order regarding the deployment of the 70 Infanteriedivision in vase of combat. On the grounds of experiences gained in the Normandy fighting, it was ordered that all troops near Festungen ot Verteidigungsbereiche were to fight their way  into these in case they were in danger of being encircled. The AOK15 had now ordered that the same held for the port and city of Antwerp. Id, in the case of Antwerp, there we signs of an enemy inte,ntion to encircle Antwerp, the 70 Infanteriedivision (less the I/GR1019) was to fight its way into the city, where it would then be subordinated to the KVA-Antwerpen for the defence of the city. The KVA Anwterpen was already to designate assembly areas and prepare deployment plans for the 70 ID. In case the division was deployed in Antwerp, the I/GR1019 would be subordinated to the 165 Reservedivision, since this batallion had the task to defend the Bath isttmus or the feste Platz Goes.

 

In the period January-July 1944 the Wochenberichte of the corps gave detailed information with respect to units arriving, leaving, moving and reorganizing in the sector of the LXXXIX Armeekorps, as well as detailed information on the construction of the Atlantikwall, the 2. Stellung and the Landfront. This detailed information can be found in the document below:

 


On 1 July 1944 an Ergänzung zur Kriegsrangliste, i.e. an addition to the overview of officers was issued. It has been processed into the document below: