Operation Bristle
(Sainte-Cecile - 3/4 June 1942)
(from a German perspective)


This account is based on the final AOK15 report of 10 June 1942 submitted to the OBWest
(with comments of the AOK15))



German-drawn map of the landing attempt

I WEATHER


Wind force: 2-3; visibility: 80-100m; High tide: 4.33u; Moonrise: 0.21u; Moonset: 11.13u
In view of this weather situation the division had ordered more intense patrolling between 1-5am for the night of 3-4 June 1942, so that every point along the coast would be passed every half hour. Searchlights were ordered to light the beach and surf 4 times an hour

II LANDING ATTEMPT

The landing attempt occurred in the sector of the III/IR589 (11. Kp) against the line Wn Dannes - Stp Ste-Cecile, in 3 boat groups of presumably 4 boats each.

III Widerstandsnest Dannes

1) At 3.12am a landing boat was recognized in the light of a hand-held searchlight in front of the Wn Dannes. Fired at by the joint fire of 2 heavy and 2 light MGs the boat was forced to turn around. Shortly afterwards, 2-3 other boats emerged with which a firefight ensued in the time period 3.15-3.50am. Taking part in this firefight was the patrol Bögener (of 11/IR 589), which was underway from the Wn Dannes to the neighbouring Stp Zollhaus to the north. A total of 1623 rounds were fired from the Wn Dannes and the patrol. Presumably some 50 soldiers would have been busy releasing dinghies from the boats, but they were chased away by the effective fire. No enemy soldiers came ashore in front of the Wn Dannes.

2) The telephone line between the Wn Dannes and the Stp Ste-Cecile (here company headquarters) was cut. Through this telephone line the Wn Dannes had been alerted shortly before (+/- 3.10am) on the grounds of a sea fight between own Hafenschutz boats an British E-boots in front of the Stp Ste-Cecile. It became clear later that this line had, running only some 150 metres behind and parallel to the coastline had been cut in three places close to the Sprechstelle 5, of which the French field telephone had been removed by the enemy.
Consequently, the Wn Dannes, at 3.25am reported the sea fight to the Stp Zollhaus, which at 3.33am had reported it to the I/IR589 (the telephone line had been unavailable due to other call for the period between 3.25 and 3.33am). At 3.36am Stp Zollhaus then reported the incident to the IR 589.

3) Artillery fire was not called up by Wn Dannes, neither by light signals nor by telephone. The regiment also did not order fire to come down on the four boats in front of Wn Dannes.

comments of the AOK15

1) The soldiers of the WN Dannes and the patrol Bögener were able to prevent the enemy from landing and acted quickly and correctly.
2) The location of the telephone line between the strongpoints parallel to and so close behind the coastline is wrong.
3) If a telephone line is occupied so that an important tactical message cannot be transferred (and delayed for 8 miinutes) a prepared codeword should ensure that the line is freed. This tupe of message has priority over all other messages.
4) The regiment should have ordered artillery fire to com down onto the boats in front of the Wn Dannes.

IV LANDING SITE LEFT AND RIGHT OF TARGET POINT 13B

1) The patrol of corporal Schultz (11/IR589) had reported no observations from the Sprechstelle 5 at 3am and was on the way back to the Wn Dannes when it saw 4 boots trying to come ashore. The patrol leader immediately openend fire. Because he observed the fire from the Wn Dannes (directed at a dfferent boat group) and also because one soldier in his patrol had spent all of his ammunition, he sent this soldier back to the Wn Dannes as a runner, but also to get ammunition. The patrol Schultz fired 1014 rounds and 6 flares and threw one grenade. It remained in contact with the enemy the entire time.

2) The patrol of corporal Hoch had started out from Stp Sainte-Cecile at 2.50am and had encountered the same four enemy boats in front of the Sprechstelle 5 shortly after 3am. This patrol, too, opened fire, sent a runner to the Stp Ste-Cecile and remained in contact with the enemy. However, 2 mortar round from the landing boats killed one and injured 2 soldiers of the patrol, also causing the loss of the light MG. The patrol Hoch fired 300 rounds and 7 flares and threw 3 hand grenades.

3) The firefight by the 2 patrols lasted some 30 minutes. During this fight only the ships were fired at. as soldiers were not seen to be coming ashore. Several soldiers noticed artificial mist. The four enemy boats then departed the scene at 3.45am. Artillery fire by means of light signals was not requested by the patrols.

4) Close to 4am a troop consisting of 2 Gruppen (+/- 20 soldiers) under the command of Oberfeldwebel Eley and sent from the Stp Ste-Cecile, arrived at the scene, captured 2 British soldiers left behind, discovered equipment left behind and estimated (on the basis of footprints) that some 50-60 enemy had disembarked.

Comments of the AOK15:

1) Both patrols acted appropriately and thanks to their remaining in contact with the enemy, despite losses inflicted and numerical infeiority, they hindered the strong British landing group and caused the latter to escape in a hurry.
2) The patrol Schults should have sent a runner faster. The alarming of the WN Dannes by the fire being opened was not enough.
3) Patrol leaders should be equipped with signam munition, in order to be able to call artillery fire.

V Stützpunkt Ste-Cecile

1) Close to 3am the Stp Sainte-Cecile was alarmed by a naval fight in front of its position. It was a fight between 2 HS-boats which were returning from their position off Merlimont-Flage to Boulogne when, 2 1/2-3 nautical miles west of Ste-Cecile, they ran into 4 British E-boats which were perhaps protecting that flank of the operation. Both German boats fired recognition signals. One of the boats turned north, while the other boat incurred casualties, as a result of which no further flares could be fired or other signals given. In an attempt to escape from the E-boats, this boat headed towards the shore. Unable to identify itself as friendly, the boat was then fired at by the Sturmabwehrgeschütz of Stp. Ste-Cecile, which fired 7 rounds. The fourth round hit the ammunition storage causing the boat to catch fire. The survivors (3 sailors were killed, 3 seriously injured and 6 lightly injured)) jumped into the water and swam towards the shore. In addition to the Sturmgeschütz the German boat was fired at by other weapons, including a 2cm Flak gun. After the German boat was on fire, part of the heavy weapons and Flak fired at the 3-4 British boats.

2) In the Stp Ste-Cecile the watch officer was Stabsfeldwebel Scholz. He gave the first orders and transferred the first reports until the strongpoint commander Leutnant Meyer had arrived from his headquarters in the strongpoint, some 200 metres away. Between 3.15 and 3.18am the runner of the patrol Hoch arrived and reported to Scholz that his patrol had encountered 4 boats close to the Sprechstelle 5. This report was immediately passed on by Scholtz to the III/IR 589. Unfortunately, Scholtz neglected to inform Leutnant Meyer, who had just arrived, of this.

3) Leutnant Meyer ordered, amongst other things, that the 60cm seachlight of the Flak troop should illuminate the beach  However, because of misty conditions, nothing could be made out. When III/IR 589 then asked Meyer, on the basis of the report of 4 enemy boats off Sprechstelle 5, Meyer responded negatively, since he knew nothing about the 4 boats off Sprechstelle 5 and meanwhile had observed that the Sturmabwehrgeschütz had damaged  a German boat.

4) The III/IR 589 neglected to inform Meyer on the report of the 4 enemy boats off Sprechstelle 5. The batallion also did not order artillery fire, neither for target point 13b nor for the Stp Ste-Cecile. III/IR 589 had reported the following to the IR 589: "Patrol has seen 4-5 boats off the coast in the sector".

5) The reserve of the Stp Ste-Cecile (2 Gruppen = 20 men) under the command of Oberfeldwebel Eley was ordered by Meyer to establish contact with the WN Dannes. When giving this order Meyer only knew that the telephone line to the neighbouring strongpoint had been cut; he knew nothing from the 4 boats in front of Sprechstelle 5.

6) Meanwhile the Stp Ste-Cecile was repeatedly attacked by 2 fighters (for a total of 45 minutes). One of these planes was hit by Flak near Etaples and crashed into the fire position of an army naval battery.

7) The commander of III/IR 589 put the reserve company on alert and ran to the Stp Ste-Cecile accompanied by his orderly at 3.30am.

8) The commander of IR 589, after having received the report that the telephone line between the Stp Ste-Cecile and the WN Dannes had been cut, at 3.55am dispatched recce troops from the north, east and south towards the WN Dannes and had also assembled truck-mobile troops from the reserve batallion. The regimental commander did not order or request artillery fire.

9) Close to 5am the runners of the Eley force returned to the Stp Ste-Cecile  with 2 British prisoners and reported that all was quiet. The reserve companies of I and III/IR 589 were then deployed to search the dunes near Dannes

Comments of the AOK15:

1) The reporting and alert procedures in the Stp Ste-Cecile needs to be improved. The officer of the watch should be at the Gefechtsstand, where he has the Kompanietrupp at his disposal and where he can immediately inform his commander. It is unacceptable that an important report is lost along the way. The Kompanietrupp must be trained such that issuing orders and transferring reports are possible also when the commander is not present at the Gefechtsstand.

2) The one HS-boat was wrong in turning towards the coast. Rather, it was supposed to have freed up the field of fire out to sea or sideways. When an own boat comes so close to the shore without showing identification signals, it must take into account that it will be fired upon. The Landungsabwehrgeschütz had every right to fire at the boat.

3) It was a mistake that neither the company or the batallion, nor the regiment requested or ordered artillery fire. At least harassing fire should have been requested or ordered.

4) The measures taken by the regiment in terms of recce operations were correct.

5) The deployment of the Stosstrupp Eley from Stp Ste-Cecile was effective. When Leutnant Meyer had been aware of the report of 4 boats off Sprechstelle 5 , he would have taken command himself.

6) The III/IR 589 neither processed the report of the 4 boats off Sprechstelle 5 nor transferred it correctly to the regiment. It also failed to clear up the situation by not sending a recce troop with an officer

VI Patrol Grovejan (10/IR 589)

Since 2.40am the patrol was underway from the Stp Gabriel to the Stp Ste-Cecille. Close to Cecile the patrol leader noticed a boat which was nearing the beach and did not respond to flares being fired. The patrol opened fire. Fire was returned from the boat, which turned towards the sea. Later the patrol fired at the German boat, until the mistake was realised and aided the crew. During this action the patrol was fired upon by fighter planes. The patrol fired 235 rounds.

Comments of the AOK15:

The patrol acted appropriately.

VII ARTILLERY

1) The sector artillery did not fire, with the exception of the Stellungsbatterie A and the Landungsabwehrgeschütz in the Stp Ste-Cecile.

2) The Stellungsbatterie A was alerted by its commander shortly after 3am and was ready to fire at 3.08am. From his observation post on the Mont de Terre the battery commander observed the tracer fire exchanged between the four boats and the patrols near Sprechstelle 5. He recognized the red tracer ammunition to be British, upon which he opened fire on his own initiative at 3.20am.  The battery fired 4 Gruppen shells at a distance of 7000m which must have hit the water 2000m west of the Zielpunkt 13b. Meanwhile he sent a report to the Artilleriekommandeur of the sector of the IR 589, Major Pabst (II/AR321). At 3.30am Pabst gave the order to cease firing. At 3.36am the battery received the order from Pabst to fire 2 Gruppen at the old target, but to lay the fire closer. In execution of this order the battery fired 2 Gruppen with a distance of 5000m which must have hit the water 1000m west of Zielpunkt 13b. In none of the case was observation of the effects of the firing possible.

3) 1 und 3/AR 738 (Heeresküstenbatterien) observed the tracer fire directed at the Stp Ste-Cecile at 3.14am. However, there was no alert and fire was not opened. It was only at 3.30am that the Gruppe Le Touquet gave the codeword Seezielalarm, though without effect.

4) The naval artillery and the Stellungsbatterien Küste 312 and 419 were alerted, but observed nothing and did not receive fire requests or orders.

Comments of the AOK15:

1) The Gerätebatterie A acted appropriately. It is to be regretted that the firing was halted by the batallion commander who in his rear headquarters was unable to oversee the situation.

2) The remainder of the artillery failed.

3) It is be ensured that in every sector Sperrfeuer can be requested by the infantry by light signals (since the telephone network can be expected to be overloaded at times of crisis).

4) At least the large strongpoints (e.g. Ste-Cecile) should have a forward artillery observer, or at least an infantry soldier trained in forward observation.

5) Enemy reports and Sperrfeuer requests are always to be given in connection with Küstenzielpunkten (coast target points for the artillery). For this purpose, the target points must be known to all strongpoints and patrols.

6) If the Beaobachtungstellen cannot observe a landing site and if there are no forward observers in the sector, the A. V. Kommandos have to be be called into action without delay. For this purpose the latter should be mobile.

VIII MEASURES TAKEN BY THE DIVISION

At 3.25am the division was informed by the IR 589 that a naval fight was going on off the Stp Ste-Cecile, that the strongpoint was being attacked by fighters and that Alarmstufe II had been called by the regiment. At 3.35am the division ordered Gefechtsbereitschaft for the two other regiments and the artillery regiment.
In reaction to the report that the telephone connection between Stp Ste-Cecile and the WN Dannes had been cut, the division ordered the seding of a recce troop (with officier) from the Radfahrschwadron based at Dannes.
The Generalkommando and the neighbouring division, as well as the air force and navy headquarters were informed with a string of reports and messages from 4.15 onwards.
At 5.15am the division was informed that 2 British soldiers had been captured. At the same time the divisional commander informed the Jagdfliegerführer 2 and proposed for the latter to pursue the fleeing British boats.  At 5.25am the commander of the IR 589, on his request, was allocated his II/IR 589 (the divisional reserve) to search the dunes.

Comments of the AOK15:

1) Effective measures

2) The first report to the corps should have been made earlier.

3) It was THE big mistake of the division not to give harassing fire missions to the artillery.

IX ENEMY

On the basis of POW interrogations and findings on the spot thde following picture emerges:

The British landing troop had started from the Isle of Wight at 11am on 3 August with 8-10 landing boats and 2 gun boats. Late in the evening of 3 June it had set course to the French coast. Around 2am on 4 June the troop had navigated to the Dannes-Cecile area, during the course of which the southern group bumped into the boats of the Hafenschutzflottille.It is however also possible that the southern group did not have a landing mission but rather a covering one.

Comments of the AOK15:

Unfortunately, this force was not detected by own air reconnaissance. In contrast, the Gefechtsstand West of the naval artillery had reported at 0.15am that some 40km west of Berck small ships sailing in the direction of Dieppe had been detected. They were later lost by the radars. It is possible the ships detected were those of the raiding force.
The missing of the landing unit was to have been to reconnoitre the coastal defences, to stay on land for 1 hour, to proceed inland for about 900m, to destroy communications equipment, searchlights and weapons (canions) and to bring in prisoners. Similtaneously attacking fighter planes would cause a diversion or keep the strongpoint Sainte-Cecile occupied. Apparantly, the Brotish did not use rubber boats for this operation.
The 2 prisoners stated that the British suffered serious casualties. The British left a a large number of weapons and much equipment behind.

X OWN CASUALTIES

Army: 1 killed and 2 injured, 1 telephone
Navy: 3 killed, 3 seriously injured, 6 lightly injured, 1 HSI-boat lost

XI OTHER EXPERIENCES

1) It is necessary that the coastal occupation forces are always informed about positions and movements of own ships.

2) The equipment of the strongpoints and resistance nests with Landungsabwehrgeschützen (also Pak and Flak) is insufficient. The aim must be to equip every strongpoint with 1-2 of these guns

3) The location of the heavy searchlight of the Luftwaffe should be checked again to verify that the szarchlights can also illuminate the surf and the beach. The range of the portable searchlights is insufficient. It is therefore advised that every strongpoint/resistance nest is equipped with a 60cm searchlight.

4) All strongpoints and patrols need to know that the artillery waits for requests for Sperrfeuer and to engage naval targets. It is therefore the duty of the inpantery to to pass on such reports with target point indication to the artillery.

In the issues of principle mentioned above the OBWest decided the following;

1) Readiness of the artillery

The intenvention by the artillery was not satisfactory. OBWest demanded that the cooperation between the infantry and the artillery should be closer. As soon as the artillery recognizes that a coastal location is being threatened, it should be ready to fire.

2) Opening fire on targets in the Küstenvorfeld

A difference is to be made between ships sailing parallel to the coastline and ships sailing towards the coastline. Here it was made clear that vessels moving towards the coast were always to be made to show recognition signals. In the absence of these or other signals revealing the vessels to be friendly, warning shots were to be fired. If these remained without answer, the vessels in question were to be shelled by the artillery. If, however, it was clear from the start that enemy ships were involved, fire could be opened immediately. Importantly, the battery commanders were full responsible for the measures to be taken, but had to inform their superior as soon as possible. In other words, they were not to wait on orders from above.

3) Showing identification signals

Planned shipping movements paralel to the coast were not to be summoned to display identification signals, as this might attract enemy ships. Ships which were no longer able to show identification signals, as a result of combat signals would nevertheless have to identify themselves as friendly by any means possible. If not, they would nun the risk of being considered enemy and fired upon.

4) Sperrfeuer area at sea

Sperrfeuer areas at sea were  meant to prevent enely landing attempts and make them more difficult. These target areas were therefore not to be positioned too far offshore, also so as not to hinder shipping lanes. Thus, the target areas were to be determined in close cooperation with the navy.

5) Illuminating the Küstenvorfeld

The coastal defence units were not allowed to illuminate the Küstenvorfeld at will, since friendly ships could be lit up in this way and become easy targets for enemy ships. The local commanders, in close cooperation with the navy and the air force, would have to determine which searchlights were to be operation without restriction and which only in specific circumstances.

The above account is based on the final AOK15 report of 10 June 1942 submitted to the OBWest (with comments of the AOK15))

Previous reports:
4 June 1942:
1. 321ID Abt Ia (Fernschreiben - 06.50 - An HrGrD, AOK15, LXXXII AK)
2. 321ID - Vorläufiger fernm. Bericht der 321ID

3. Generalkommando LXXXII AK Abt Ia - Ermittlungen über den Ablauf der englischen Landung in der Nacht vom 4.6.1942 zwischen den Stützpunkten Dannes und St-Cecile.
5 June 1942:
4. Generalkommando LXXXII AK Ia Nr. 495/42 - Stellungnahme zum vorläufigen Bericht der 321 ID

5. Fernschreiben von OBWest/HrGrD von 5 Juni an LXXXIIAK (Generalkommando LXXXII AK Ia Nr. 974/42): Anerkennung von OBWest (mit Weiterleitung an unterstellte Divisionen)
6 June 1942:
6. 321 ID Ia Nr 587/42 - 6 Juni 1942 - Bericht über das engl. Landungsunternehmen am 4.6.42 gegen Abschnitt Wn Dannes - Stp Cecile

This document contains detailed information from the division (with comments by the division)

7. Generalkommando LXXXII AK Ia Nr. 506/42  - Vorläufiger Bericht mit Stellungnahme des Generalkommandos und dazugehörigen Kartenausschnitt zur Kenntnisnahme und sofortigen Auswertung der bisher gemachten Erfahrungen - an die Divisionen (nicht 321ID)
8. Generalkommando LXXXII AK Ia Nr. 506/42  - Vorläufiger Bericht mit Stellungnahme des Generalkommandos zur Kenntnisnahme - an 321ID
9. Fernschreiben von OBWest/HrGrD an LXXXII AK und 321ID von 6 Juni: 5 Fragen (fernmündlich voraus am 5 Juni)(Generalkommando LXXXII AK Ia Nr. 999/42)

10. Fernschreiben von 321 ID and OBWest/HrGrD/LXXXII AK/LXXXI AK von 6 Juni: Meldung auf 5 von der Heeresgruppe vorgelegte Fragen (Fernmündlich voraus am 5 Juni)(Generalkommando LXXXII AK Ia Nr. 981/42)

7 June 1942:

11. Generalkommando LXXXII AK Abt Ia, Nr 511/42 - an AOK15 - abschliesende Bericht  der 321ID im Originalexemplar (6. Juni 1942) mit einer von Generalkommando fertiggestellten Abschrift

12. Generalkommando LXXXII AK Abt Ia Nr. 511/42 - an AOK15 - Stellungnahme LXXXII AK zur abschliessender Bericht der 321 ID

This document contains a number of interesting Anlagen detailing the artillery, communications, coastal combat and equipment of strongpoints with weapons, the use of searchlights, what to do in case of simultaneous air attacks, ammunition supplies, medical operations and the taking of POWs.

A. The artillery

Most important is that the artillery did not fire, even though the batteries were either ready to fire or should have been ready. From the report by Hauptmann Schondelmaier, the following was retained:

1) 1 and 3/AR 738 were to have opened fire on their own initiative at 3.14 already, and reported to higher headquarters, even though the situation was still unclear.

2) In contrast, the commander of the Gerätebatterie A acted well. However, he should have tried to obtain observation possibilities for his battery. It is regrettable that the batallion commander ordered the firing to cease, as he feared hitting own ships.

3) It is remarkable that the Artillerieverbindungskommandos apparently did not come into action anywhere.

4) It is incomprehensible that the infantry did not request Sperrfeuer. Requesting Sperrfeuer by light signals is currently only possible for the port entrance to Boulogne.It should be possible for the infantry to do this in any sector and each battery recognizing the request should open fire immediately.

5) In every observation and measuring post Sperrfeuerbretter are to be provided with drawn-in Küstenzielpunkten, so that every observer can call Sperrfeuer.

6) All reports on events at or in front of the coastline, enemy landings, requests for Sperrfeuer are to be made relative to Küstenzielpunkten, e.g. enemy landing near Zielpunkt 15.

7) The large strongpoint Ste-Cecile does not have an advance observer and therefore  no direct connection to the artillery. Hence , information and directions for the artillery were utterly inadequate. Due to the intense use of the few infantry connections to the strongpoint, no artillery unit was able to contact the strongpoint. It is necessary that every infantry strongpoint has a direct connection to the nearest artillery unit. Ideal would be the presence of an artillery observer in every large strongpoint and a trained infantry soldier in the smaller strongpoints.

8) Events have shown that an observation post higher up will see more than an observation post at ground level. Neverthless, observation at the latter level must always be guaranteed.+

Anlage 1:

The HKB 1/738 equipped with 6x 15cm (f) was subordinated to the Gruppe Le Touquet and commanded by Hauptmann Ney. Its firing position was along the coastal road some 1km north of Etaples. The Messstelle schwarz was located to the rear of Dannes; the Messstelle rot on the lighthouse at Le Touquet. Beobachatungsstellen were located behind the Feuerstellung. The battery was able to fire with 5 canons (the sixth was under repair).

The HKB 2/738 had its Feuerstellung south of Le Touquet. It had 4 operational canons, but did not fire due to the presence of own ships.

The Gerätebatterie A equipped with 4x 10.5cm (t) had its Feuerstellung 400m southwest of Neufchatel. The B-Stelle was located on the Mont de Terre. The battery commander was Leutnant Politycki

In the Stp Cecile the following heavy weapons were present: LAG 7.5cm, Pak 3.7cm (did not fire since located at the rear), 3x Flak 2cm (one gun fired; theother two were located at the rear). The commander of the Flakzug was Leutnant Müller.

 

German-drawn map of artillery batteries in the area

 

B. Communications

It must be achieved in the first instance that the communications network from the strongpoints at the coast to the rear is protected from enemy action. This requires Verkablung (cabling). Sideways connection between strongpoints and for the Meldedienst are desirable. Here too the use of Kabelgräben would be ideal. For lack of resources for the time being we will have to make do with open connections somewhat distant from the coastline and Stichldeitungen towards the coastline.

C. Coastal combat and equiment of strongpoints with weapons

Combat by the strongpoint and the resistance nest, as well as by the patrols, had been waged well. The measures taken were successful. It appeared that even light machine gun and infantry fire prevented the landing of the enemy boats, even though the latter were armoured. Of special importance, though, was the equipment with Pak, Flak and LAG guns. It had been shown that the LAG gun in the Stp Cecile had fulfilled its task, even though operated by the infantry. It was, therefore, desirable that every strongpoint/resistance nest was to be equipped with 1-2 LAG, so that the entire coastline could be covered by these weapons, both frontally and in a flanking way.

D. Lighting of the Küstenvorfeld

The operation has shown that it is urgently required to check that the searchlights of the Flak can be used to light up the beach and the Vorfeld.

E. Procedure in case of simultaneous air attacks

During the landing attempt the strongpoints were simultaneously attacked from the air. It is to be expected that in case of larger-scale landings the enemy will deploy substantial aerial forces. Thus, a reinforced deployment of Flak at the coast is necessary, even in less important sectors. If this is imposssible, there should be sufficient mobile flak forces present in the corps area. Some days before the landing the commander of the 321 Infanteriedivision had even requested extra Flak defences, but the XI Flakbrigade had been unable to meet this request.

F. Ammunition supplies

The strongpoints were show to possess sufficient amounts of ammunition. The patrols, though, quickly ran out of ammunition. Increased ammunition supplies are thus necessary for the patrols.

G. Medical services

The medical services had functioned without any problems.

8 June 1942

13. 321 Infanteriedivision - Kommandeur 587/42 - Nachtrag zum Bericht über das englische Landungsunternehmen am 4.6.42 gegen Abschnitt Widerstandsnest Dannes - Stp Cecile.
This document contains further additions to document no. 5 above.


Overview of strongpoints strengths, weapons, bunkers and emplacements (5 June 1942)

Stp 32 Hardelot:
2x MG-Schnabelstände - splittersicher
2x MG-Rundumstände - splittersicher
2x lMG-Stellungen - offen
2x Fla-Stellungen - offen
Wn 32a
Wn 33a Chalets:
1x Unterstand - splittersicher
Stp 33 Zollhaus:
1x MG-Rundumstand - splittersicher
1x Unterstand - splittersicher
1x Fla-MG-Stellung - offen
Stp 34 - geplannt - Gefechtsstand I/IR589
Stp 35 Mont de Terre
Wn 37 Dannes: 0/4/33 (Heer)
3x lMG
2x sMG
2x MG-Stellungen - offen
3x Unterstände - splittersicher
Wn 37a Dannes - Marineminenlager
Wn 37b Dannes - Heeresbatterie 1/738:
1x Beobachtungsstand - splittersicher
Stp 38 Cecile: 2/18/173 (Heer und Luftwaffe)
Heer (2/11/110)
8x lMG, 4x sMG, 1x GrW, 1x Pz.B., 1x lFK 235 (b)
Luftwaffe (0/7/63)
4sMG, 1x Pak, 3x Flak 2cm, 2x Flammenwerfer, 2x Handscheinwerfer, 1x Scheinwerfer 60cm
4x MG-Rundumstände - splittersicher
5x Gruppenunterstände - splittersicher
6x Unterstände - splittersicher
3x Flakstellungen - offen
4x MG-Stellungen - offen
1x Geschützstellung - offen
1x Beobachtungsstand - offen
2x Luftwaffengeräte - offen
Wn 38a
Wn 39a

Stp 39 St-Gabriel:
1x MG-Rundumstand - splittersicher
2x MG-? -splittersicher
3x Gruppenunterstände - splittersicher
4x Unterstände - splittersicher
2x MG-Stellungen - offen
Gefechtstand III/IR 589 Camiers
Wn 40a - Marinepeilstelle 4 (nördlich Ferme Beauregard)
Stp 40 Canche-Nord
3x MG-Stellungen - offen
4x Unterstände - splittersicher
Stp 42  Pointe du Touquet
Heeresbatterie 2/738 (La Folie)(nördlich Etaples)
Heeresbatterie 3/738 (Le Touquet)
Gefechtsstand II/IR 589 (Frencq)
Gefechtsstand IR589 (Nesles)

Finally, a document dated 4 June 1942 drafted by the Abt Ia - Stoart of the Generalkommando LXXXII AK provides further info on the number of shots fired by the artillery: LAG im Stp Cecile (7 Schuss), Gerätebatterie A bei Neufchatel (4 Gruppen = 16 Schuss). Interestingly, this document also mentions the other canons that could have intervened if required, totalling 23, divided as follows:
2x LAG Stp Hardelot, 2x HKB 1/738, 2x HKB 3/738, 4x Stellungsbatterie K419 , 3x MKB Mont de Couple, 3x MKB Flugplatz Le Portel, 3x MKB La Creche I, 4x(?) MKN Grosser Kurfürst