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The Battle of the Bulge - Part
IV - Seize the Bridges Basics: Soft cover, 8.5"x11", ~277 pages, black & white photographs and color photographs, maps, copies of original documents. |
| Description: This is the fourth book about the action at the North Shoulder of the Battle of the Bulge. It is also the last book examining the US and German units that fought there, and it continues to involve units of the German Sixth Panzer Army. Hopefully, in these books credit is given to all units that saw action in this area. Soon there will be two new books describing the battle fought in the Schnee Eifel, the first one involving the 106th Infantry Division and its supporting troops. The second one will be primarily about the first battle for St. Vith, in the sector defended by the 7th Armored Division and element of the 9th Armored Division, supported by surviving units of the 106th Inf Div. attacked by General der Panzertruppen Hasso Eccard von Manteuffel’s Fifth Panzer Army. Over the years many books have been written about Kampfgruppe Peiper, which was part of the 1st SS Panzer Division of the Sixth Panzer Army. Book four is different. Through the eyes of soldiers on both sides who fought in that area, you can visualize their individual reactions and sense their feelings: German soldiers who fought to reach their goal and change the fortunes of war, and also soldiers of the US units spread out all over the area, who had to respond very quickly to the breakthrough of a well-trained, mechanized force consisting of many experienced Eastern front veterans. This book also tells about the Malmédy Massacre (Baugnez Crossroads). In this chapter it is not my intention to point an accusing finger at soldiers of a war that occurred more than 60 years ago. I try to respect members of both sides, to include those with whom I have worked and interviewed over the past 10 years. It is only through this approach that I can write these books in which I don’t choose sides nor express my personal opinions. Because the chapter on Malmédy was one of the toughest chapters to write, I asked for assistance from my friend US Major (ret) Michael DeBarto, with whom I worked in the field many years. During the time of his assignment at the Warrior Preparation Center, Einsiedlerhof, Germany, he was in charge of organizing Battle Staff Rides to the Ardennes area for officers and enlisted personnel of the US Army, Air Force, and Navy. DeBarto and I met with veterans of both sides who were involved in the Malmédy Massacre, and I asked him to write the chapter, to which I added some eye-witness accounts. Because so much has been written about this event, I am not the one who would like to go into deep detail on what happened more than 60 years ago. I hope the reader of this book will understand. FOREWORD In December 1944 I was a 19-year-old mortar sergeant. My battalion commander was Major Hal D. McCown, who was captured between Stoumont and La Gleize, Belgium, escaping four days later. In September 1944 when Hitler first revealed his intention to attack through the Ardennes to take Antwerp, and divide the American and British armies, it was quickly noted he did not have the resources to do so, particularly gasoline. It would be necessary for them to capture American supplies. The capture of Antwerp and the division of the Allied armies therefore took on secondary roles from day one of the attack. In the many ’little’ battles, time, fuel and troops were spent overcoming the defensive actions of individuals and small units. In retrospect, the capture of enemy supplies, particularly gasoline, and finally the capture of routes and bridges en route to the final goal became paramount. Sixty years later, stepping back and looking at a map of Belgium, it is apparent all these goals rested in the northern shoulder of the Bulge: the network of roads at St. Vith, the gasoline dumps at Francorchamps, the bridge at Stavelot, and the villages of Stoumont and La Gleize. These areas stand out as major, intermediate military goals, and at the risk of being controversial, neither Bastogne nor any other parts of the southern shoulder fit into this category. Because time was the most important commodity on the 16th and 17th of December, it could be argued the Bulge was won at the Losheim Gap by individuals and by small groups of stubborn, heroic GIs, not only infantry but by engineers, armored troops and artillery men. The stand of the 99th Division at Losheim Gap, the defense at Elsenborn by the 1st, 2nd and 99th Divisions, the blowing up of the Amblève bridge at Stavelot, the defensive actions by the 30th Division at Stoumont and the destruction of the armored point of the 1st SS Panzer Division at La Gleize stand out as key elements in the defeat of the German army. I realize my view of the Bulge is myopic at best, but in my own defense I have revisited Belgium often (perhaps as many as 30 times) the first in 1952, the latest in June 2004. The visits were augmented by long telephone calls and long visits with Maj Gen McCown. From 1983 until his death in July 1999, I visited him three times in Little Rock, Arkansas and spoke with him many times on the phone for a total of perhaps 40 to 50 hours. The 30th Division arrived in Belgium to a horribly confused mess. The first night my battalion dug in, and we were told, ’There is thought to be one, maybe two panzer divisions in front of you. If they attack, let the tanks roll over you and shoot as many of the infantry as you can.’ I told my squad, ‘Lots of luck, boys.’ Later, on the 21st of December, the 2nd Battalion, 119th Infantry, led by (then) Major McCown, climbed a steep hill between Targon and Stoumont and walked in a curving path, arriving at its goal, the road connecting Stoumont and La Gleize. Here Major McCown decided to do a little exploring on his own and was captured. This action by McCown’s battalion was important because it convinced Peiper he was in danger of being cut off so that he retreated to La Gleize. McCown was kept for 90 hours as a prisoner of Lt Col Peiper, commanding the tank regiment of the 1st SS Panzer Division, the spearhead of the German army. McCown escaped the night of 24/25 December. His debriefing document makes interesting reading and gives one an insight into the character of not only Peiper and McCown, but also their troops. On 23/24 December the Germans left La Gleize, crossed the river and eventually rejoined the main body of the German army. After Peiper’s troops left, the 30th Division attacked. My company attacked with two platoons, one with six men and one with five. The T/O of these two platoons normally would have been a total of 82 men. Fortunately the battle was no battle. December 24th turned out to be a sunny, almost warm day. No significant burning of German equipment, no Germans stripped of their American uniforms standing naked in the freezing cold, no atrocities. It was a pretty calm, almost boring affair. Today there is an interesting museum in La Gleize, and Maj Gen McCown’s photograph is on the lecturn in the movie theater, and at the top of front stairs on the right is a photograph of some members of the 2nd Platoon, E Company, 119th Infantry taken in La Gleize about 10 a.m. on the 24 December. The final six weeks turned out to be anticlimactic, a slug fest whose final decision became increasingly obvious. Hans’s book is an important contribution to military history with much impressive documentation. I think his interest in the Bulge has given us detailed data on what really happened on both sides. I am pleased he asked me to write this foreword. Elmer S. Mc Kay E Company, 119th Infantry Regiment, 30th Infantry Division. Phoenix, Arizona October 2005 |
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